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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Throughout the past decade, major non-GCC countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa Region (MENA), also referred to as the “Arab Region” have undergone major 
structural changes and reforms in their political, legal, economic, military and social 
regimes. However, seven years ago, the trend of change took a serious and unprecedented 
diversion known as the “Arab Spring” and which has brought damaging security, 
economic and social repercussions and aftermaths on the Arab World in general. As a 
result, the long-awaited dream of Arab unity has been jeopardised more than ever. 
Nevertheless, history has proven that times of transition are times for change, and thus 
the current turbulent Arab situation could be utilised as the golden gate and one-time 
opportunity to achieve the desired transformation towards Arab economic integration and 
unification, which, if successful, could place the Arab World in pole positions along with 
global economic giants and gurus. This research represents a new regulatory approach to 
regional economic integration.  
The purpose of this research is to suggest legal, constitutional and structural frameworks 
for the creation of an Arab Economic Union. This research incorporates the findings of 
available and existing work on the various attempts of Arab economic integration, and it 
explores the development, failures and accomplishments in this sphere. In addition, the 
research fills into the gap of the existing work through exploring former experiences and 
suggesting a new innovative and speculative constitutional structure of the desired AEU. 
The research also displays the historic and current economic models and discusses the 
outcomes of main integration attempts. More importantly it suggests a comprehensive 
institutional structure for the desired AEU in a detailed manner, and observes economic 
operational liberty through the performance of currently existence trading blocs. 
Moreover, and in an unprecedented manner, this research discusses the role of Arab 
migrant workers’ remittances to enhance the development of the desired AEU. 
Over and above, the research demonstrates the New Arab Model through proposing the 
innovative “Shamgate Treaty” and argues that times of commotion, security instability 
and economic disorder pose the best time for change through economic unity based on 
common interests between member states, based on economic functionalism.  
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INTRODUCTION, RESEARCH SUMMARY and HYPOTHESES 
 
A. PROLEGOMENA and HYPOTHESES 
Reaching a state of economic unity amongst Arab countries, through the sound allocation 
of resources and skills in the most efficient and effective ways, to establish a self-
contained area by promoting the Arab citizens’ wealth and transforming the Arab power 
into a major force on the global level, has always been a dream and a far reached vision. 
 
Following the Arab countries’ independences through the declaration of sovereignty over 
their lands, the dilemma of creating an Arab union has always existed; since a full 
political integration or ARAB UNION would be the favourable state for Arabs, which 
could be highly marketable taking into consideration the successful unification examples 
which include the United States of America and the United Arab Emirates. On the other 
hand, a counter argument relies globally in the example of the Soviet Union and 
regionally the failure of previous attempts to establish the United Arab Republic1 when 
Egypt, through its president then, Nasser, established an Arab Union commencing in 
1958 between Syria and Egypt, it collapsed in 1961. This attempt was condemned to 
failure due to several factors which include Syrian internal refusal and Russian external 
veto, but most essentially the lack of proper organisation and disrespect to the hierarchy 
of economic integration through trading blocs. 
Based on historical chronology and major previous experiences, it has become essential 
to observe key facts, five of which are: 
I. Seeking full political integration among Arab states requires adopting the standard 
hierarchical “Free Trade” ladder in order to reach an economic union. 
II. An integrated economic union must meet the shared visions of Arab countries. 
III. Political, legal, economical and social factors must form the bases for any unity. 
IV. Security is regarded as the “essential prerequisite factor” to any unity initiative. 
V. Most importantly, any unification attempt must be based on a solid legal, regulatory 
and legislative structure, based on the conformity of relevant Arab laws.  
The Arab world witnessed drastic changes through major unprecedented uprisings and 
turbulence leading to the fall of long-standing regimes. It all started with the eruption of 
                                               
1 The United Arab Republic, (UAR) was a short-lived political union between Egypt and Syria from 1958 till 1961.  
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the Tunisian uprising and revolution2 which was directly followed by the Egyptian 
revolution. This led to the emergence of revolutionary councils to run the countries in 
phases of transition. The situation also resulted in noticeable commotion and insecurity in 
major states in the Arab World, where insecurities and wars have occurred. 
With the continuance of uprisings and wars, accompanied with undesirable atrocities, 
political regimes continue to fall, paralleled with attempts to develop new policies based 
on amended legal, regulatory, economic and fiscal patterns which are being formulated. 
 
As a result, this research (which was partially dependant on observing the previous 
efforts of now “fallen regimes”), has faced serious challenges as a result of the so called 
“Arab Spring”, due to many factors, including but not limited to the following: 
 
1. EGYPT, with its rich political heritage and its grand population is regarded as the 
heart of the Arab World and a nation which has experienced the Arab economic and 
political unity with Syria in the 1950s. Following the fall of the 35 years Egyptian 
long standing Mubarak regime, and the irreparable chaos and civil war taking place 
in SYRIA with major security threats and potential political, economical and legal 
transition, the target of unification seems to be far from a fetched goal at such times, 
and it remains to be seen whether the new regimes being formulated or the old still 
standing regimes will take any closer steps towards reaching Arab economic unity. 
 
2. SUDAN represents the most recent separation experience, in opposite direction of 
unification, characterised in the official split of Sudan in to two states4, where the 
non-Arab Republic of South Sudan have become the newest state on the world map. 
 
3. YEMEN on the other hand, which has succeeded in its unification endeavour after a 
long civil war, has recently undergone a change of regime, and as the events are 
evolving, voices of separation between the South and the North are vividly floating.  
                                               
2 The Tunisian Revolution was an intensive campaign of civil resistance, including a series of street demonstrations 
taking place in Tunisia. The events began on 18 December 2010 and led to the ousting of long time President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011 eventually, leading to what was seen by many a thorough democratization of the 
country and to free elections which marked the victory of a coalition of the Islamist Ennahda Movement at that time. 
 
4 
On July 9th 2011, and after decades of violence and on-and-off civil war Christian Sudanese in the south have split 
from their Muslim neighbours in the north to form the Republic of South Sudan; the world's newest country. The nation 
is the 193rd country recognized by the United Nations, and it is the 54th U.N. member state in Africa. Source: 
http://digitaljournal.com/article/308916#ixzz2N7kfqlHR 
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4. LIBYA, and within a similar context, previously under the leadership of the late 
Colonel Ghadafi, has taken a front position in terms of enhancing Arab Unity (in 
Ghadafi’s specific vision), a case which Ghadafi abandoned and resorted to Africa to 
lead the African Union. The most famous attempt was the Arab Islamic Republic5 
 
5. IRAQ, and in spite of governmental attempts to keep the country united, seemed to 
be heading towards a “Sudan-like split”, since the already autonomous Province of 
Kurdistan has repeatedly expressed intention to form the long-awaited state, whereby 
this was translated through a referendum, which was refused by Iraqi government. 
 
In light of the above, and based on the unprecedented transitions which continue to occur, 
the research has become more challenging and subject to impediments as a result of the 
significant changes which occurred, and more to come. Building a legal and regulatory 
framework must be strictly accompanied by political, economic and security stability, all 
of which are currently far from existing in a continuously chaotic Arab turbulent region. 
 
On the other hand, historical events have proven that there could be no better moment in 
history than the time of crises and even atrocities, to formulate and come up with bold 
and innovative ideas and initiatives to enhance development and establish progress. This 
could surely apply in the case of the Arab World, through adopting the suggestion to 
construct the legal framework to establish the Arab Economic Union, which leads to the 
ultimate goal of reaching a sustainable Arab unity based on elements of success. There is 
no doubt that the first favourable vehicle for change is the legal and regulatory one.  
 
As a result, a necessity emerges, to briefly discuss the mentioned, in order to transform 
challenges into opportunities by seeking best experimented courses of action. This may 
be accomplished through utilising the unfortunate wars in the region and capitalise on 
them to achieve desired results of economic unity, eventually targeting political unity. 
 
The main hypothesis that this research aims to present, observes whether placing a 
legal framework to establish the Arab Economic Union based on regional common 
interest and economic functionalism, will support forming the AEU as an ultimate 
solution for Arab economic and socio-political development towards full integration. 
                                               
5 Arab Islamic Republic was a proposed unification of Tunisia & Libya in 1974, agreed by Libyan Ruler Gaddafi and 
Tunisian Pres. Bourguiba. Morocco and Algeria were later included in the proposal, which was never implemented. 
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B. The “ARAB ECONOMIC UNION” – A REGULATORY UNI -VISION... 
Prior to discussing exploring further, the hypothesis for formulating a legal framework 
for the establishment or creation of an Arab Economic Union, a brief idea on some basics 
and specificities related to a “Union” versus a “Trading Bloc” will be presented. In 
addition, - light will be shed on the new vision for Arab unity, particularly spurred 
following the Arab Uprisings, which continue to storm the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region as these words are written. 
 
i) A Union versus a Trading Bloc 
A union is the incorporation of several sovereign states in full political integration to 
form one greater entity with a harmonised political and economic stand and a single ruler 
similar to the union of the states of America into the entity known as the United States of 
America (USA); this is usually referred to as a Political Union6.  
On the other hand, a trading bloc is the multi-layered economic integration, a state of 
affairs, or a process, involving the incorporation of various types of sovereign economies 
into a larger entity. In specific terms, it strives for cooperation among states and is 
concerned with removing all trade restrictions between the member nations and evolving 
certain elements of cooperation and coordination amongst them, similar to the case of the 
European Union (EU), or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with a 
lesser degree of harmonisation than what is present in the EU. A trading bloc does not 
require the unification of legislations and laws; however, one of the essential elements of 
a union’s structure is the conformity and harmonisation of laws and legislations on a wide 
level. Many unification experiences have witnessed a true harmonisation of laws while 
preserving the legal sovereignty through maintaining the local and domestic legislations 
which fall hierarchically under the union (or federation) laws and regulations. This 
formula could be perceived as a compromise and a lubricant to formulate a union while 
demolishing impediments connected to rigid legal and regulatory structures. 
Having said that, it is important to note that experiences have shown that the main 
impediments are mostly political ones which, when and if solved, tend to clear up the 
horizon for economic and legal barriers to be abolished as well. 
                                               
6 A political union is a type of state which is composed of or created out of smaller states. Unlike a personal union, the 
individual states share a central government and the union is recognized internationally as a single political entity. A 
political union may also be called a legislative union or state union. 
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ii) Arab “Post Crises” New Vision 
Following the global financial crisis and in light of the so called “Arab Spring”, also 
referred to as “Arab Uprising”, the process of observing the major themes in terms of pre 
and post global financial crisis and their effect on developing new regional programs in 
the MENA Region in order to suggest a framework, mainly legal, to establish the Arab 
Economic Union, has proven to be a “Now or Never” scenario. 
It is believed that the connection between the Arab Spring, seen by some as a political 
and social reaction to the austerity, corruption and dictatorship in Arab countries, and the 
unification attempts post financial crisis are debatable. As a result, an initiative to 
establish an Arab Economic Union, especially from a regulatory and constitutional 
perspective, should be handled with ultimate prudence and concrete planning to avoid a 
similar situation which has recently hit the EU as a result of the Brexit, and the anti-
austerity movements in Greece7, which may spur an ongoing ripple effect of crisis. The 
creation of an Arab Economic Union (AEU) results in reaching a status of unification 
between Arab countries where all Arab resources and skills can be deployed in the most 
efficient way to establish a self-sufficient region that promotes the Arab citizens’ wealth 
and transforms the Arab power into a major global force. It is a test which has neither 
been properly taken nor evaluated, and an initiative which never left its infancy stage. 
 
iii) Common factors enhancing the status of the union: 
Along with the oil rich Arab Gulf states, most Arab countries generally possess an 
adequate reserve of natural resources which include mineral salts, natural gas, oil, 
phosphate (with its uranium deposit), marble, iron, copper, coal and water amongst many 
other factors. In addition, all the Arab countries share the same Arabic language while 
enjoying a second international language namely English and/or French. More 
                                               
7 The Greek government-debt crisis is one of a number of current European sovereign-debt crises and is believed to 
have been caused by a combination of structural weaknesses of the Greek economy coupled with the incomplete 
economic, tax and banking unification of the European Monetary Union. In late 2009, fears of a sovereign debt crisis 
developed among investors concerning Greece's ability to meet its debt obligations due to strong increase in 
government debt levels. This led to a crisis of confidence, indicated by a widening of bond yield spreads and the cost of 
risk insurance on credit default swaps compared to the other countries in the Eurozone, most importantly Germany.  
The downgrading of Greek government debt to junk bond status in April 2010 created alarm in financial markets, with 
bond yields rising so high, that private capital markets practically were no longer available for Greece as a funding 
source. On 2 May 2010, the Euro zone countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed on a €110 billion 
bailout loan for Greece, conditional on compliance with the following three key points: 
1. Implementation of austerity measures, to restore the fiscal balance. 
2. Privatization of government assets worth €50bn by the end of 2015, to keep the debt pile sustainable. 
3. Implementation of outlined structural reforms, to improve competitiveness and growth prospects. 
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importantly, the Arab countries share the same religious beliefs were the dominant 
religion is Islam and the second religion is Christianity with a huge gap in numbers. 
Other religions exist in minority groups including Judaism in Yemen and Morocco and 
Zoroastrianism in Iraq.  
Most importantly, the vast majority of Arab countries share common laws and 
legislations due to the similar sources of legislations. To be more specific, the Arab 
States’ legislations are derived either from the Islamic Sharia’a which is purely based on 
the holy Quran texts, or originate from former colonial legal systems which vary between 
the British Anglo-Saxon legal system and the French civil Latin legal system. Such 
uniformity of laws and regulations, particularly economic laws, makes it more efficient 
and systematic to formulate a legal framework to achieve the Arab Economic Unity. 
 
iv) Post crisis lessons and challenges 
Following the brief reference to the connection between the Global Crisis and the Arab 
Spring, namely the impact of austerity policies, one can derive that the culture of markets 
is shifting. Despite the fact that modern markets have played a widely acceptable role in 
the global economy, the last few years have revealed the gaps and lifted the lid off the 
dangers and instabilities of such markets. This has led to the provision of more education 
in economic, financial and regulatory fields about copious new elements that were not 
previously surfaced, to an extent that reveals that the monetary policies adopted were 
insufficient, the financial modelling was faulty, and therefore credit rating agencies were 
all at fault, due to the false and inaccurate information provided to them for evaluation. 
This resulted in unveiling many challenges and revealed important lessons to overcome 
such challenges, all of which will be discussed in the course of Chapter 1 of this research. 
In the same context, and to a certain extent, we have witnessed the Arab world surviving 
the global financial crisis, not necessarily due to its agility, but more likely due to failure 
to catch up with the global economic developments, which played as a positive factor as 
it delayed and weakened the effect of the credit crunch and the sub-prime crisis. 
However, this crisis has caused fundamental revision and review of how markets 
(domestic, regional and international) are operated, governed and regulated; these have 
also produced “Lessons to Learn”, to be further explained in the first chapter, while 
looking at regional post crisis models. 
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C. RESEARCH METHEDOLOGY 
The research for the purpose of this study was planned to be carried out mainly through 
desktop research, making use of the material existing at various libraries and academic 
databases. Thus, the study aims, in its essence, at wide breadth documents and materials. 
 
An important methodological tool is using comparative assessment of the jurisprudence 
available in the Arab states and the Arab unification initiatives on one hand and the 
western unification success stories on the other hand. In addition, conducting comparative 
assessments between the existing global economic and political unions comprise 
important tools for this study. 
 
To be more specific, the nature of this research required resorting to several methods 
including, but not limited to:  
 
1) Theoretical: Due to the legal and economical nature of the research, many 
economic theories were examined. Here, the available literature mostly relates to 
the field of legal, economic and financial theories; some of those theories have been 
relegated by the recent sub-prime crisis and “Arab Spring” or “uprising” in a more 
factual term, while other theories have further emerged. 
 
2) Empirical: Since the research involves all the countries and states in the MENA 
region in their different formations and systems, it requires various anticipated data 
collection instruments (e.g. interviews, observations, documentary analysis), but 
most importantly, field research, which falls within the main administration and 
conveyance of the research; some interviews which were conducted with 
professionals in the legal, economic, financial, political and social realms, in 
different countries across the MENA Region were not used as a result of the Arab 
Spring and its impact on these individuals8. In addition, visits to Arab Middle 
Eastern countries were planned to stand on the facts that would be used as data for 
the research, as well as maintaining all the updates related to the research. 
                                               
8 Many interviews were conducted with politicians from Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Sudan. A number of those 
have passed away while others have been indicted as part of the fallen regimes. 
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3) Secondary or desk research: Desk research was also essential for this research. 
The collating and analysis of secondary data in the form of desk research, in order 
to compile the data that already exists and may be found or published by another 
party and readily available.  
 
4) Case studies: Case studies play an important factor in this research, due to the 
experiences undergone by countries on the national level. Countries of the Arab 
Spring represented the majority of the case studies, especially that most of them 
have undergone attempts of unification initiatives, some of which have succeeded 
while others have failed. 
 
5) Library based: Literature examined for the purpose of this research was found in 
legal text books, journals and reviews, in addition to economic and legal journals, 
special report, thematic studies as well as trusted media sources and documentaries. 
 
6) Existing literature review: This is a main pillar of my methodology, derived from 
the library based and internet research. This tool includes the critical examination, 
summarization, interpretation or evaluation of existing literature in order to 
establish current knowledge on what is available on Arab economic integration and 
the legal and regulatory frameworks or structures that were involved to facilitate it.  
 
7) Qualitative research: Qualitative research was essential for this study, as it helped 
to gain insights concerning attitudes, beliefs, motivations and behaviours; and 
included methods such as observation research, case studies and special interviews.  
 
8) Quantitative research: Quantitative research was also essential, especially since 
this study is concerned with measurement of attitudes, behaviours and perceptions 
and includes interviewing methods such as telephonic and personal interviews. 
 
More importantly the research examines some relevant laws, regulations and legislations 
in the Arab world; it identifies the related problems and proposed solutions, which is also 
obtained from interviews and surveys. Issues of orientation have dealt with laws, stages 
of legal reform, and projected policy changes and tailored solutions. 
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OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS: 
 
Chapter (1) is a “historical background study” which begins with a description of the 
economic and financial global crisis in the First Section, while the Second Section 
discusses the historic and current models of trading blocs and global economic 
integration models. The Third Section observes the previous and scheduled attempts to 
establish economic Arab unity, followed by the Fourth Section which explores the 
incentives, challenges and opportunities to create a legal and financial order from the eye 
of the Arab Spring which is claimed to be the result of political and social reaction to the 
austerity and corruption. In general, the overall ideas in Chapter (1) are organized in 
terms of (1) Exploring what currently exists, (2) Identifying problems, (3) Identifying 
challenges, (4) Suggesting ways of challenges’ management, and (5) Concluding ideas. 
 
Chapter (2) adopted a study with an economic approach from a regulatory point of 
view. Section (1) of this chapter observes the application of trading blocs towards 
creating a Trade Union. It is followed by Section (2) providing a vivid distinction of the 
movement of factors of production (Capital, People, Services and Products). Afterwards, 
it discusses the first serious step towards full integration, being the creation of a “Trade 
Union” within the Arab region, especially with reference to the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) and EU models as favourable models from an institutional point of view. 
 
Chapter (3) suggests the Institutional Structure of the Arab Economic Union, since it 
details the actual construction of the union. All factors and elements of the organisational 
structure are detailed from a substance, technical and logistical perspective. In essence, it 
discusses the structure of all elements including membership, location, administration, 
management, organisational structure, hierarchy, functions, objectives, partnerships and 
other relevant elements.  
In this chapter, there is an attempt to place Arab economic integration in its proper frame 
in terms of the composition and structure by looking at unions of similar functions around  
the world, while taking into account the Arab specificities and culture. In addition, this 
chapter describes the structure of the suggested newly established bodies within the Arab 
Economic Union with their different functions and roles. 
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Chapter (4) considers Lebanon as a case study and a “Lesson to Learn” due to the fact 
that it tops the ranking (versus Gross Domestic Product - GDP) of recipient of 
remittances in the Arab World. It focuses on the role of the Arab migration power and 
the importance of Arab workers’ remittances in the advancement of economic unity. 
The First Part presents information on the state of remittance inflows to Lebanon to 
provide an understanding on how the matter of remittances is handled at all levels, 
namely by addressing the regulatory and legislative position. The comprehensive 
research undertaken on remittances in Lebanon aims at proposing policies and programs 
in the form of policy recommendations, in an attempt to enhance the impact of 
remittances on financing sustainable economic development in the country, and create a 
lesson for other Arab countries, and as a supporting tool along their path to establish an 
Arab Economic Union. Part Two of this chapter, which comes in a form of a factual 
report about remittances and its stakeholders, was based on the conviction, which applies 
to all Arab countries (in our case Lebanon), that recipient countries suffered from lacking 
a proper infrastructure for migration, including the remittances factor of course. The 
chapter is concluded with general and policy recommendations to deploy Arab workers’ 
remittances as a vehicle to support the establishment of an Arab Economic Union. 
 
Chapter (5) deals in a direct approach, with the creation of an Arab monetary union. The 
main aim behind this chapter is to test Arab readiness for the creation of proper trading 
blocs at a national level(s). An emphasis on monetary integration towards a single 
currency is also presented. At the end of this Chapter, there is highlight on the application 
of some articles from the Maastricht Treaty to utilise them in the favour of the Arab 
economic unification initiative. It also aims at the suggestion of the New Arab Solution 
through the proposal of the “New Model”. The base of this chapter is of legal and 
regulatory nature. The first section discusses the signing of a “Maastricht-like” treaty 
amongst the Arab States, which will be followed by an innovative proposal to create the 
“SHAMGATE Treaty” which is the equivalence of the EU Schengen Agreement. This 
chapter also explores the enhancement of domestic laws, legislations and regulations in 
order to promote for the implementation process of economic integration, especially that 
any legal framework for the unification process cannot take place without the conformity 
of the existing national laws in the sphere on a large Arab legal and legislative sphere. 
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CHAPTER (1) 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
1.A The Arab World 
      The Arab world referred to in Arabic as (Al A’lam Al Arabi) consists of 22 countries9 
with a high population density of about 400 million10 citizens. From a geographical 
perspective, the Arab states spread out in two main regions, (i) the Asian part and (ii) the 
larger African part. The Arab states extend from (a) the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the 
Arabian Sea in the east, and (b) from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the Horn of 
Africa and the Indian Ocean in the southeast. According to (Khan, 2013)11, the Arab 
world covers a total area of 14,291,469 km2  which is around 10.2% of the world’s land 
mass, 72.45% is located in Africa and 27.55% is located in Asia, while the distance from 
east to west of the Arab World is 6,000 Kilometres and 4,000 Kilometres from north to 
south. 
 
From a cultural aspect, the Arab states may be divided into six districts as follows:  
1. The Levant “Al - Mashriq” which includes the Republic of Lebanon, the State of 
Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
2. The “Persian Gulf” which includes the oil rich states of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the State of Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, the 
Kingdom of Bahrain and the State of Kuwait. 
3. The “Maghreb” which includes the Kingdom of Morocco, the Republic of Algeria, 
the Republic of Tunisia, the Republic of Libya and the Republic of Mauritania. 
4. The Bab-el-Mandeb which includes the Republic of Yemen, the Republic of 
Somalia and Djibouti, and the Indian Ocean that includes the Comoros Islands. 
5. The Nile Valley which includes the fertile lands of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the 
Republic of Sudan, and the Republic of Iraq. 
                                               
9  See UN. (2017). Demographic Yearbook 2011: Population by sex, annual rate of population increase, surface area 
and density. Retrieved from UN Stats: 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2011/notes/notes03.pdf 
 
10 The number may well exceed 400 million citizens since the phenomenon of not registering births or delaying such 
registration is quite common in many rural underprivileged areas in a number of Arab countries.  
11 See Khan, Z.-I. (2013, April 2). The Arab World – an Arab perspective. The Milli Gazette, 1-2. 
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In his lecture at the Islamic university, “The Arab World – an Arab perspective”, Zafarul-
Islam Khans said the British coined the term “Middle East” around 1850, and since 
“Middle East” does not cover the whole Arab region, they have added North Africa to it 
(to become Middle East & North Africa – MENA) a term preferred by the American 
administration in a conscious effort to avoid using the word “Arab”, in Khans’ opinion.  
All Arab countries share the same Arabic language as a unifying feature of the Arab 
world, with the majority of them having a second language namely French due to the 
colonization period mostly during the first half of the 20th century. The English language 
however is increasingly becoming the dominant second language in the Arab world 
especially since it is the recognized prime international language for business, and the 
common language for tourism. In addition, other languages are found in the Arab world 
spoken by minorities such as Armenian in Lebanon and Syriac in Syria, in addition to 
other dialects. On the religious level, the vast majority of people in the Arab World 
adhere to Islam and the religion has official status in most countries, with the second 
religion being Christianity which does not exceed 5% of the Arab population. Other 
religions exist in minority groups like Judaism in Yemen, Palestine and Morocco, and 
Zoroastrianism in Iraq. While some Arab countries have substantial reserves of natural 
resources like mineral salt, natural gas, petroleum, phosphate, marble, iron, copper, coal 
and water, the Persian Gulf is particularly well-endowed with this strategic raw material; 
namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar are among the top ten oil or gas 
exporters in the world. Other countries such as Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Sudan all have smaller but significant reserves, with Lebanon on the verge 
of extracting substantial amount of gas reserves planned to start in the year (2018). Such 
facts and other events have had significant impacts on regional geopolitics, leading to 
economic disparities between oil-rich and oil-poor Arab countries, and particularly, in the 
more heavily populated states of the Persian Gulf and Libya, triggering extensive labour 
immigration. 
Figure (1): Reveals a basic map of the Arab World or the MENA Region; 
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1.B Table (1.1): List of Arab countries and territories (In population order) 
 
 
Country/ 
dependent 
territory) 
July 1, 2015 
projection13 
% of 
pop. 
Avg. 
relative 
annual 
growth   
(%) 
Avg. 
absolute 
annual 
growth  
Est. 
doubli
ng 
time 
(Yrs) 
Official 
figure 
(where 
available) 
Approx. 
date of 
  last 
figure 
 Total 389,373,000 100.00 2.36 8,995,000 30   
1 Egypt 90,045,700 22.73 2.29 1,981,000 31 93,164,000 May 2017 
2 Algeria 40,100,000 10.25 2.07 808,000 34 40,400,000 Jan  2016 
3 Sudan14 38,435,000 9.87 3.07 1,146,000 23 38,435,252   Feb 2015 
4 Iraq 36,575,000 9.39 2.90 1,030,000 24 36,575,000 Mar 2015 
5 Morocco 33,680,000 8.65 1.24 412,000 56 33,337,529 Sep 2014 
6 KSA 31,521,000 8.10 2.44 751,000 29 31,521,418 May 2015 
7 Yemen 26,745,000 6.87 2.95 766,000 24 24,527,000 Jul  2012 
8 Syria 23,270,000 5.98 2.45 557,000 29 21,377,000 Dec 2011 
9 Tunisia 11,118,000 2.86 1.04 114,000 67 10,982,754 Apr 2014 
10 Somalia 10,972,000 2.82 1.54 166,000 45 12,316,895 Jan 2014 
11 UAE 9,500,000 2.76 2.75 183,000 26 9,500,000 Sep 2015 
12 Jordan 8,933,000 2.29 1.57 138,000 45 9,531,712 Nov 2015 
13 Libya 6,278,000 0.54 1.13 70,000 62 5,298,152 Apr 2006 
14 Palestine15 4,683,000 1.20 2.92 133,000 24 4,550,368  May 2014 
15 Lebanon 4,288,000 1.10 1.78 75,000 39 4,965,846 Dec 2013 
16 Oman 4,181,000 1.07 5.13 204,000 14 4,295,200 May 2017 
17 Kuwait 4,161,000 1.07 3.00 121,000 23 4,183,658 Jun 2015 
18 
Mauritania 
3,632,000 0.93 2.43 86,000 29 3,718,678 Jan 2016 
19 Qatar 2,113,000 0.54 4.29 87,000 16 2,412,483 Oct 2015 
20 Bahrain 1,781,000 0.46 7.35 122,000 10 1,234,571 Apr 2010 
21 Djibouti 961,000 0.25 2.67 25,000 26 864,618 Jul  2011 
22 Comoros 783,000 0.20 2.62 20,000 27 806,200 Jul  2016 
 
 
                                               
13 Calculated, when available, from the latest national censuses or most recent official estimates using the exponential 
formula shown on the List of countries by past and future population article. This is done to normalize the different 
populations to a unique date, so that they are really comparable.  
See Wikipedia. (2017). List of Arab countries by population. Retrieved from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Arab_countries_by_population 
 
14 Also known as North Sudan since South Sudan's independence and officially the Republic of the Sudan.  
See The World Factbook: Sudan. (2011). U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
 
15 It comprises the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, separated between each other by Israel. 
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1.C Impact of globalisation and economic integration among Arab Countries 
 
The phenomenon of globalisation, according to Primorac16, marked with rapid 
technological innovations, deregulation and elimination of physical, fiscal/financial and 
technical barriers, increasing homogenization of tastes and attitudes and predictive 
uncertainty are among the factors that underlay the importance of emerging the new 
economic integration approach and relationships among bloc of countries.  
The main reason is that most countries and organisations cannot always have the 
resources or know-how to cope with increasingly complex global environments from 
internal resources alone.  
 
At the fourth Nordic Conference on Middle Eastern Studies “The Middle East on 
Globalizing World” held in Oslo in August 1998, (Zineldin, 1998) stated that “an 
economic alliance or network based on cooperation, collaboration, flexibility, 
adaptation, risk and cost reduction, shared interest and objectives, closeness, openness, 
and a commitment between different countries on an integrating ongoing basis, has been 
emerged as a more effective approach to meet the new global environmental challenges 
and opportunities. The nature of these economic integration relationships usually results 
in achieving synergy effects18”. (End of quotation)  
 
The whole world is currently witnessing a leap in the economic and political equations. 
Globally, groups of countries are adopting economic defensive mechanisms, through 
joining together in trade blocs with an aim to develop them into economic blocs. Such 
groups also seek to increase their influence in their own areas as well as outside it.  
While Europe has adopted a solid model, the Far East has already established its own 
regional trade agreements and free trade zones. In the same context, the Asian countries 
have already adopted necessary protective measures to secure their strength on the global 
economic, financial and political arenas.  
                                               
16 See  Marina Primorac. (2012). IMF Survey: The Global Village: Connected World Drives Economic Shift. IMF 
NEWS. 
 
18 See Zineldin, M. (1998). Globalisation and economic integration among Arab countries. The Middle East in 
globalizing world (p. 3). Oslo: Växjo University. 
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With the wave of the Arab rapid change of regimes, through the so called “Arab Spring / 
Uprising” which has taken the form of military conflicts, and the world’s governments 
trying to revitalize their economies by drastic reforms and/or by enacting laws that 
streamline existing systems, the need of economic blocs have become more demanding.  
 
In the case of the Arab world also known as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA 
Region)20, the future awaits the Arabs, and it remains to be seen whether the drastic 
changes will bring positive repercussions, all of which could depend on how shrewdly 
and how effectively an economic strategy is formulated and executed. Such a strategy is 
essential in order to match the policies of other already existing economic blocs.  
 
A single country, standing alone, could never hope to achieve anything against a large 
economic bloc; it compares to as a plane trying to defeat a fleet. It has become evident 
that unorganized countries will be obliged, whether they akin to it or not, to follow the 
dictates of the large economic blocs, if they do not start planning to create their own.  
 
Against these trends and in order to provide an effective counter to European, Asian, or 
US designs, the immediate formation of an Arab Common Market becomes a most 
pressing imperative. There is no much choice, either Arabs can get their acts together or 
they will remain bystanders, watching the participants in the world trade system and 
globalisation movements move forward by leaps and bounds, while they are left behind.  
 
Globalisation of western countries can cause more problems and crisis for the developing 
countries, if these countries are not able to compete or cooperate with developed 
countries. The existing economic blocs create a more unbalanced economic situation 
which may increase the tension between the south and the north. These blocs would have 
an extremely prominent and powerful position as guiders and advisers in Arab countries.  
The main dilemma is that Arab countries often compete with each other rather than 
cooperate with each other. Thus, one could not assume that the current circumstances of 
                                               
20 See Larbi, H. (2016, May). Rewriting the Social Contract: Toward Inclusive Development Toward Inclusive 
Development. Retrieved from Belfer Center: 
http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Rewriting%20Arab%20Social%20Contract%20Final_opt.pd
f 
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Arab or Islamic countries are favourable for the creation of (Zineldin, 1998) an Arab or 
Islamic form (Islamic Sharia’a21) of economic integration. Arab countries have a sheer 
need to cooperate, build up confidence and alliances with each others to achieve some 
synergy effects and to be able to create the required economic balance in the global era. 
Without socio-economic integration amongst Arab countries the changes of an 
interdependence relationship between westerners and Arabs are quite low. Certainly, the 
increased dependence on western countries or blocs is not to the benefit of Arab states.  
 
Following the latest global sub-prime crisis, which the Arab world managed to avoid its 
worst repercussions, the MENA region emerged as a capital exporting region showing 
real stamina when required. Many believe that there is no better time for Arabs to take 
their quantum leap by joining efforts, resources and strengths, not only to succeed 
economically, but to reach the state of full political unity at some point, which will bring 
for Arabs the dynasty which they have enjoyed for hundreds of years prior to the (Sykes-
Pico Accord) executed in 1916 during WWI, from a more cultural, economic, scientific 
and regulatory perspective.  
 
Section (1): Economic and Financial Crisis 
1.1 Global Perspective of crisis 
1.1.1 Introduction to the Sub-prime Global Financial Crisis22 
The financial crisis of 2007 - 2008, also known as the global financial crisis and 
the Lehman Brothers financial crisis, is considered by most economists and experts 
to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930. It resulted 
in the threat of total collapse of large financial institutions and markets, the bailout 
of banks by their national governments, and downturns in stock markets around the 
world. In many areas, the housing market also suffered, resulting in evictions, 
foreclosures and prolonged unemployment, and the global economies still suffers.  
                                               
21 See Zineldin, M. 1998. Globalisation and economic integration among Arab countries. Oslo, Växjo Uni, p.5.  
 
22 See David Pendery, 2010. Two top economists agree 2009 worst financial crisis since great depression; risks 
increase if right steps are not taken, s.l.: Reuters. 
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The crisis played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in 
consumer wealth estimated in trillions of US dollars, and a downturn in economic 
activity leading to the 2008 - 2013 global recession and contributing to the 
European sovereign-debt crisis.  
 
The bursting of the U.S. housing bubble, which peaked in 2006, caused the values 
of securities tied to U.S. real estate pricing to plummet, damaging financial 
institutions globally. The financial crisis was triggered by a complex interaction of 
policies that encouraged home ownership, providing easier access to loans for 
subprime borrowers, overvaluation of bundled sub-prime mortgages based on the 
theory that housing prices would continue to escalate, questionable trading 
practices on behalf of both buyers and sellers, compensation structures that 
prioritize short-term deal flow over long-term value creation, and a lack of 
adequate capital holdings from banks and insurance companies to back the 
financial commitments they were making. Questions regarding bank solvency, 
declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact on 
global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 
2009. Economies worldwide slowed during this period, as credit tightened and 
international trade declined Governments and central banks responded with serious 
fiscal stimulus, monetary policy expansion and institutional bailouts.  
In the U.S., Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009. In the EU, the UK responded with austerity measures of spending cuts and 
tax increases without export growth and it has since slid into a double-dip 
recession.  
 
Many causes of the financial crisis have been suggested, with varying weight 
assigned by experts. The U.S. Senate's Levin–Coburn Report23 asserted that the 
crisis was the result of "high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed 
conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the 
market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street."  
                                               
23 See Boundless. (2016). Politics and the Great Recession of 2008. Retrieved from Boundless: 
https://www.boundless.com/political-science/textbooks/boundless-political-science-textbook/economic-policy-
16/politics-and-economic-policy-104/politics-and-the-great-recession-of-2008-556-5848/ 
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1.1.2 Countries worst hit by the Crisis  
According to (McCormick, 2012)24, in his research on the impact of economic 
crisis, very few countries have escaped the repercussions of the collapse of the 
financial markets, and while some economies have relatively escaped the crisis, it 
remains necessary to point out that many countries were strongly struck by it. 
Logically, the majority of the countries which were hit most were those already 
struggling to keep their economies intact. Nevertheless, even the most solid 
economies could not remain safeguarded from the impacts of the crisis.  
 
In an article written for Forbes, (Zumbrun, Joshua, 2009) attempted to identify the 
10 countries hit hardest by the downturn through resorting to data available from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to create a “Misery Index25” which builds 
up on the gross domestic product, inflation rate and purchasing power parity. This 
“Misery Index” points out the countries with the fastest shrinking economies, the 
worst inflation rates and diminishing purchasing power from 2008 to 2010, by 
resorting to data and estimates from the IMF. The common standard used for 
depression is an economic decline by more than 10%. By that standard, five 
countries in the world have faced full-fledged depression.  
 
The index identified the following ten countries as being the worst hit by the crisis 
in accordance to the above-mentioned criteria. These are Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, 
Jamaica, Latvia, Lithuania, Seychelles, Singapore, Ukraine and Venezuela. 
However, Forbes criteria may have lacked main elements which include 
unemployment and foreign direct investment, and thus the countries selected do 
not necessarily qualify as being hit the most by the crisis. 
 
The global credit crunch pushed many developed economies to failure. In 
addition, several multinational investment banks that used to dominate the 
                                               
24 See McCormick, L. (2012). 8 Countries Hit Hardest by the Global Financial Crisis. Retrieved from Two Pennies 
Earned: http://twopenniesearned.blogspot.com/2009/08/8-countries-hit-hardest-by-global.html 
 
25 See Zumbrun, Joshua. (2009). The World's Hardest-Hit Economies. Forbes. 
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financial scene disappeared and of course “Lehman Brothers”26 will never drop 
from our minds. The global financial market became so condensed with bizarre 
financial instruments created by so called intelligent financial engineers. Add to 
that the insanity that took form in the real-estate sector, which certainly played a 
major role in the creation of the financial bubble. 
This was considered by many, in their objective judgment as a combination of 
negligence, financial ignorance and imprecise information from internal rating 
agencies and bad risk management from the banks themselves. As a result 
enormous defaults have occurred with irreparable impacts on main sectors.  
 
1.2 Impact of Crisis on the MENA Region   
1.2.1 MENA countries and different impacts of the crisis: 
At the MENA region level, it was quite surprising, that several Arab countries were 
not adversely affected by the crisis owing to the fact that these countries lacked the 
adequate integration in the global financial system and in the global economy. 
Nevertheless, countries such as the United Arab Emirates which stands as the 
economic hub of the Arab region witnessed great crisis related depression. 
 
Therefore, and to a large extent, the Arab World was less affected by the latest 
financial crisis which hit almost every corner of the globe. The MENA Region 
managed to evade some of the impacts due to two main reasons; Firstly, the Arabs 
possession of significant foreign reserves and liquidity generated from petroleum 
exports, which has created an economic buffer zone and a sponge for the crisis. 
Secondly, it was owed to the delay of the Arab economy to catch up with the pace of 
the economic and financial evolution; this matter has proven its merit since such 
delay has saved the Arab region from the most negative impacts of the global 
                                               
26 “Lehman Brothers was a global financial services firm. Before declaring bankruptcy in 2008, Lehman was the 
fourth-largest investment bank in the United States (behind Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch), 
doing business in investment banking, equity and fixed-income sales and trading (especially U.S. Treasury securities), 
research, investment management, private equity, and private banking. Lehman was operational for 158 years from its 
founding in 1850 until 2008”. 
 
See Dubofsky, M. (2013). The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Business, Labor, and Economic History. In M. 
Dubofsky. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
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financial crisis. During the past few years, the Arab world was hit by a “spring” 
which had all the signs of a bleak “winter”. In spite of the fact that dictatorship long 
standing regimes have fallen, the MENA region is still witnessing unprecedented 
commotion and major economic falls. Thus, and while most Arab states managed to 
avoid the extreme direct destructive impacts of the crisis, the Arab uprisings which 
started in 2010 have led to much more severe repercussions on the Arab financial, 
economic, social and political structures, whereby the wellbeing and safety of Arab 
individuals and entities were and are still seriously compromised. 
 
1.2.2 Impact of crisis on oil export industry, Private Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), and doing of business in the MENA countries: 
Unlike the rest of the Arab countries affected by the crisis, the capital exporting and 
oil producing countries were less affected by the impacts of the crisis with the 
exception of the United Arab Emirates, due to the fact that high oil reserves managed 
to contain the aftershocks. In addition to that, the countries with the highest oil 
production comprise a unified custom union, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
which has succeeded in maintaining its economic solid status even during times of 
crisis, and thus managed to avoid being struck hard by the crisis. 
 
Section (2): Historic and current models of trading blocs and economic integration 
models on the global level 
 
2.1 Introduction to Economic Unions and Trading Blocs as types of economic 
cooperation 
 
2.1.1 Economic Union 
According to (Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), 
1999)27, the economic union is a common market with provisions for the 
harmonisation of certain economic policies, particularly macroeconomic and 
regulatory. Currently, the EU is the best standing example of an economic union. 
                                               
27 See Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), 1999. Economic Union , s.l.: Glossary of 
Insurance Policy Terms, OECD, Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members. 
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It is necessary to observe the advantages and disadvantages of the Economic Union, 
namely the European Union in order to realize the importance of seeking the 
establishment of an Arab Economic Union.  
 
2.1.1.1 Advantages of an economic union: 
a. Elimination of transaction costs: 
 Firms will save costs while buying and selling foreign currencies to do 
business within the union, which implies increasing profitability for the 
union’s firms and businesses.  
b. Price transparency: 
 Firms and households often find it difficult to accurately compare the 
prices of goods, services and resources across a given region because of 
the distorting effects of exchange rate differences, this discourages trade. 
According to economic theories, prices should act as a mechanism to 
allocate resources in an optimal way, as to improve economic efficiency.  
c. Eliminating uncertainty due to exchange rate fluctuations: 
 Several firms become wary when investing in other countries because of 
the uncertainty caused by the fluctuating currencies in the union. 
Investment would rise in the economic union / area as the currency is 
universal within the area; therefore, the anxiety usually caused by 
exchange rate fluctuations, which previously existed will be diminished. 
d. Single currency in single market: 
 Trade and all other relevant factors tend to operate more effectively and 
efficiently with a single currency in the market, as the case is in the EU. 
e. War avoidance: 
 An economic union is a prerequisite towards political integration. Such 
step could be the key factor for war prevention. It is commonly known 
that countries which engage in efficient and productive mutual trade 
transactions are less likely to engage in military conflicts and wars. On 
the contrary, they try to form military alliances to build up protectionism 
to their union, since any attack on one of them would reflect negatively 
on the rest of them, especially on economic, fiscal and monetary levels.   
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f. Increased trade and reduced costs to firms: 
 Promoters of integration argue that in addition to bringing considerable 
economic trade through the wiping out of exchange rate fluctuations (as 
mentioned in point ‘c’), it also facilitates lowering costs to industry since 
companies avoid buying foreign exchange for use within the union.  
g. Political solidarity: 
 Although countries usually prefer to maintain their sovereignty through 
avoiding accession into political unions, the fact remains that the merits 
of a political union, if well structured, are far beyond the demerits. This is 
conditional upon the concrete regulatory and legislative formula adopted. 
 
2.1.1.2 Disadvantages of an economic union 
a. Potential system instability: 
There are many examples on the potential system instability that an 
economic union creation might cause. However, perhaps the clearest 
example relates to the United Kingdom (UK) joining the ERM28 
(Exchange Rate Mechanism). Throughout most of the 1980s the UK 
refused to join the ERM. It argued that it would be impossible to 
maintain exchange rate stability within the ERM, especially in the early 
80s when the Sterling Pound was a petro-currency and when the UK 
inflation rate was consistently above that of Germany. When the UK 
joined the ERM in 1990 there had been three years of relative currency 
stability in Europe and it looked as though the system had become 
relatively robust. The events of September 1992, when the UK and Italy 
were forced to leave the system, showed that the system was much less 
robust than it had been thought to be. 
b. Over estimation of trade benefits 
Some economists argue that the trade and cost advantages of an 
economic union have been overestimated. There is little to gain from 
moving from a common market or a monetary union which has some 
stability built into it, to the rigidities which an economic union brings. 
                                               
28 See Potts, N., 2009. Economic and Monetary Unioin , Southamton : Southamton University . 
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c. Decrease in sovereignty indications: 
On the political side, it is argued that an independent central bank is 
undemocratic. Governments must be able to control the actions of the 
central banks because governments have been democratically elected by 
the people, whereas an independent central bank would be controlled by 
a non-elected board or body. Moreover, there would be a considerable 
loss of national monetary sovereignty. This would be highly undesirable 
because national governments would lose the ability to control policy.  
d. Deflationary tendencies: 
Perhaps the most important economic argument relates to the 
deflationary tendencies within the system. For example, in the 1980s and 
90's, France succeeded in reducing its inflation rates to German levels, 
but at the cost of higher unemployment. For the UK, it can be argued, 
that membership of the ERM between 1990 and 1992 prolonged 
unnecessarily the recessional period. This is because the adjustment 
mechanism acts rather like that of the gold standard. Higher inflation in 
one ERM country means that it is likely to generate current account 
deficits and put downward pressure on its currency. To reduce the deficit 
and reduce inflation, the country has to deflate its economy. This may 
well apply on Arab countries upon the formulation of an AEU. 
e. Regulatory discrepancies: 
One of the most superseding obstacles is of regulatory nature. 
Notwithstanding the fact that economic unity may well ease up the 
regulatory standardization, such matter remains to be an impediment. In 
our current days, we still witness regulatory, policy, constitutional and 
legislative discrepancies within one country and one nation; therefore 
such elements’ standardisation pose a serious challenge, and if such 
standardisation is accomplished, it will pave the way to a healthy, 
consistent and prolonged unity, since the rule of law comes on the top of 
hierarchical structure of all unification factors. 
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2.1.2 Trading Bloc 
According to (Nergiz, 2014), a trade bloc can be defined as a ‘Preferential Trade 
Agreement’ (PTA)29 between a subset of countries, designed to significantly reduce 
or remove trade barriers within member countries. When a trade bloc comprises of 
neighbouring or geographically close countries, it is referred to as a ‘Regional 
Trade (or integration) Agreement’. It is sometimes also referred to as a ‘natural’ 
trade bloc to underline that the preferential trade is between countries that have 
presumably low transport costs or trade intensively with one another. The two 
principal characteristics of a trade bloc are that: (1) it implies a reduction or 
elimination of barriers to trade, and (2) this trade liberalisation is discriminatory, in 
the sense that it applies only to the member countries of the trade bloc, outside 
countries being discriminated against in their trade relations with trade bloc 
members. Though few, there exist as well regional integration agreements in which 
cooperation rather than preferential market access is emphasised. Trade blocs can 
also entail deeper forms of integration, for instance of international competition, 
investment, labour and capital markets (including movements of factors of 
production), monetary policy and more. The integration of countries into trade blocs 
is commonly referred to as ‘regionalism’30, irrespective of whether a trade bloc has 
a geographical base or not. 
 
2.1.2.1 Advantages (for joining countries) of joining a Trading Bloc31 
a.  Access to larger markets leads to internal economies of scale. 
b. External economies of scale due to improved infrastructure.  
c. Lower exchange risk and transaction costs due to removal of tariffs. 
d. Greater bargaining and negotiating power with global powers. 
e. Increased competition between members. 
f. Further rapid spread of technology due to enhanced member cooperation.  
                                               
29 See Nergiz, E., 2014. The Evolution of of the European Union as a Trade Bloc . In: H. H. Ü. Dincer, ed. 
Globalization of Financial Institutions: A Competitive Approach to Finance and Banking. Istanbul : Springer 
International Publishing, p. 9. 
 
30 See Jones, R. J. B., 2001. Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy: Entries P-Z. In: R. J. B. Jones, 
ed. Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy. Reading: Routledge: Taylor& Francis Group , p. 1571. 
 
31 Anon., n.d. Economics Online. [Online]  
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2.1.2.2 Disadvantages (country risks) of joining a Trading Bloc32 
While joining a trading bloc bring the joining state major economic advantages, 
there still remains some risks involved for joining states, among which are: 
a. High administrative costs of trading bloc. 
b. Loss of resources to more efficient members/or geographical centre 
c. Firms Cooperation and merge leading to greater monopoly power.  
d. Diseconomies of scale if firms become very large.  
e. Regulatory and policy making ambiguities and conflicts of interest. 
 
2.1.3 A Political Union versus a Trading Bloc 
While a political union relates to the incorporation of several sovereign states in a 
full political integration to form one greater entity with a harmonized political and 
economical stand and a single ruler similar to the union of the states of America 
into the entity known as the United States of America (USA); a trading bloc is the 
multilevel economic integration, or a process, involving the incorporation of varied 
types of sovereign economies into a larger entity. In specific terms, it strives for 
cooperation among states and is concerned with removing all trade restrictions 
between the participating states and evolving of certain elements of cooperation and 
coordination amongst them, similar to the case of the European states in the 
European Union (EU), or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)33, 
which has less degrees of harmonization than in the EU. 
 
2.1.4 Types and levels of Integration: 
There are five main different types of economic integration. These comprise the 
levels towards whole integration: 
A. Free Trade Area. 
B. Custom Union. 
C. Common Market. 
D. Economic Union - Complete economic integration. 
E. Political Union - Complete political integration. 
                                               
 
33 See Utz, S., 1994. Tax Harmonization and Coordination in Europe, Connecticut: University of Connecticut School 
of Law. 
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A. Free Trade Area34 
In this form of economic integration, member nations remove all trade 
impediments among themselves but retain their own policies with the outside 
world. That being said, the member countries do not charge any import tariff on 
imports from each other but they do have their respective policies as regards levy 
of import tariffs on imports from the countries outside the group. 
 
B. Custom Union35 
This arrangement of economic integration is similar to a free trade area, whereby 
member states have common external commercial relations. For example, they 
adopt common external tariff on imports from the non-member nations. Thus, 
custom union marks the second stage of economic integration amongst the nations. 
 
C. Common Market36 
In this type of economic integration, the member states have a custom union 
agreement with one another and they also agree for factor mobility across the 
national borders of member countries. Thus, the common market arrangement 
permits free movement of all factors of production mainly including people, 
services, products, labour and capital amongst the member nations. 
 
D. Economic Union - Full economic integration37 
This is the final stage of economic integration and many serve as the basis for 
complete political integration. In this type of economic integration, member 
countries are part of common market and agree to have whole unification of 
monetary and fiscal policies. This arrangement is akin to economic and monetary 
union amongst the member nations.  
                                               
34 See Suranovic, S., 2010. Economic Integration: Free Trade Areas, Trade Creation, and Trade Diversion. In: 
International Trade: Theory and Policy. Washington : Saylor Foundation.  
 
35 See Definition of economic integration. (n.d.). Retrieved from CALCULEMUS:http://calculemus.org/pub-libr/eu-
integr/1-2econ-integr.pdf 
 
36 See Suranovic, S., 2010. Economic Integration: Free Trade Areas, Trade Creation, and Trade Diversion. In: 
International Trade: Theory and Policy. Washington : Saylor Foundation. 
 
37 See Definition of economic integration. (n.d.). Retrieved from CALCULEMUS:http://calculemus.org/pub-libr/eu-
integr/1-2econ-integr.pdf 
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E. Political Union – Full political integration38 
This is the ultimate stage of integration amongst the nations where member states 
literally merge their individual identities into one nation. In this form, the members 
have a central parliament with the sovereignty of a national government. 
 
2.2 Examples of economic blocs throughout the history 
To emphasise the significance and success of the trading / economic blocs as 
strategic alliances between nations, it is worth including a list of few trading blocs 
throughout history. Most of these blocs cease to exist, not because they have failed, 
but since they have developed by moving towards a higher level of integration. 
 
2.2.1 European Economic Area (EEA)39 
Member Countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
 
2.2.2 European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
Member Countries: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein. 
 
2.2.3 Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) 
Member Countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Republic of 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia. 
                                               
38 Political Integration and National Sovereignty  
 When nations join with others in a trade or political bloc, they give up some national sovereignty. The European Union 
started out as a free trade zone and built considerable political integration over a period of several decades. But the EU 
is far from a unified state and far from a satisfactory Europe-wide democratic order, while substantial sovereignty still 
remains with the EU's member governments. In a globalizing world, nations feel pressure to join trade and political 
pacts. Often, these international groupings erode national democracy while offering diminished accountability at the 
wider policy-making level. How, then, can trade pacts be subject to democratic accountability and how can integration 
proceed without losing the advantages of smaller-scale political process? The internationalists may be naive 
enthusiasts, while the nationalists may often be bigoted and reactionary. But somewhere in this debate lie the core 
issues of governance in a globalizing and integrating planet 
See: https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/political-integration-and-national-sovereignty-3-22.html  
 
39 See European Commission. (2010). European Economic Statistics. Belgium: European Union. Retrieved from 
Europa.eu. 
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2.2.4 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
Member Countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
2.2.5 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) 
Member Countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon. 
 
2.2.6 East African Community (EAC) 
Member Countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda. 
 
2.2.7 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
Member Countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland. 
 
2.2.8 Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) 
Member Countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan 
 
2.2.9 Pacific Regional Trade Agreement (PARTA or PIF) 
Member Countries: Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. 
 
2.2.10 Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA)40 
Member Countries: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia. 
 
2.3 Current Existing Economic Blocs 
2.3.1 European Union (EU) 
Member Countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
                                               
40 See Trade, R. o. (2017, April 7). Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). Retrieved 2011, from Economy: 
http://www.economy.gov.lb/?/subSubcatInfo/2/91 
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Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom  
 
2.3.2 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)41 
Member Countries: Canada, Mexico, United States of America. 
 
2.3.3 Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) 
Member Countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, USA, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong , 
China, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Chile, Peru, Russia, Vietnam 
 
2.3.4 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)42 
Member Countries: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia 
 
2.3.5 Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU)43 
Member Countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,  
Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Kingdom of Saidi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
 
2.3.6 Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)44 
Member Countries: Kingdom of Bahrain, State of Kuwait, Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
 
2.3.7 Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) 
Member Countries: Afghanistan, I. R. of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Turkish Cypriot State (observer)45 
                                               
41 See Representative, O. o. t. U. S. T., 2011. USTR. [Online]  
Available at: https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta 
 
42 See Africa, U. N. E. C. f., 2016. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. [Online]  
 
43 See Jovanovic, M. N., 2011. Int'l Handbook on the Economics of Integration. 508 ed. s.l.:Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
44 See International Relations and Security Network. (2011, April 6). Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  
45 See Secretariat, E. (2015). Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO). Retrieved from Prevention Web: 
http://www.preventionweb.net/organisations/4819 
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2.3.8 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
Member Countries: Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Comoros. 
 
2.3.9 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
Member Countries: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe. 
 
2.3.10 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Member Countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Togo.  
 
2.3.11 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Member Countries: Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.  
 
2.3.12 Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) 
Member Countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Hellenic, 
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine. 
 
2.3.13 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
Member Countries: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova / Georgia (withdrew).46 
 
2.3.14 East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) 
Member Countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
(Suspended)47 
 
2.3.15 South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) 
Member Countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
                                               
46 See Anon., n.d. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Stats. [Online]  
47 See Khalifah, N. A., 1992. International Trade of the East Asian Economic. Jumal E Malaysia, Issue 25, pp. 19-45.  
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Section (3): Previous attempts to establish an Arab economic unity 
 
3.1 The Possibility of unity among Arab states 
From the time Arab countries gained their independence from the colonizing powers 
(mostly French, British and Italian), Arabs or what they like to refer to themselves as the 
“Arab Nation” (Al Umma Al Arabia) have always had the ultimate dream or vision of 
creating a unified power which can be the rival to major global existing powers on both 
political and economic levels. The main reasons, other than Arab nationalism, religion 
and patriotism, were the wide arsenal of natural resources which exist in the Arab world, 
in addition to their everlasting wish to regain the glory of the Arabs who historically 
dominated a wide geographical and cultural part of the world.  
 
Prior to the rise of Islam in the 6th century, the term “Arab” was exclusively applied to a  
homogenous group of people limited to the Arabian Peninsula48 and inside fringe of the 
adjoining Fertile Crescent. With the phenomenal spread of the Arabic language and the 
religion of Islam, the subsequent admixture of Arabian with other ethnic stocks as a result 
of the far-flung Muslim conquest of the first century after the Hegira, the term had 
acquired a more extensive meaning. Since the 9th century and afterwards, an “Arab” 
could be any Arabic-speaking individual from Turkestan and Persia in the east to 
Morocco and the Iberian Peninsula in the west, regardless of original race or nationality. 
This term and following the break-up of the caliphates of Baghdad, Cordoba, and Cairo, 
and with the resurgence of national life in such countries as Persia and Spain, has lost its 
ethnic and acquired linguistic connotation and shrunk into its present dimensions. 
 
The term “Arab Union” was first used when the British promised Arabs a united 
independent Arab State49 which never took place due to the Sykes–Pico Agreement50, 
which totally dismantled the Arab Region and drew sporadic boarders, as many believe. 
                                               
48 See Radison, M., 1979. The Arabs. Chicago : Presses Universitaires de France . 
 
49 See Anon., 2011. Revolvy.  
 
50 See Fromkin, D. (1989). A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern 
Middle East. New York: New York: Owl. 
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This Sykes – Pico Agreement51 is referred to by many as the nightmare that struck Arabs. 
Arabs have since, craved for unity, where the late Arab leader and Egyptian president 
Jamal Abdel Nasser52 - 53, during his presidency to Egypt, has attempted to establish 
several Arab federations, alongside with other Arab states, such as the United Arab 
Emirates, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Sudan and North Yemen. The United Arab 
Republic (UAR), which will be discussed next, marked the most prominent attempt. 
                                               
51  On May 19, 1916, representatives of Great Britain and France secretly reach an accord, known as the Sykes-Picot 
agreement, by which most of the Arab lands under the rule of the Ottoman Empire are to be divided into British and 
French spheres of influence with the conclusion of World War I.  
After the war broke out in the summer of 1914, the Allies—Britain, France and Russia—held many discussions 
regarding the future of the Ottoman Empire, now fighting on the side of Germany and the Central Powers, and its vast 
expanse of territory in the Middle East, Arabia and southern-central Europe. In March 1915, Britain signed a secret 
agreement with Russia, whose designs on the empire’s territory had led the Turks to join forces with Germany and 
Austria-Hungary in 1914. By its terms, Russia would annex the Ottoman capital of Constantinople and retain control of 
the Dardanelles (the crucially important strait connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean) and the Gallipoli 
peninsula, the target of a major Allied military invasion begun in April 1915. In return, Russia would agree to British 
claims on other areas of the former Ottoman Empire and central Persia, including the oil-rich region of Mesopotamia. 
More than a year after the agreement with Russia, British and French representatives, Sir Mark Sykes and Francois 
Georges Picot, authored another secret agreement regarding the future spoils of the Great War. Picot represented a 
small group determined to secure control of Syria for France; for his part, Sykes raised British demands to balance out 
influence in the region. The agreement largely neglected to allow for the future growth of Arab nationalism, which at 
that same moment the British government and military were working to use to their advantage against the Turks. 
In the Sykes-Picot agreement, concluded on May 19, 1916, France and Britain divided up the Arab territories of the 
former Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence. In its designated sphere, it was agreed, each country shall be allowed 
to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the 
Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. Under Sykes-Picot, the Syrian coast and much of modern-day Lebanon 
went to France; Britain would take direct control over central and southern Mesopotamia, around the Baghdad and 
Basra provinces. Palestine would have an international administration, as other Christian powers, namely Russia, held 
an interest in this region. The rest of the territory in question—a huge area including modern-day Syria, Mosul in 
northern Iraq, and Jordan—would have local Arab chiefs under French supervision in the north and British in the south. 
Also, Britain and France would retain free passage and trade in the other’s zone of influence. 
See Britain and France conclude Sykes-Picot agreement. (2017). Retrieved from History: http://www.history.com/this-
day-in-history/britain-and-france-conclude-sykes-picot-agreement 
 
52 Gamal Abdel Nasser was the second President of Egypt, serving from 1956 until his death. Nasser led the 1952 
overthrow of the monarchy and introduced far-reaching land reforms the following year. Following a 1954 attempt on 
his life by a Muslim Brotherhood member, he cracked down on the organisation, put President Muhammad Naguib 
under house arrest, and assumed executive office, officially becoming president in June 1956. 
Nasser's popularity in Egypt and the Arab world skyrocketed after his nationalization of the Suez Canal and his 
political victory in the subsequent Suez Crisis. Calls for pan-Arab unity under his leadership increased, culminating 
with the formation of the United Arab Republic with Syria (1958–1961). In 1962, Nasser began a series of major 
socialist measures and modernization reforms in Egypt. Despite setbacks to his pan-Arabist cause, by 1963 Nasser's 
supporters gained power in several Arab countries, but he became embroiled in the North Yemen Civil War. He began 
his second presidential term in March 1965 after his political opponents were banned from running. Following Egypt's 
defeat by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, Nasser resigned, but he returned to office after popular demonstrations called 
for his reinstatement. By 1968, Nasser had appointed himself prime minister, launched the War of Attrition to regain 
lost territory, began a process of depoliticizing the military, and issued a set of political liberalization reforms. After the 
conclusion of the 1970 Arab League summit, Nasser suffered a heart attack and died. His funeral in Cairo drew five 
million mourners and an outpouring of grief across the Arab world. 
Nasser remains an iconic figure in the Arab world, particularly for his strides towards social justice and Arab unity, 
modernization policies, and anti-imperialist efforts.  
See Abdel-Nasser, H. G. (n.d.). A historical sketch of President Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Retrieved from Nasser: 
http://www.nasser.org/Common/pictures01-%20sira_en.htm 
 
53 See Editorial Research Report 1990. (1990). The Elusive Search for Arab Unity. Washington DC : CQ Press. 
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In the recent years, and more specifically in the 2004 Arab League Summit in Egypt54, the 
President of Yemen, at that time, now late Ali Abdullah Saleh55 proposed the creation of 
an Arab union would will replace the Arab League, in an attempt to create a stronger 
political and geographical body, capable of dealing with world issues. However, the 
Proposal failed to reach the Summit's agenda. However, in the 2009 Arab League Summit 
in Qatar56, the proposal managed to occupy a part in the Summit's agenda. The states’ 
representatives decided back then that the proposal will be looked into and discussed. 
This proposal included various non-economic issues with economic impact which 
includes integration of academia, and was based on the following principles which, if 
well implemented, fit to draw a road map to move forward towards the Arab solid unity: 
a. To formulate regulations, legislations, and tariffs, aiming at the creation of a unified 
comprehensive Arab custom union. 
b. To coordinate foreign trade policies with a view to ensuring the coordination of the 
region's economy vis-à-vis world economy. 
c. To coordinate economic development and formulate programs for the attainment of 
joint Arab development projects. 
d. To coordinate policies related to agriculture, industry, and internal trade. 
e. To coordinate financial and monetary policies with the aim to achieve monetary unity. 
f. To coordinate legislations, policies and regulations to conform taxes and duties. 
g. To formulate unified regulations for transport and transit in the contracting countries. 
h. To draft common legislations related to labour and social security. 
i. To prepare a budget for the CAEU and its affiliated bodies. 
 
3.2 Attempts of Arab economic unity throughout the history 
As previously explained, international economic integration results in reaching an 
integrated economic union among a group or groups of countries. Frequently this is also 
called 'total' economic integration in distinction of some other international arrangements 
                                               
54 See AFP, n.d. radical party. 
 
55  See AFP: Yemen's Saleh formally steps down after 33 years". Google. Retrieved April 2011 
 
56 See Summit, A., 2009. Coalition for the International Criminal Court. Doha, Coalition for the International Criminal 
Court . 
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involving closer economic cooperation or some degree of integration such as free trade 
areas, custom unions, and common markets.  
In his paper “Industrial Economics and Organisation: Conventional and Islamic 
Perspectives”, Yusoff (Yusoff, 2014)57 states that “from an Islamic point of view any 
arrangement is welcome as long as it leads to the establishment of closer cooperation or 
stronger ties among Muslims”. 
  
In his paper “Globalisation and economic integration among Arab countries” Zineldin 
(Zineldin, 1998)58, explains that despite the great attention paid to the cooperation and 
integration by Arabs, no real or considerable progress has been accomplished. He 
elaborates further that in spite of the continuous expression by Arabs of their will towards 
unity, many of them did not have genuine intentions, while others argue that the 
emergence of the state israel and the Arab – israeli conflict59 along with the existence of 
the israeli - US - European strong ties, have all greatly impeded the recognition of any 
Arab solid unity.   
 
The Arab League was the first to call for agreements for economic cooperation among 
Arab counties. The League of Arab States submitted the proposal around forty years ago 
prior to most of the international economic cooperation projects. Nevertheless the Arab 
politicians paid very little attention to economic cooperation and integration and began to 
widely discuss political and military cooperation. The Arab League has never been able 
to grasp the importance of the economy as a means of realizing political goals. Business 
and commerce were matters that Arab politicians looked down on. They considered them 
as effects rather than causes, of political action. Egyptian President late Gamal Abdel 
Nasser of the "Nasserism" ideology was the first to define the pan-Arabism of the 1960s 
through Arab Unity60. There have been several attempts to bring about a Pan-Arab state 
by many well known Arab leaders, all of which eventually resulted in failure.  
                                               
57 See Yusoff, W. S. (2014). Industrial Economics and Organisation: Conventional and Islamic Perspectives . Xlibris 
Corporation . 
 
58 See Zineldin, M. (1998). Globalisation and economic integration among Arab countries. The Middle East in 
globalizing world (p. 3). Oslo: Växjo University. 
 
59 See "Arab-Israeli War". (n.d.). In Wikipedia, Retrieved 6 April, 2011, from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab%E2%80%93Israeli_conflict 
 
60 See The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. (2002). Arab Unity. NewYork: Continuum . 
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The United Arab Republic (UAR)61 in 1958 was the first and most serious attempt. 
Formed under Nasser, it was a union between Egypt and Syria, whereby Nasser exerted 
so much control over the union that the UAR functioned more as a Nasserist takeover 
rather than a cooperation between two governments and respectively countries. The UAR 
lasted in this form until 1961, when Syria withdrew from the union. In April 1963, Egypt, 
Syria and Iraq agreed to form a new 'United Arab Republic62', which was to be entirely 
federal in structure, leaving each member state its identity and institutions." The UAR 
was finally abolished in 1971 due to irreconcilable differences between Syria and Egypt.  
 
According to Cleveland and Bunton, the idea of a unified Arab state was something that 
enticed Nasser, and that seemed to be along the lines of his message of Arab unity and 
Arab Nationalism. Thus, “the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in early 1958 
appeared to be a major step along the road to Arab unity. “The UAR was a contemplated 
union between Syria and Egypt which would result a single unified state63”.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
61 The United Arab Republic was a short-lived political union between Egypt and Syria. The union began in 1958 and 
existed until 1961, when Syria seceded from the union after the 1961 Syrian coup d'état. Egypt continued to be known 
officially as the "United Arab Republic" until 1971. The president was Gamal Abdel Nasser. It was a member of the 
United Arab States, a loose confederation with North Yemen which in 1961 dissolved along with the Republic. 
The reason for the United Arab Republic was not only because of Nasser’s emphasis on pan-Arab unity, but it also 
came about as a result of domestic political developments in Syria. Having elected anti-French leaders in the 1940s, the 
Ba’th Party who was in power in the late 1950s was concerned about a Communist political movement in the country 
possibly taking them out of power. Thus, by asking Nasser to joint with Syria as the United Arab Republic, they hoped 
to stop the communist influence, and all the while, keep their own influence, and be able to stay in power. Shortly after, 
the United Arab Republic was announced (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013: 292).  
However, the creation of this new United Arab Republic was not a smooth transition between Egypt and Syria. Part of 
this was because of the domestic turmoil within Syria itself. And Nasser, who was a strong advocate of Arab unity, saw 
this as a great example of his ideas put into practice, and could not turn down what the Syrian leaders were proposing 
(Cleveland & Bunton, 2013: 292).  
However, as the UAR developed, it becomes clear that the Syrian leadership would not having primary, or equal 
control of the state. In fact, “Egypt quickly became dominant.” The Syrian leaders who had requested the merger found 
themselves forced to live in Cairo, from where they exercised little influence on events in their homeland. Nasser, who 
became the first president of the UAR, simply imposed on Syria the single-party military regime that had worked so 
well in Egypt. Egyptian military and civilian personnel streamed into Syria, replacing their Syrian counterparts in 
several important functions…”  
See Cleveland, W., & Bunton, M. (2013). A History of the Modern Middle East Boulder . Colorado : Westview Press. 
See Goldschmidt Jr. , A. (2004). Modern Egypt: The formation of a Nation State . Colorado: Westview Press . 
 
 
62 See The Robinson Library, The United Arab Republic, [online], Available at: www.robinsonlibrary.com  
 
63 See Cleveland, W., & Bunton, M. (2013). A History of the Modern Middle East Boulder . Colorado : Westview 
Press. 
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Two later attempts were conducted by Libya's leader at the time late Muammar al-
Gaddafi; these were the Federation of Arab Republics64 and the Arab Islamic 
Republic65, both of which have died shortly after their birth due to lack of organisation.  
 
On the other hand, the only current example of successful political unification between 
Arab neighbours would be the unity of seven Arab emirates that have formed the United 
Arab Emirates66 which was established on 2 December 1971, and successfully continued.  
 
However, and upon reviewing the main attempts of cooperation, alliances or integration 
among Arab or Islamic states in the last half century, one would observe large initiatives 
being launched with unlimited potential for unification; and very little or nothing left 
towards the implantation of such initiatives. Such projects include some bodies that are 
currently in full successful operation, such as the Arab Monetary Fund; however with no 
direct or serious aims for Arab unity, these include but are not limited to the following: 
                                               
64 The Federation of Arab Republics was an attempt by Libya's Muammar Gaddafi to merge Libya, Egypt and Syria in 
order to create a United Arab state. Although approved by a referendum in each country on 1 September 1971,[2] the 
three countries disagreed on the specific terms of the merger. The federation lasted from 1 January 1972 to 19 
November 1977. It is not to be confused with the United Arab Republic, which was a single sovereign state uniting 
Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961. 
See The Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR)  / Middle East Journal  / Vol. 25, No. 4 (Autumn, 
1971), pp. 523-529  / Published by: Middle East Institute  / Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4324834 
65 Arab Islamic republic was a proposed unification of Tunisia and Libya in 1974, agreed upon by Libyan head of state 
Muammar Gaddafi and Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba. Additional countries - Morocco and Algeria - were later 
included in the proposal, which was never implemented. 
See "Arab Islamic Republic". (n.d.). In Wikipedia, Retrieved April, 2011, from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Islamic_Republic 
 
66 The United Arab Emirates is a federal absolute monarchy in Western Asia at the southeast end of the Arabian 
Peninsula on the Persian Gulf, bordering Oman to the east and Saudi Arabia to the south, as well as sharing maritime 
borders with Qatar to the west and Iran to the north. In 2013, the UAE's population was 9.2 million, of which 1.4 
million are Emirati citizens and 7.8 million are expatriates.  
See BBC. (2016, September 28). United Arab Emirates country profile. Retrieved from BBC News: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703998 
 
The country is a federation of seven emirates, and was established on 2 December 1971. The constituent emirates are 
Abu Dhabi (which serves as the capital), Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al-Quwain. Each 
emirate is governed by an absolute monarch; together, they jointly form the Federal Supreme Council. One of the 
monarchs is selected as the President of the United Arab Emirates. Islam is the official religion of the UAE and Arabic 
is the official language (although English and Indian-language dialects are widely spoken, with English being the 
language of business and education particularly in Abu Dhabi and Dubai). 
See Morton, M. (2016). Keepers of the Golden Shore: A History of the United Arab Emirates . London: Reaktion 
Books . 
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1. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)  
2. The emergence of new centres of development and investment finance; 
3. Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development  
4. Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab economic Development  
5. Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) 
6. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  
7. Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa  
8. Arab Maghreb Union: Tunisia (AMU)  
9. Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), 1976  
10. Arab Trade Financial Program (ATFP)  
11. Arab Common Market, 1964  
12. Arab Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) 
 
Based on the above mentioned attempts and formed bodies, it becomes relevant to 
provide a brief overview on the following experiences, as they represent the closest to the 
Arab dreams in terms of economic and political unification: 
1. Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) - 195767. 
                                               
67 AGREEMENT ON ARAB ECONOMIC UNITY* [excerpts]  
The Agreement on Arab Economic Unity was signed on 3 June 1957 and came into force on 30 April 1964.  The 
original signatory States were Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahirija, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and the Arab Republic of Yemen. Mauritania, Palestine and 
Somalia subsequently also became signatories to the Agreement.  
The Governments of: the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; the Tunisian Republic; the Republic of Sudan; the Republic 
of Iraq; the Saudi Arabian Kingdom; the Syrian Arab Republic; the United Arab Republic; the Lebanese Republic; the 
United Libyan Kingdom; the Yemenite Kingdom; the Kingdom of Morocco; and the State of Kuwait; In pursuance of 
their desire to organize and consolidate economic relations among the Arab League States on principles conforming 
with the natural and historical ties among them, and with view to creating the best conditions for the advancement for 
their economy, for promoting their wealths and ensuring the welfare of their peoples, have agreed on setting up a 
complete unity among themselves to be achieved gradually with the speed commensurate with effecting their transfer 
from the present to the desired situation without detriment to its vital interests, in accordance with the following 
stipulations:  
 
CHAPTER I OBJECTIVES AND METHODS   
Article 1  
A complete economic unity shall be established among the Arab League States. The member states and their nationals 
are guaranteed the following on equal footing:  
1. Freedom of movement of persons and capital.   
2. Freedom of exchange of domestic and foreign goods and products.   
3. Freedom of transport and transit and of using means of transport, ports and civil airports.  
4. Freedom of residence, work, employment and exercise of economic activities.                                                      
5. Rights of ownership, of making one's will and of inheritance.  
  
Article 2  
For attaining the unity mentioned in Art (1), contracting states shall work for accomplishing the following:  
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This Council was formed by Kuwait, Iraq, Jordon, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, 
Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. 
The Council of Arab Economic Unity became effective with the following 
objectives: 
 
a. Formulating regulations, legislations, and tariffs, aiming at the creation of a 
unified Arab custom area. 
b. Coordinating foreign trade policies with a view to ensuring the co-ordination 
of the region's economy vis-à-vis world economy 
c. Coordinating economic development and formulating programs for the 
attainment of joint Arab development projects. 
d. Coordinating policies related to agriculture, industry, and internal trade. 
e. Coordinating financial and monetary policies with aiming to achieve 
monetary unity. 
f. Coordinating legislations related to tariffs taxes and duties. 
g. Formulating unified regulations for transport and transit in the contracting 
countries. 
h. Drafting common legislations on labour and social security. 
i. Preparing a budget for the council and its affiliated bodies. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
1. The Arab States should be made one customs zone subject to a single administration. Customs' tariffs, 
legislation and regulations applied in these states should be standardized.  
2. The Arab States should work for standardizing regulations thereof.  
3. Standardizing transport and transit systems.  
4. Concluding collective trade agreements and payments agreements with third countries.  
5. Co-ordinating policies related to agriculture, industry, and internal trade.  Economic legislations should be 
standardized in a manner ensuring equal terms to all nationals of the contracting countries with respect to 
work in agriculture, industry, and other professions.  
6. Co-ordinating labour and social insurance legislation.  
7. a. Co-ordinating legislation concerning government and municipal taxes and duties and all other taxes 
pertaining to agriculture, industry, trade, real estate, and capital investments in a manner ensuring equal 
opportunities.  
b. Avoiding double taxation and duties levied on the nationals of the contracting parties.  
8. The co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policies and all regulations thereof [in] the contracting countries 
should be undertaken as a prerequisite for the standardization of the currency.  
9. Standardizing the methods of the classification of statistics.  
10. All necessary measures should be taken to ensure the attainment of the goals specified in Article (1) and (2) 
of the Agreement.  
It is, however, possible to circumvent the principle of standardization in respect of certain circumstances and certain 
countries subject to the approval of the Council of Arab Economic Unity.  
See General Secretariat . (1957). AGREEMENT ON ARAB ECONOMIC UNITY. Council of Arab Economic Unity. 
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2. The Agadir Agreement for the establishment of a Free Trade Zone between the 
Arab Mediterranean Nations was signed in Morocco on 25 February 2004:  
The agreement aimed at establishing a free trade area between Jordan, Tunisia, 
Egypt and Morocco and it was seen as a possible first step in the establishment of 
the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area68 as envisaged in the Barcelona Process69. 
All members of the Agadir Agreement have since joined the Greater Arab Free 
Trade Area (GAFTA), effectively superseding the agreement. 
 
3. Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) – 1998 
The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) was founded in 1997 / 1998 by 14 
Arab countries, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
The major elements of the GAFTA aiming towards full implementation are: 
 
a. Instruct the inter-customs fees: To reduce the customs on Arab products by 
10% annually, the 14 Arab states reported their custom tariff programs to the 
Security Council of the Arab League to coordinate them with each others, 
except for Syria that continued to use the Brussels Tariffs System70. 
 
b. Applying the locality of the Arab products:  
i. All members have shared their standards and specifications to help their 
products move smoothly from one country to another. 
ii. The League also created a project to apply the Arab Agriculture Pact71, 
based on sharing the standards of the agricultural sector and injecting 
several more restrictions and specifications involved by all members. 
                                               
68  The convention covers the EU, the EFTA, the EU customs unions with third states (Turkey, Andorra, San Marino), 
the EU candidate states, the partners of the Barcelona Process and possibly at a later stage all of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy partners. 
 
69 See Claisse, M., n.d. The Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.barcelona.com/barcelona_news/the_barcelona_process_or_euro_mediterranean_partnership  
 
70 See Organisation, W. C. (2015). What is the Harmonized System (HS)? Retrieved from World Customs Organisation 
(WCOOMD): http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-harmonized-system.aspx 
 
71 See Lbp, I. (2016). Arab League League of Arab States Business Law. Int'l Business Publications. 
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iii. The Arab League granted exceptions, which allowed applying customs 
rate for certain goods, to six members72 for several goods, however 
rejected requests by Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan for additional 
exceptions, a step which was seen as biased at the time. 
 
c. Private sectors:  The League created a database and a service to inform and 
promote for the private sector’s benefits, and how their work was needed 
under GAFTA. 
 
d. Communication: The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in the 65th 
meeting agreed on pointing a base to ease communication between Member 
States, and also to work to facilitate communication between the private and 
public sectors to apply the Greater Arab Free Trade Area between members. 
 
e. Customs Duties:  In its 67th meeting ECOSOC agreed that the 40% decrease 
on customs on goods in the past four years of GAFTA will continue and 
following the decisions of the Amman summit73, the members will put more 
efforts to eliminate all customs duties on local Arab goods. 
 
3.3 Moving Forward 
One cannot exclude the possibilities of achieving a certain level of success through 
schemes of partial economic integration on a limited scale, such as what has been 
established on Gulf countries’ level “the GCC”. Fortunately, the Gulf countries, led by 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have realised the importance of creating free trade blocs. 
Thus, even though these might be considered as infant steps when compared to other 
non-Arab countries integration efforts, they still comprise a major step forward.  
Nevertheless, the emergence of the Qatar crisis in May 2017 and which remained in 
escalation during the finalization of this paper, and caused a rupture in the GCC and kept 
Qatar in GCC isolation, has posed a large question mark, not only by sceptics of the GCC 
but also by its supporters, towards the strength, continuance and evolution of the GCC.  
                                               
72 See Anon., n.d. Dubaided. [Online]  
73 See Council of Arab Economic Unity. (n.d.)., Retrieved April, 2011, from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_of_Arab_Economic_Unity 
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Most recently and during producing the final draft of the thesis during the month of May 
2017, the GCC faced a harsh blow with the emergence of the Qatar crisis74. The positions 
taken by the GCC countries (with the exception of Oman) along with five other countries 
have proven that this currently existing custom union is very far from being the “fit to 
follow” example and the cornerstone for the development and establishment of the AEU.   
In light of the recent events, the next important move is to focus on creating the regional 
trade zone. While it is currently a very difficult and challenging task, it is evident that 
free trade zones are growing even among the world's poorest countries, such as South 
America and Africa, despite the existence of major political problems. The establishment 
of a trade region extending beyond the GCC would be a good starting point. Such trade 
union would cooperate with other non-Arab Asian or European countries to create a 
stronger alliance with a GDP large enough to support the members’ competency against 
other trade economic blocs around the world.  
 
Indeed, and according to a senior economic analyst interviewed at the Arab Monetary 
Fund in its headquarters in Abu Dhabi, all Arabs have now been struck by certain basic 
realities, as they have all realized the fact that the world has been transformed into 
economic blocs that carry economic and political weight. They are even at last admitting 
the failure of political and military cooperation.  
In the same context, he described the situation of non-action as “very odd”, especially 
that the elements of success are available for Arabs to create an economic union much 
more than they have been for other countries. This applies in theory and practice. Sudan 
could be the bread basket of the Arab region, the Gulf its oil reservoir, Egypt its labour 
force, Syria its farm and Morocco a great market, while Lebanon can play the role of its 
                                               
74 "Shortly after US President Donald Trump delivered his historic address to the US-Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh, 
seeking to align Washington’s traditional Arab allies against Iran and its regional agenda, a new Middle East crisis 
erupted. 
The 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis began when several countries abruptly cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar in June 
2017. These countries included Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt. The severing of relations 
included withdrawing ambassadors, and imposing trade and travel bans. The Saudi-led coalition cited Qatar’s support 
for terrorism as the main reason for their actions, insisting Qatar has violated the Riyadh Agreement on returning GCC 
diplomats to Doha and its Complementary Arrangement in 2014. Saudi Arabia and other countries have criticized Al 
Jazeera and Qatar's relations with Iran, and accused Qatar of funding terrorist organisations. Qatar denied that it 
supports terrorism, given that it has assisted the United States in the War on Terror and the ongoing military 
intervention against ISIL. Saudi Arabia's move was welcomed by United States president Donald Trump. A number of 
countries in the region, including Turkey, Russia and Iran, called for the crisis to be resolved through peaceful 
negotiations.” 
See  Neubauer, S. (2017). The curious timing of the Qatar crisis. Washington. 
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human resource developer. All these were and still are known facts; however such facts 
become untranslatable in the light of lack of planning, poor determination and not finding 
a mechanism for implementation. Arab economists have often agreed that increased 
commerce and investment among the Arab states will diminish the mistrust that has long 
divided governments and prevented private sectors from working together for their 
mutual benefit, because states that do business together tend to avoid conflicts.  
 
According to the Head of Arab Affairs at the Beirut Bar Association (BBA) Lawyer 
Hussein Zbeeb, who was interviewed in BBA in 2014, and whom has taken part in 
discussions for Arab unification attempts from a legal and regulatory perspective in 2013, 
he believes “that the Arab world is still suffering from a state of fragmentation and 
disruption, the Arabs need to rearrange their internal affairs to help their nation to stand 
firm and to launch the unification process with full vigour along the path of progress and 
prosperity” (End of quotation). 
 
In his speech at the Permanent Office of the Arab Lawyers Union in Cairo in January 
2015,75 the President of the Beirut Bar Association Me. Georges Jreij, who was 
interviewed at the BBA in 2016 addressed the participants from all the Arab countries 
when he said: “I salute every Arab country, whether it is or not member in our Union; we 
are clinging to each and every State because in our unity lies all the strength”. 
 
In April 2011, at a conference organized by the Union of Arab Banks titled “unification 
of Arab Laws”, the Secretary General of the Arab Lawyers Union76 Omar Zein, who was 
interviewed in Beirut in 2015, expressed that the main problem currently existing in the 
Arab world, with reference to unification attempts, is the lack of enthusiasm, especially 
                                               
75 See Jreij, G. (2015, January 15). Address of the President Jreij at the permanent Office of the Arab Lawyers Union. 
Retrieved from Beirut Bas Association : 
http://bba.org.lb/en/Syndicat/CaptainNews/Details/77/Address_of_the_President_Jreij_at_the_permanent_Office_of_th
e_Arab_Lawyers_Union 
 
76 The Union of Arab Lawyers (Also referred to as Federation of Arab Lawyers) was established in 1958 in Cairo – 
Egypt. The UAL acts in the interests of the Arab Nation to achieve its national objectives; facilitate contacts between 
Arab lawyers; safeguard and develop legislative and judiciary language; assure the freedom of lawyers in their work 
and the independence of magistrates; allow all Arab lawyers to take cases in any Arab country; harmonize the 
conditions of the legal profession; establish and harmonize links with international legal organisations; restore the study 
of Muslim law as a basis for law; promote and protect human rights. Its activities include (9) commissions:  Arab 
Affairs; Palestine; Unification of Law in Arab Countries; Defence of Civil Liberties and Rule of Law in Arab 
Countries; Harmonization of Legal Terminology; Rules on the Legal Profession; Socialization; Support of the Palestine 
Liberation Movement; Defence of Palestinian Resistance Workers.  
See Arab Lawyers' Union (ALU). (2012). Retrieved from UIA : https://www.uia.org/s/or/en/1100045435 
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with relevance to the parties in charge of the project of Arab Common Market, the project 
of economic integration or representatives of the Arab league's member countries.  
In the same conference, the President of the BBA, Nouhad Jabr who was interviewed in 
Beirut, has called for Arabs to stop blaming others for all their troubles, but focus more 
on capitalizing their own identity, values, religion, education, experimented science and 
technology, sounding economic liberalization and economic integration among 
themselves, which would lead to sound economic competitiveness. He added, “Arabs 
must admit that it is clear that the economic woes of the Arab countries stem more from 
their own internal policies than from the conflict with others” (End of quotation). 
 
The Arab global economic position and the number revealed by the World Bank, reveal 
that trade among Arab countries has been weak despite previous efforts to engage into 
different forms of regional economic integrations. Many Arab economists share the view 
that for the Arab world to progress, it has become a matter of some urgency to develop 
such economic integration in order to allow the region to move beyond current position. 
Thus, it becomes a fact that Arab economic integration or real cooperation will provide 
better economic opportunities for all Arabs and lessen threats of Arab dependence on 
foreign powers, particularly the west, for most of its consumer and industrial products. 
EU’s experience has proven the mentioned in a sense that cooperation produces strength. 
 
WB and WTO trade statistics reveal that most of the Arab countries are buying goods and 
services from Europe, Asia and the United States. A free trade agreement or Arab 
common market will naturally speed up their industrialization and substantially increase 
the wealth of almost all the Arab nations. Such economic co-operation will increase the 
market size of any Arab country and naturally create the factors necessary for the Arab 
nations to become producers and exporters rather than just importers and consumers. It 
will also create the necessary elements for the Arab Nation to be an equal partner on the 
global arena while obtaining the fair opportunity to compete more effectively. 
 
At one of his speeches during the League of Arab States (LAS)77 meetings, the former 
Secretary General of LAS Mr. Amr Mousa, who was interviewed in 2016 after he left 
                                               
77 See Admin1. (2012, September 13). Presentation of the Arab League . Retrieved from Arableagueonline.org: 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/hello-world/#more-1 
 
62 | P a g e  
 
office, stated that the relationship amongst Arabs has to be founded on amity, cooperation 
and giving counsel on a reciprocal basis, out of key points of agreement, rather than 
minor point of disagreements, to serve as starting point.  
 
In his address to the 11th Summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference78 in 
Tehran in December 1997, the late King of Saudi Arabia (Crown Prince at the time) 
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, stated that “The state of disunity runs counter to the most 
distinctive characteristic of the present age, namely the inability of smaller entities to 
wield an influence in their international contemporary society wherein the trend is for 
such smaller entities to unite or merge together to form more powerful and efficient units. 
There is no longer a place in the world that is isolated and is basking in the warmth of 
isolation” (End of quotation).  
 
Section (4): Arab Spring (A brief overview exploring the incentives, challenges and 
opportunities to create a legal, monetary and financial order). 
 
4.1 Arab Spring – a brief overview 
The Arab Spring, aka “Uprisings” as commonly defined79, is a revolutionary wave of 
demonstrations and protests occurring in the Arab world that erupted on 18 Dec 2010.  
                                               
78 See Secretary-General, U. N., 2008. Secretary-General's address to the 11th Summit of the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference. Dakar, United Nations . 
 
79 The Arab Spring was a series of anti-government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions that spread across the 
Middle East in early 2011. But their purpose, relative success, and outcome remain hotly disputed in Arab countries, 
among foreign observers, and between world powers looking to cash in on the changing map of the Middle East. 
The term “Arab Spring” was popularized by the Western media in early 2011 when the successful uprising in Tunisia 
against former leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali emboldened similar anti-government protests in most Arab countries. 
The term was a reference to the turmoil in Eastern Europe in 1989, when seemingly impregnable Communist regimes 
began falling down under pressure from mass popular protests in a domino effect. In a short period of time, most 
countries in the former Communist bloc adopted democratic political systems with a market economy.  
But the events in the Middle East went in a less straightforward direction. Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen entered an 
uncertain transition period; Syria and Libya were drawn into a civil conflict, while the wealthy monarchies in the 
Persian Gulf remained largely unshaken by the events. The use of the term the “Arab Spring” has since been criticized 
for being inaccurate and simplistic. The protest movement of 2011 was at its core an expression of deep-seated 
resentment at the aging Arab dictatorships (some glossed over with rigged elections), anger at the brutality of the 
security apparatus, unemployment, rising prices, and corruption that followed the privatization of state assets in some 
countries. But unlike the Communist Eastern Europe in 1989, there was no consensus on the political and economic 
model that existing systems should be replaced with. Protesters in monarchies like Jordan and Morocco wanted to 
reform the system under the current rulers, some calling for an immediate transition to constitutional monarchy, others 
content with gradual reform. People in republican regimes like Egypt and Tunisia wanted to overthrow the president, 
but other than free elections they had little idea on what to do next. 
And, beyond calls for greater social justice, there was no magic wand for the economy. Leftist groups and unions 
wanted higher wages and a reversal of dodgy privatization deals; others wanted liberal reforms to make more room for 
the private sector. Some hard-line Islamists were more concerned with enforcing strict religious norms. All political 
parties promised more jobs but none came close to developing a program with concrete economic policies. 
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To date, rulers have been forced out from power in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen; 
with military conflict turning into a war in Syria, and ongoing uprisings in Bahrain; in 
addition to major protests which have broken out in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon and Morocco. Meanwhile, other serious protests have occurred in 
Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Western Sahara over the past few years.  
 
These protests have shared techniques of mostly civil resistance in sustained 
campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches, and rallies, as well as the use 
of social media (namely Facebook80 and YouTube81) to organize, communicate, and 
raise awareness against state attempts at repression and internet censorship.  
 
Many demonstrations have met violent responses from authorities, as well as from 
pro-government militias and counter-demonstrators. These attacks have been 
answered with violence from protestors in some cases. A major slogan of the 
demonstrators in the Arab world has been "the people demand bringing down the 
regime" – in Arabic “Al Sha’ab Yurid Iskat Al Nizam”. 
 
When the protests first erupted, they stemmed from the loss of hope of a Tunisian 
university graduate desperate to find a job to support his family in a country ruled by a 
long standing intelligence regime abusing the country’s resource, yet it continued to 
reveal the rapacity of the West in the Arab Countries. What started to be a good cause, 
ended with a huge misuse of the cause and unethical behaviour towards Arab citizens, 
this eventually resulted in a bloodshed wave in many parts of the Arab region, 
whereby wars and military conflicts continue to destroy Arab states and kill citizens.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Was Arab Spring a Success or Failure? Arab Spring was a failure only if one expected that decades of authoritarian 
regimes could be easily reversed and replaced with stable democratic systems across the region. It has also 
disappointed those hoping that the removal of corrupt rulers would translate into an instant improvement in living 
standards. Chronic instability in countries undergoing political transitions have put additional strain on struggling local 
economies, and deep divisions have emerged between the Islamists and secular Arabs. 
See Manfreda, P. (2017, February 10). Definition of the Arab Spring. Retrieved from ThoughtCo.com: 
https://www.thoughtco.com/definition-of-the-arab-spring-2353029 
 
80 Facebook is an American for-profit corporation and an online social media and social networking service based in 
Menlo Park, California 
 
81 YouTube is an American video-sharing website headquartered in San Bruno, California. The service was created by 
three former PayPal employees — Chad Hurley, Steve Chen, and Jawed Karim — in February 2005 
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4.2 Arab Spring – brief literature review 
The quote underneath from the Article of “Arab Spring: A Mirage” (Suhrawardy, 
2012)82 shows the cupidity of the countries in the Arab Spring and how they tried to 
benefit from the blood spread to get their interests. Shahrawati claims that “In essence, 
the ongoing phase of political trans-formation, ostensibly in the name of democracy, 
cannot be described even as a partial success in the few Arab nations that have been 
affected by it. The process is still taking place. Success remains elusive as well as 
considerably distorted from what it was projected as initially. Now, this in itself raises 
two crucial questions. Considering that only a few of the numerous Arab countries 
have been actually affected by a phase of political transformation, would it be fair to 
label this as “Arab Spring” and raise false notions about the entire Arab world 
having been affected by it? Besides, the different ways in which transformation is 
taking place in a few countries cannot be sidelined. This adds credence to questioning 
the hype raised about Arab Spring when in essence the transformation is yet to satisfy 
the people and leaders in a few countries where the movement began. This naturally 
demands deliberation on whether the hype was deliberately raised to ensure that 
political transformation begins in a few nations and justify the support for the same in 
others”. (End of quotation) 
 
In another Article, (Suhrawardy, Arab Spring: Failure of “Manufactured Revolution”, 
2012) states that “Among the few odd nations where political transformation is taking 
place are Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya and Iraq. These are a handful of the 
countries grouped together as the Arab nations. Equally important is the fact that the 
role of external powers and internal forces has varied strongly in all these countries 
which are said to be heading towards greater democracy. It may not be possible to 
delve in detail on developments in each of these nations, but they shall be referred to 
briefly. From one angle, the way the Arab Spring has been projected by the Western 
media and nations suggests that this process was long overdue and democratically the 
Arabs are moving forward in the “right” direction. At the outset, one is tempted to 
raise the question as to whether it would be fair to blame Arabs if they have not yet 
                                               
82 See Suhrawardy, N., 2012. Arab Spring: A Mirage, India : Courtesy: Aakrosh. 
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included democratic principles in their political structure. Yemen, for instance, was 
subject to Western colonialism less than a century ago. It takes decades, even 
centuries, for the development of democratic institutions and norms. Considering that 
colonialism had not allowed democracy to actually take roots in Yemen, why should 
only the Arab leaders of this nation be blamed for their country’s political system?” 
(End of quotation). 
 
If the so-called supporters and promoters of Arab Spring are doing so out of their 
genuine concern for democracy to take roots in this region, there is yet another angle 
to this by external forces. When external pressures or forces are used to change 
regimes in the name of establishing democracy, in essence it is nothing but another 
form of neo-colonialism confirming its grip on that country.  
 
Another piece by Roberto Toscano, Senior Research Fellow Associate CIDOB, titled 
“Which Democracy after the “Arab Spring”? He wrote: 
“The experience of the “Arab Spring”, with its achievements and its failures, raises 
several fundamental questions on democracy that are valid beyond the region. 
 
The weakness of secularism in the Muslim world is mainly due to the fact that it is 
perceived not as promoting the separation of religion and state, but as being hostile to 
religion, and opposed to the presence in the public sphere of religion, which it would 
like to see limited to the merely private domain. Whereas in the West democracy has 
historically come only on the basis of a long process of construction of the rule of law, 
we seem now to expect that countries that have entered the XXI century without any 
real experience of the rule of law will move directly to democracy.  
Liberals in the Middle East have a tendency to focus on political issues (human rights, 
individual freedom) and disregard social issues. Radical Islam is strong not because 
of the strength of religious fundamentalism, but rather thanks to its credible social 
activism (and reputation for not being corrupt).” (End of quotation). 
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According to (Phillips, 2012)83, a Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs 
in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, the countries 
affected by the “Arab Spring” face much more difficult transitions to stable 
democracy than is generally recognised;  
He elaborates that Islamists have gained the most in the political upheavals so far, by 
capturing leadership of governments in Egypt (prior to bringing down the brotherhood 
regime) and Tunisia, and achieving influence in Libya, and playing key roles in 
insurgencies in Mali, Syria, and Yemen. He also believes that al-Qaeda is now 
positioned to exploit the aftermath, and power vacuum.  
 
Finally, it is clearly observed that the Arab Spring gradually turned into a “bleak dark 
Arab winter” marked with bloodshed, economic collapse and social destruction, 
whereas extremists and radicals falsely claiming to represent Islam, backed up by 
some western and regional countries, are continuously attempting to hijack the 
incomplete revolutions and impose totalitarian dictatorships in the affected countries. 
 
Section (5): A brief comparative study between EU and GCC 
5.1 Structure of the EU in brief. 
5.2 Structure of GCC in brief. 
5.3 Assessment and extraction of the successful experiences in both blocs to use 
for the construction of the AEU. 
 
5.1 Structure of the EU in brief84 
The European Union is composed of 28 sovereign Member States: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Croatia Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (pending the Brexit coming into force85). 
                                               
83 See Phillips, J. (2012). The Arab Spring Descends into Islamist Winter: Implications for U.S. Policy. New York: The 
Heritage Foundation. 
 
84 See European Union. In Wikipedia, Retrieved July, 2011, https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union  
85 The people of Britain voted for a British exit, or Brexit, from the EU in a historic referendum on Thursday June 23.  
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The EU's membership has grown from the original six founding states being 
Belgium, France, West Germany (now Germany, after unification), Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, to the current 28 states in a gradual form as 
countries were accessing treaties.  
 
In order to join the EU a country must meet the Copenhagen criteria, defined at the 
1993 Copenhagen European Council which mostly require the existence of the rule 
of law, a stable democracy that respects human rights; a functioning market 
economy capable of competition within the EU; and the acceptance of the 
obligations of membership, mainly the EU law. No member state has ever left the 
EU, however Greenland withdrew in 1985, and the UK has voted to exist in 
accordance with the article provided by the Lisbon Treaty related to EU. 
 
Four countries from Western Europe have, to a certain extent, committed to the EU's 
economy and regulations although they are not EU members: Iceland (a candidate 
country for EU membership), Liechtenstein and Norway (which are a part of the 
single market through the European Economic Area), and Switzerland, which has 
similar ties through bilateral treaties. There are four official candidate countries, 
Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, and Turkey (political factors impede its accession). 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia are officially recognized 
as potential candidates. The small European states, Vatican, San Marino, Andorra 
and Monaco commitments include using the euro and other areas of cooperation. 
                                                                                                                                            
On the one-year anniversary, Brexit campaigner Nigel Farage said: “This time last year we dared to dream and then 
won an historic victory."After the declaration of the referendum result, the pound fell to its lowest level since 1985 and 
David Cameron resigned as Prime Minister.  
Prime Minister Theresa May triggered Article 50 - the step that starts the timer on two years of Brexit talks - in late 
March 2017.  
But Brexit was thrown into uncertainty when the Conservatives lost their majority in a general election in June 2017, 
leaving Britain with a hung parliament. Theresa May is now pushing ahead with Brexit after clinging on to power by 
forming a minority government with support from Northern Irish party the DUP.  Britain is now pushing ahead with the 
first phase of EU exit talks on the rights of EU citizens in the UK, the Brexit bill and the Irish border.   
EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier has refused to let discussions move on to trade without recognition that Britain 
owes the EU billions. However, Brexit Secretary David Davis has hit back at Mr Barnier's claim that the UK is 
wallowing in 'nostalgia' for the benefits of EU membership. Under Article 50, Britain is scheduled to finally leave the 
EU by the end of March 2019. MPs and peers will be given a vote on the final EU deal.  
 
What is Brexit and what is going to happen now that Britain has voted to LEAVE the EU?  
By Alice Foster  - PUBLISHED: 11:00, Fri, Sep 1, 2017 | UPDATED: 15:39, Fri, Sep 1, 2017  
See: http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/682376/Brexit-how-long-take-Britain-to-leave-EU-referendum-2016-vote-
talks-negotiations  
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Table (1.2): List of European Union countries and territories by population 
 
Name Capital Accession 
Population 
(2016) 
Area (km2) 
Population 
density 
(per km²) 
Austria Vienna 1 Jan 1995 8,700,471 83,855 103.76 
Belgium Brussels Founder 11,289,853 30,528 369.82 
Bulgaria Sofia 1 Jan 2007 7,153,784 110,994 64.45 
Croatia Zagreb 1 July 2013 4,190,669 56,594 74.05 
Cyprus Nicosia 1 May 2004 848,319 9,251 91.7 
Czech 
Republic 
Prague 1 May 2004 10,553,843 78,866 133.82 
Denmark Copenhagen 1 Jan 1973 5,707,251 43,075 132.5 
Estonia Tallinn 1 May 2004 1,315,944 45,227 29.1 
Finland Helsinki 1 Jan 1995 5,487,308 338,424 16.21 
France Paris Founder 66,661,621 640,679 104.05 
Germany Berlin Founder 82,162,000 357,021 230.13 
Greece Athens 1 Jan 1981 10,793,526 131,990 81.78 
Hungary Budapest 1 May 2004 9,830,485 93,030 105.67 
Ireland Dublin 1 Jan 1973 4,658,530 70,273 66.29 
Italy Rome Founder 60,665,551 301,338 201.32 
Latvia Riga 1 May 2004 1,968,957 64,589 30.48 
Lithuania Vilnius 1 May 2004 2,888,558 65,200 44.3 
Luxembourg 
Luxembourg 
City 
Founder 576,249 2,586 222.83 
Malta Valletta 1 May 2004 434,403 316 1,374.69 
Netherlands Amsterdam Founder 16,979,120 41,543 408.71 
Poland Warsaw 1 May 2004 38,454,576 312,685 122.98 
Portugal Lisbon 1 Jan 1986 10,341,330 92,390 111.93 
Romania Bucharest 1 Jan 2007 19,759,968 238,391 82.89 
Slovakia Bratislava 1 May 2004 5,426,252 49,035 110.66 
Slovenia Ljubljana 1 May 2004 2,064,188 20,273 101.82 
Spain Madrid 1 Jan 1986 46,438,422 504,030 92.13 
Sweden Stockholm 1 Jan 1995 9,851,017 449,964 21.89 
United 
Kingdom 
London 1 Jan 1973 65,341,183 243,610 268.22 
Totals: 28 countries  510,056,011 4,475,757 113.9686 
                                               
86 See European Union. (2017). Countires. Retrieved from European Union: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/countries_en 
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The EU operates solely within those competencies conferred on it upon the treaties and 
according to the principle of subsidiary. Laws made by the EU institutions are passed in a 
variety of forms; and can be classified into two groups. First group includes laws which 
come into force without the necessity for national implementation measures, and second 
group includes laws which specifically require national implementation measures.  
 
Competencies in scrutinizing and amending legislation are divided between the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, while executive tasks are carried out 
by the European Commission and in a limited capacity by the European Council (not to 
be confused with the aforementioned Council of the European Union). The monetary 
policy of the euro zone is governed by the European Central Bank. The interpretation and 
the application of EU law and the treaties are ensured by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. There are also a number of ancillary bodies which advise the EU or 
operate in a specific area. 
 
The EU comprises of several institutions and bodies of homogenous nature operating 
under a hierarchical structure.87 
                                               
87 EU institutions and other bodies 
EU institutions in brief 
European Parliament / European Council / Council of the European Union / European Commission / Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) / European Central Bank (ECB) / European Court of Auditors (ECA) / European External 
Action Service (EEAS) / European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) / European Committee of the Regions 
(CoR) / European Investment Bank (EIB) / European Ombudsman / European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) / 
Interinstitutional bodies 
A unique institutional set-up 
In the EU's unique institutional set-up: 
• the EU's broad priorities are set by the European Council, which brings together national and EU-level leaders 
• directly elected MEPs represent European citizens in the European Parliament 
• the interests of the EU as a whole are promoted by the European Commission, whose members are appointed by 
national governments 
• Governments defend their own country's national interests in the Council of the European Union. 
Setting the agenda 
The European Council sets the EU's overall political direction – but has no powers to pass laws. Led by its President - 
currently Donald Tusk - and comprising national heads of state or government and the President of the Commission, it 
meets for a few days at a time at least twice every 6 months. 
Law-making 
There are 3 main institutions involved in EU legislation: 
• the European Parliament, which represents the EU’s citizens and is directly elected by them; 
• the Council of the European Union, which represents the governments of the individual member countries. The 
Presidency of the Council is shared by the member states on a rotating basis. 
• the European Commission, which represents the interests of the Union as a whole. 
Together, these three institutions produce through the "Ordinary Legislative Procedure" (ex "co-decision") the policies 
and laws that apply throughout the EU. In principle, the Commission proposes new laws, and the Parliament and 
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5.2 Structure and nature of the Gulf Cooperation Council – (GCC)  
The GCC is the most explicit trading bloc agreement in the Arab region, with the 
exception of the Qatar crisis explained earlier, it presents the example which serves 
this research, being the most developed trading bloc among Arab countries. The AEU, 
if ever achieved would be an explicit form of an extended GCC. The Gulf countries 
share homogeneous aspects such as same language, culture, religion and history, and 
also face similar set of economic challenges, a fact that necessitated the development 
of stronger economic integration. From 1975 till 1978, four GCC members (UAE, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar) attempted to reach a monetary coordination, as a step 
toward issuing a common Gulf currency. The attempt however was futile and the 
issuance of a common currency was put off (El-Kuwaiz, 1988).88 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Council adopt them. The Commission and the member countries then implement them, and the Commission ensures 
that the laws are properly applied and implemented. 
Decision-making in the EU - more on EU law-making procedures 
List of presidencies of the Council of the EU 2014-2020 
  
Other EU institutions and bodies 
Two other institutions play vital roles: 
• the Court of Justice of the EU upholds the rule of European law 
• the Court of Auditors checks the financing of the EU's activities. 
The powers and responsibilities of all of these institutions are laid down in the Treaties, which are the foundation of 
everything the EU does. They also lay down the rules and procedures that the EU institutions must follow. The Treaties 
are agreed by the presidents and/or prime ministers of all the EU countries, and ratified by their parliaments. 
The EU has a number of other institutions and inter-institutional bodies that play specialised roles: 
o the European Central Bank is responsible for European monetary policy 
o the European External Action Service (EEAS) assists the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, currently Federica Mogherini. She chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and conducts the 
common foreign and security policy, also ensuring the consistency and coordination of the EU's external action. 
o the European Economic and Social Committee represents civil society, employers and employees 
o the European Committee of the Regions represents regional and local authorities 
o the European Investment Bank finances EU investment projects and helps small businesses through the European 
Investment Fund 
o the European Ombudsman investigates complaints about maladministration by EU institutions and bodies 
o the European Data Protection Supervisor safeguards the privacy of people’s personal data 
o the Publications Office publishes information about the EU 
o the European Personnel Selection Office recruits staff for the EU institutions and other bodies 
o the European School of Administration provides training in specific areas for members of EU staff 
o a host of specialised agencies and decentralised bodies handle a range of technical, scientific and management 
tasks 
See European Union . (2017). EU institutions and other bodies. Retrieved from European Union : 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies_en 
 
88 See El-Kuwaiz, A. I., 1988. Economic Integration of the GCC: CHallenges, Achievements and Future 
Outlook. s.l.:American-Arab Affiars. 
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It was not until May 1981 when the four Gulf countries, along with Saudi Arabia and 
Sultanate of Oman, signed the Charter of the GCC. The six members have a combined 
population of about 37 million, in 2007, and had a combined GDP of USD 821 billion.  
 
5.2.1 The objectives of the GCC: 
The objectives of the GCC include coordination, integration and inter-connection 
between member states in all fields, formulation of similar regulations in the fields of 
economic and financial affairs, commerce, customs and communications.  
To achieve these objectives the GCC countries erected three main entities which are: 
1) The Supreme Council; 
2) The Ministerial Council; 
3) The Secretariat General.  
The GCC Charter allows each of the above organisations to establish sub-agencies as it 
may deem necessary (GCC Charter)89. The Charter spreads over (22) Articles as follows:  
The UAE, State of Bahrain, KSA, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar and State of Kuwait;  
Being fully aware of the ties of special relations, common characteristics and similar 
systems founded on the creed of Islam which bind them; and Desiring to effect 
coordination, cooperation and integration between them in all fields; and, Having the 
conviction that coordination, cooperation, and integration between them serve the 
sublime objectives of the Arab Nation; and, Having the conviction that coordination, 
cooperation, and integration between them serve the sublime objectives of the Arab 
Nation; and, In pursuit of the goal of strengthening cooperation and reinforcement of the 
links between them; and In an endeavour to complement efforts already begun in all 
essential areas that concern their peoples and realize their hopes for a better future on the 
path to unity of their States; and  
In conformity with the Charter of the LAS which calls for the realization of closer 
relations and stronger bonds; and  
In order to channel their efforts to reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic causes,  
Have agreed as follows:  
                                               
89 Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) / 25 May 1981  
The Cooperation Council – Charter: The Supreme Council - Rules of Procedure The Ministerial Council - Rules of 
Procedure The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes - Rules of Procedure  
See ISN, 1981. Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) , Zurich: s.n. 
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Article (1): The Establishment of the Council: A Council shall be established hereby to 
be named The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf hereinafter referred to 
as the Cooperation Council (GCC).  
Article (2): Headquarters: The CC shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  
Article (3): Cooperation Council Meetings: The Council shall hold its meetings in the 
state where it has its headquarters, and may convene in any member state.  
Article (4): Objectives: The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council are:  
(1) To effect coordination, integration and inter-connection between Member States in all 
fields in order to achieve unity. (2) To deepen & strengthen relations, links & areas of 
cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in various fields. (3) To formulate 
similar regulations in various fields including the following:  Economic and financial 
affairs, Commerce, customs and communications, Education and culture. (4) To stimulate 
scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mining, agriculture, water 
and animal resources; to establish scientific research; to establish JVs and encourage 
cooperation by the private sector for the good of their peoples.   
Article (5): Council Membership: The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six 
states that participated in the Foreign Ministers' meeting held in Riyadh on 4 Feb. 1981.  
Article (6): Organisation of the Cooperation Council: The Cooperation Council shall 
have the following main organisations: (1) Supreme Council to which shall be attached 
the Commission for Settlement of Disputes, (2) The Ministerial Council, and (3) The 
Secretariat General. Each of organise may establish sub-agencies as may be necessary.  
Article (7): Supreme Council (SC): The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six 
states that participated in the Foreign Ministers' meeting held in Riyadh on 4 February 
1981. The SC is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council and shall be formed of 
heads of member states. Presidency shall be rotatory based on alphabetical order of 
member states names. The SC shall hold one regular session every year. Extraordinary 
sessions may be convened at the request of any member seconded by another member. 
The SC shall hold its sessions in the territories of member states. A Supreme Council's 
meeting shall be considered valid if attend by two-thirds of the member states.  
Article (8): The Functions of the Supreme Council: The SC shall endeavour to realize 
the objectives of the Cooperation Council, particularly through 10 functions:  
Article (9): Voting in the Supreme Council: The Cooperation Council shall be formed 
of the six states that participated in the Foreign Ministers' meeting held in Riyadh on 4 
February 1981. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote. Resolutions of 
the Supreme Council in substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous approval of the 
member states participating in the voting, while resolutions on procedural matters shall 
be carried by majority vote.  
Article (10): Commission for the Settlement of Disputes: The Cooperation Council 
shall have a commission called "The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes" which 
shall be attached to the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council shall establish the 
composition of the Commission for every case on an "ad hoc" basis in accordance with 
the nature of the dispute. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or opinion, 
as applicable, to the SC for such action as the Supreme Council deems appropriate.  
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Article (11): Ministerial Council: The Ministerial Council shall be formed of the 
Foreign Ministers of the member states or other delegated ministers. The Council 
Presidency shall be for the member state, which presided the last ordinary session of the 
Supreme Council, or if necessary, for the state which is next to preside the SC.  
The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may hold extraordinary 
sessions at the invitation of any member seconded by another member.  
The Ministerial Council shall determine the venue of its next session. A Council's 
meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two-thirds of the member states.  
Article (12): Functions of the Ministerial Council  
(1) Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing 
cooperation and coordination between member states in various fields and adopt the 
resolutions or recommendations required in this regard. (2) Endeavour to encourage, 
develop and coordinate activities existing between member states in all fields. 
Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be referred to the Ministerial Council for 
further submission, with recommendations to the Supreme Council for appropriate action. 
(3) Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies whereby 
the Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put into effect. (4) Encourage means of 
cooperation and coordination between the various private sector activities, develop 
existing cooperation between the member states' Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
and encourage movement within the GCC of workers who are citizens of member states. 
(5) Refer any of the various aspects of cooperation to one or more technical or specialised 
committee for study and presentation of appropriate recommendations. (6) Review 
proposals related to amendments to this Charter/submit appropriate recommendations to 
the Supreme Council. (7) Approve Rules of Procedure of both the Ministerial Council 
and Secretariat General. (8) Appoint Assistant SG., as nominated by the SG, for a period 
of three year, renewable. (9) Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and 
regulations relating to administrative and financial affairs proposed by the Secretary-
General, and submit recommendations to Supreme Council for approval of budget of 
Secretariat General. (10) Make arrangements for meetings of the Supreme Council and 
prepare its agenda. (11) Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.  
Article (13): Voting in the Ministerial Council: Every member of the Ministerial 
Council shall have one vote. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council in substantive matters 
shall be carried by unanimous vote of the member state present and participating in the 
vote, and in procedural matters by majority vote.  
Article (14): The Secretariat General: The Secretariat General shall be composed of a 
Secretary-General who shall be assisted by assistants and a number of staffs as required. 
The SC shall appoint the Secretary-General, who shall be a citizen of one of the 
Cooperation Council states, for a period of three years, which may be renewed once only.  
The Secretary-General shall nominate the Assistant Secretaries General. The Secretary 
General shall appoint the Secretariat General staff from among the citizens of member 
states, and may not make exceptions without the approval of the Ministerial Council.  
Article (15): Functions of the Secretariat General: These are split into (8) functions.   
Article (16): The SG and Assistant SG and all SG staff shall carry out their duties in 
complete independence and for the joint benefit of the member states. They shall refrain 
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from any action/behaviour incompatible with their duties and from divulging confidential 
matters relating to their appointments either during or after their tenure of office.  
Article (17): Privileges and Immunities: The Cooperation Council and its organisations 
shall enjoy on the territories of all member states such legal competence, privileges and 
immunities as are required to realize their objectives and carry out their functions. 
Article (18): Budget of the Secretariat General: The Secretariat General shall have a 
budget to which the member states shall contribute in equal amounts.  
Article (19): The Implementation of the Charter: This Charter shall go into effect as 
of the date it is signed by the Head of States of the six-member states named in this 
Charter's preamble. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with the MoFA 
of KSA which shall act as custodian and shall deliver a true copy thereof to every state. 
Article (20): Amendments to Charter: Any member state may request an amendment 
of this Charter. Request for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the SG who shall 
refer them to the member states at least four months prior to submission to the Ministerial 
Council. An amendment shall become effective if unanimously approved by the SC.  
Article (21): Closing Provisions: No reservations may be voiced in respect of the 
provisions of this Charter.  
Article (22): The SG shall arrange to deposit and register copies of this Charter with the 
League of Arab States and the United Nations, by resolution of the Ministerial Council.  
This Charter is signed on one copy in the Arabic language at Abu Dhabi City, United 
Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401 corresponding to 25 May 1981.  
 
5.2.2 Unified Economic Agreement: 
In accordance with the GCC Charter and as a step toward strengthening their 
economic ties, the GCC members signed the Unified Economic Agreement on the 
25th of May 1981 in Abu Dhabi. The UEA articulated the principles of coordination 
and integration of economic activities. The agreement calls for the following actions:  
a. Dismantling tariffs on regional products and implementing a common tariff on 
non-GCC products. 
b. Coordinating member states commercial policies and relations with other states 
and regional economic blocs with a view to creating balanced trade relations. 
c. Granting all GCC citizens equal treatment regarding freedom of movement, work 
and residence; freedom of exercising economic activities and capital movement 
d. Coordinating and harmonizing members’ development plans. 
e. Formulating unified oil policies. 
f. Adopting a common legal framework for trade and investment. 
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g. Cooperating in the financial and monetary sphere. Article (22) of the Agreement 
reads (available GCC web-site), "Member states shall seek to coordinate their 
financial, monetary and banking policies and enhance cooperation between 
monetary agencies and central banks, including the endeavour to establish a joint 
currency in order to further their desired economic integration”.  
 
Efforts toward regional integration have strengthened the ties between the 
member states. The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has been 
underway over the past twenty years, has resulted in the freedom of movement of 
goods, services, national labour, and capital.  
As previously mentioned, the main goals of the GCC include strengthening the 
economic cooperation among member countries, harmonizing their economic and 
financial policies, developing the private sector, and achieving a monetary union.  
 
5.2.3 Arab Common Characteristics: 
Over and above, the GCC countries share common characteristics; namely, heavy 
reliance on hydro carbon, geographical proximity, small private and dominant public 
sectors, heavy reliance on foreign labour force in the private sector, common 
language and culture, and small populations except for KSA that has about 70 % of 
the population of the GCC countries (Thomas D. Willett, 2009)90.  
In the year 2000, the GCC countries approved the use of a common exchange rate 
peg as a step towards the formation of a common currency in 2010. In 2001, a joint 
custom tariff of five percent was agreed on and enforced two years later. In 2002, the 
USD was chosen as the intermediate peg before the common currency comes into 
effect.  In 2003, the GCC countries have adopted the customs union to lift all the 
tariffs and other trade barriers among themselves (Bank, 2010).91 
To further strengthen ties between them, group of states harmonized the banking 
sector, as well as permitted nationals to own real estate and trade in member states 
stock exchange. It was necessary however to revise the initial target date of 2010 that 
                                               
90 See Thomas D. Willett, 2009. The GCC’s Fixed Exchange Rate: A Major Anomaly for OCA Analysis. 1st ed. s.l.:s.n. 
 
91 See Bank, W., 2010. Economic Integration in the GCC , Washington : World Bank/Dominic Sansoni. 
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was set for adopting a common currency and forming a monetary union until the 
following reforms were completed (Fasano & Iqbal, 2003).92   
a. Adopting a common code of fiscal conduct, consisting of clear criteria for fiscal 
convergence, a common accounting framework for public accounts, and adequate 
budgetary procedures.  
b. Determining a common exchange rate policy, including pooling of official foreign 
assets and the irrevocable fixing of bilateral conversion rates. 
c. Developing institutions, such as a common central bank, to support the monetary 
union, as well as a common set of instruments to ensure that monetary policy 
operations have a similar effect throughout the GCC monetary area. 
d. Establishing adequate data quality and common standards to assess progress 
toward convergence criteria and adherence to policy objectives.  
 
In accordance with its charter, the GCC presidency is rotated yearly in the Arabic 
alphabetical order of member states names. The Ministerial Council composed of the 
foreign ministers of the member states or other delegated Ministers. The Secretariat-
General is run by a Secretary General (SG) and three Assistant SGs in charge of 
political, financial and military affairs respectively.  
The position of the Secretary General is rotated in the Arabic alphabetical order of the 
names of the member states and appointed by the Supreme Council during the 
summit meeting with a 3-year term of office.  
 
Facing the present new global situation, the six countries of the GCC have 
increasingly shown a tendency of participating in international and regional affairs in 
the capacity of the GCC as a whole, developing pluralistic foreign relationship and 
emphasizing on achieving equilibrium between major powers.  
On major global and regional affairs, GCC states are supposed to adopt a unified 
stand and play a collective role, reflecting unity and integrity of foreign policies of 
the six countries; however, the recent Qatar crisis which erupted in May 2017, and 
which has been thoroughly explained previously in this chapter, has revealed the 
loopholes and anomalies, and posed a threat to the structure of the GCC itself. 
                                               
92 See Fasano, U., & Iqbal, Z. (2003). GCC Countries: From Oil Dependence to Diversification, IMF.  
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5.2.4 Reasons for establishment 
The general source to establish the GCC was to effect integration between 
member states in all fields. More precisely, and as per the GCC Charter, amongst 
the main establishment reasons are: 
1.  To effect coordination, integration, and interconnection among member states 
in all fields in order to achieve unity among them. 
2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links and areas of co-operation now 
prevailing among their people in various fields. 
3. To promote the development of industry, agriculture, science and technology, 
to establish scientific research centres. 
4. To set up joint ventures and encourage economic and trade cooperation by the 
private sector. 
5.  To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following 
a. Economic and financial affairs 
b. Commerce, customs and communications 
c. Education and culture 
d. Social and health affairs 
e. Information and tourism 
f. Legislative and administrative affairs 
 
5.3 Assessment and extraction of the successful experiences in both blocs to adopt 
and utilise for the construction of the Arab Economic Union 
 
5.3.1 Assessment of an Arab Economic Union 
One cannot overlook the general disadvantages of a trading bloc that would 
normally apply to an Arab Economic Union, however, greater are the advantages 
that would apply as well, and this is how an AEU could be seen as a goal where 
the outputs would be mostly in the benefit of the Arab citizens, promoting their 
prosperity, providing a more secure region, securing further economic and 
political immunity to the internal and external instability factors threatening the 
security of the Arab citizens in general. 
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On the other hand, the Arab Economic Union would be a natural evolution of the 
Arab societies; what applies to the GCC regarding the common elements and 
shared facts between its members applies explicitly to the Arab countries that 
share several aspects of their civilization through centuries of common history, 
language, religious beliefs, and social tradition and values as well as few trading 
agreements, bilateral trading agreement and free trade area agreements. 
Unfortunately, it is common to find protected corruption in Arab states. It is this 
corruption that hinders any step towards a better future and destroy the possibility 
to arrange a constructive structure. 
 
To overcome this dark fact, and to avoid losing hope, it is important to remember 
that it took the GCC’s six members 16 years to step into the second stage of their 
process whereby they finally signed their custom union agreement. Although they 
could not meet their plans for a common currency in 2010, they were able to 
achieve significant growth throughout the years since the GCC’s inception. 
Although the recent Qatar crisis has raised many fears concerning the future of the 
GCC, this custom union remains to be the most developed in the region on the 
integration level. In addition, it took the Europeans almost 50 years to accomplish 
their economic union. Therefore, and even if the AEU construction required a full 
generation period to be achieved, it is worth the wait due to the anticipated results. 
 
5.3.2 The Union literacy  
This empirical rule paves the way towards a successful AEU. Developing a 
mature literacy of the economic union vision is an ongoing long term process that 
helps to raise a generation ready to encourage and to facilitate the establishment 
of an economic union among Arab countries, hopefully leading one day to a fully 
operational Arab political union. A literacy integrated in the Arab societies 
confirms the necessity and the feasibility of the economic union. Such literacy is 
assimilated by several accomplishable intangible and tangible means. Investing in 
infrastructure regional projects and mutual profit oriented business projects would 
strengthen the interest factor were several Arab countries (desiring to benefit from 
the advantages of an economic bloc) would mutually invest in large businesses 
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and projects in the fields of tourism, healthcare, sports, education, research, hedge 
funds, sovereign funds, trans-border transportation, electricity, irrigation, 
agriculture and more. Such investments will attract other Arab states and broaden 
the AEU perspective, which represents a pre-step as a preparatory stage to set up 
a free trade area followed by a custom union and a common market in order to 
reach an economic union with common currency after creating an Arab Central 
Bank, all of which play as the sound platform to achieve full political integration 
based on many common factors which do not exist in other parts of the world. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter serves to set up the platform considered as the first step in a “thousand mile 
journey”, and while it presented a “factual background study” through providing a 
description of the economic and financial global crisis followed by discussing the historic 
and current models of trading blocs and global economic integration models, it also 
observed the previous and scheduled attempts to establish Arab economic unity.  
 
More importantly there is an attempt to conclude this chapter by exploring the incentives, 
challenges and opportunities to create a legal and financial order from the eye of the Arab 
Spring / Uprising which is thought to be the result of political and social reaction to the 
government austerity and corruption. As a result, this introductory chapter focused on the 
idea of transforming the most severe challenges into real opportunities of unification, 
through shedding the light on positive elements that currently exists to build on them as 
basis for unity, especially with the Arab world witnessing unprecedented turbulence, 
commotion and wars; ultimately believing that this is the best time to achieve the desired 
change. 
 
Over and above, the currently only existing Arab regional custom union (GCC) makes 
the Arab integration process more facilitated, since it presents the cornerstone and 
backbone of Arab economic integration. In addition, the existence of the EU model 
represents a “fit to follow” example and a lesson to learn from, and which may be highly 
benefited from, as the most successful reference in recent history. 
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CHAPTER (2) 
ECONOMIC OPERATIONAL LIBERTY AND FREE MOVEMENT 
OF FACTORS OF PRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
 
For over 50 years now, there has been increased awareness of Arab nationalism which 
affirms in its nature that Arabs should seek to constitute a single nation.  Arabism binds 
Arabic speaking people to each other on the basis of cultural uniformity beyond the 
political, economic, linguistic, religious, historical, and emotional links. This has become 
more vivid along with the wide expansion and diversity within the Arab World.93 
 
Currently, the Arab League “League of Arab States – LAS” and in spite of its defective 
efficiency and performance, is the only inclusive organisation which is considered as the 
umbrella for Arab cooperation. As a regional organisation of Arab states created in 1945, 
the LAS aims, as per its Charter, to enhance Arab cooperation and coordination in all 
relevant areas with the ultimate goal of establishing the Arab Common Market and 
economic integration, namely through the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU).  
 
As a result, the LAS is theoretically regarded as a representative of Arabs welfare through 
pursuing the political unification of the Arab countries and paving the Pan Arabism 
project. The Arab world’s integration efforts have practically instigated in the 1950s, 
prior to any initiatives which took place in other developing regions, and almost around 
the same time of the European initiation.  
 
The most famous example was the Arab Economic Unity Agreement signed on 
03/06/1957 and which came into force on 30/04/1964 as an initiative by Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, and Syria to form an Arab Common Market.   
 
                                               
93 See Dawisha, A. (2003). Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century: From Triumph to Despair. Princeton University 
Press. Retrieved from The Guardian . 
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Today, the key multilateral trade agreements are the Agadir Agreement between Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia which has been in force since 2007, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) which is the only existing custom union in the region in force since 2003, 
and the Pan Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA) in force since 1998 which includes 
members of the GCC and Agadir as well as other members of the Arab League.  
 
In addition, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which includes Agadir parties Tunisia, 
Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania. Over and above, Arab countries also belong to 
a crossing network of intraregional bilateral trade agreements amongst them.  
 
For instance, Jordan has agreements with Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, UAE and is negotiating an agreement with the GCC; Tunisia has 
agreements with Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco; and Egypt has agreements 
with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. 
 
Based on the above, it has become evident that Arab states have already put in place 
many bilateral and multilateral agreements amongst them, which indicates their readiness 
and existing will to march forward towards establishing further cooperation which leads 
to integration.  
 
As a result, and in line with what was discussed in Chapter (1), and what will be further 
discussed and explored in the coming chapters, the Arab states are required to utilise the 
elements which currently exist for the sole purpose of realising full economic integration, 
based on first the efforts that have already been exerted, and second on the very 
promising potential and capabilities which exist.  
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Section (1): Introduction of trading blocs and their application towards creating a 
trade union followed by full economic integration (economic union) 
1.1 Free Trade Area 
It is a group of countries that have signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and 
have few or no price controls in the form of tariffs or quotas between each other. Free 
trade areas allow the signatory nations to focus on their comparative advantages and to 
produce the goods they are comparatively more efficient at making, thus increasing the 
efficiency and profitability of each country and increase in competition because 
manufacturers are closer together, which create economy of scale due to decrease cost 
and increase mass production.  
 
One of the most well known and largest free trade areas was created by the signing of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on January 1st, 1994. This agreement 
between Canada, the United States of America and Mexico encourages trade between 
these North American countries and Mexico. 
 
In order to develop a FTA, participating nations must develop rules concerning its 
operation and administration. In terms of the customs procedures that each country must 
follow; the tariffs, if present, that will be allowed and their associated costs, solutions of 
trade disputes between participating countries, resolution of trade disputes, transportation 
of goods for trade, establishing and management of intellectual property rights. The goal 
is to create a trade policy that all countries in the FTA agree to implement diligently. 
 
Free Trade Areas benefit consumers, who will have increased access to less expensive 
and higher quality foreign goods, whereby prices decrease since governments reduce or 
eliminate tariffs. Producers may struggle with increased competition, but they may also 
acquire a greatly expanded market of potential customers. Workers in some countries and 
industries are likely to lose jobs as production shifts to become more efficient overall. 
Free Trade Areas can also encourage economic development in countries as a whole, 
benefiting everyone who resides there through increased living standards and wellbeing. 
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1.2 Custom Union 
The Custom Union is a trade agreement by which a group of countries charges a common 
set of tariffs to the rest of the world while granting free trade among each others; It is a 
partial form of economic integration that offers an intermediate step between free-trade 
zones (which allow mutual free trade but lack a common tariff system) and common 
markets (which, in addition to the common tariffs, also allow free movement of resources 
or factors of production such as capital, labour, products and services between member 
countries). A free-trade zone with common tariffs is a customs union. 
It has long been recognised that tariff barriers generally reduce the quantity of trade 
between countries. Under most circumstances this reduction in trade protects certain 
domestic producers, but it also translates into higher costs for consumers in both the 
importing and the exporting countries. Many governments attempt to resolve this 
problem by protecting politically favoured producers while also reducing consumer costs. 
Custom Unions, along with other forms of partial economically integrated blocs, offer 
solid means to achieve that balance. 
The Arab Custom Union is a custom union announced at the Arab League's 2009 Arab 
Economic and Social Development Summit in Kuwait in order to achieve a functional 
customs union supposedly by 2015, and the establishment of an Arab Common Market 
by 2020, which would be paralleled with increasing, inter Arab trade and integration.  
The announcement was made by the head of the Arab Customs Union Committee, Saud 
Al Jefeiri, who presided over a two-day meeting of the committee at the Arab League 
headquarters in Cairo, Egypt. Participants in the meeting discussed the Custom Union 
plan and its administrative structure, and reviewed the legal structure and regulations for 
this union. The union was planned to lead to the establishment of an Arab Common 
Market. Al Jefeiri, who represented Qatar at the meeting, said most Arab member 
countries agreed to put forward and implementing plan, Egypt and Morocco asked for an 
independent accord to govern the Custom Union. The Arab Custom Union resolution 
contains 17 chapters and 179 articles regulating economic and trade relationship between 
Arab countries, and aims to boost trade and investment among member states. 
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1.3 Common Market 
A common market is usually referred to as the first stage towards the creation of a single 
market. It is usually built upon a free trade area with relatively free movement of capital 
and of services, but not so advanced in reduction of the rest of the trade barriers.  
A common market allows for the free movement of capital and services but large 
amounts of trade barriers remain. It eliminates all quotas and “tariffs” – duties on 
imported goods – from trade in goods within it. However, “non-tariff barriers” remain 
such as differences between the Member States’ safety, packaging requirements and 
national administrative procedures.  
In a common market, the manufacturers for example, are prevented from marketing the 
same goods in all member states. The objective of a common market is most often 
economic convergence and the creation of an integrated single market. It is sometimes 
considered as the first stage of a single market. The European Economic Community was 
the first example of a common market. 
Examples and samples of Common Market throughout recent history: 
• European Union Single Market (European Economic Area – Switzerland)94 
• European Free Trade Association (EFTA)95 
                                               
94 The European Economic Area (EEA) was set up in 1994 to extend the EU’s provisions on its internal market to the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are parties to the EEA. Switzerland is 
a member of EFTA but does not take part in the EEA. The EU and EEA partners (Norway and Iceland) are also linked 
by various ‘northern policies’ and forums which focus on the rapidly evolving northern reaches of Europe and the 
Arctic region as a whole. According to (Bahadir, 2017), “the purpose of the European Economic Area (EEA) is to 
extend the EU’s internal market to countries in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA).  
These countries either do not wish to join the EU or have not yet done so. EU legislation relating to the internal market 
becomes part of the legislation of the EEA countries once they have agreed to incorporate it. Implementation and 
enforcement are then monitored by specific EFTA bodies and a Joint Parliamentary Committee.” 
See Bahadir, A. (2017, March). The European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland and the North. Retrieved from 
europarl.europa.eu: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.3.html 
 
95 According to (The European Free Trade Association), “The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an 
intergovernmental organisation set up for the promotion of free trade and economic integration to the benefit of its four 
Member States.” The Association is responsible for the management of: 
• The EFTA Convention, which forms the legal basis of the organisation and governs free trade relations between 
the EFTA States; 
• EFTA’s worldwide network of free trade and partnership agreements; and 
• The European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, which enables three of the four EFTA Member States (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway) to participate in the EU’s Internal Market. 
EFTA was founded in 1960 on the premise of free trade as a means of achieving growth and prosperity amongst its 
Member States as well as promoting closer economic cooperation between the Western European countries. 
Furthermore, the EFTA countries wished to contribute to the expansion of trade globally. 
See The European Free Trade Association. (n.d.). Retrieved from efta.int: http://www.efta.int/about-efta/european-free-
trade-association 
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• CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)96 
• Southern Common Market (Mercosur)97 
• Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)98 
• Eurasian Economic Union99 
                                                                                                                                            
 
96 According to (CARICOM: Definition of CSME, 2017), the CSME Unit of CARICOM is the implementation office 
which assists the Member States in fulfilling the requirements of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. 
The CSME seeks to implement provisions for the removal of trade and professional restrictions. These provisions 
facilitate the right to establishment businesses, to provide regional services, the free movement of capital and the 
coordination of economic policies. In the ensuing years, some Caribbean economies, under the auspices of multilateral 
lending institutions, implemented structural adjustment programmes having at their core, programmes of economic, 
financial and trade liberalisation that far exceeded their commitments as expressed in the Treaty of Chaguaramas.  The 
fundamental aspects of CSME are as following: 
1. Consumer Affairs 
2. Competition Policy 
3. Social Security 
4. Contingent Rights 
5. Immigration Arrangements for Free Movement of Persons 
6. Administrative Arrangements for Commercial Establishment 
7. Government Procurement 
8. Trade and Competitiveness in CARICOM 
See CARICOM: Definition of CSME. (2017). Retrieved from CARICOM Single Market & Economy.: 
http://csmeonline.org/news/about-the-csme  
 
97 According to (Keller, 2016), The Southern Common Market is one of the world’s leading economic blocs and 
its fifth-largest economy. Mercosur is made up of four member countries—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay—after Venezuela was notified it would be suspended from the trading bloc on December 1.  Founding 
member countries decided to remove Venezuela, which had joined Mercosur in 2012, for its failure to 
incorporate standards on trade and human rights into national laws, although the country could rejoin if it were to adopt 
the necessary norms. Bolivia is in the final stages of the accession to become the sixth member. Known as Mercosur in 
Spanish or Mercosul in Portuguese, the group encompasses 295 million people and has a combined GDP of nearly $3.5 
trillion. One of Latin America’s largest regional integration projects, Mercosur also counts Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Guyana, Peru, and Suriname serve as associate members.  
Mercosur functions as a customs union and free-trade area, and has ambitions to become a common market along the 
lines of the European Union. However, more than 20 years after its founding, the group still struggles to achieve that 
goal. Some questioned the bloc’s feasibility in recent years following decisions to temporarily suspend Paraguay after 
its president was impeached, and then when it admitted Venezuela as a full member. Nevertheless, Mercosur remains 
an economic and political force in the region, uniting South America’s two largest economies and providing a potential 
springboard for Latin American integration. With the Pacific Alliance, Latin America’s newest economic bloc, the two 
blocs combined represent more than 80 percent of regional trade and over 90 percent of its GDP. 
See Keller, M. (2016, December 06). Americas Society / Council of the Americas. Retrieved from as-coa.org: 
http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-what-mercosur-0 
 
98 According to (Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General, 2017), on 21st Rajab 1401 
AH corresponding to 25th May 1981, Their Majesties and Highnesses, the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, State 
of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar and State of Kuwait met in Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab Emirates, where they reached a cooperative framework joining the six states to effect coordination, 
integration and inter-connection among the Member States in all fields in order to achieve unity, according to article 4 
of the GCC Charter. Article 4 also emphasized the deepening and strengthening of relations, links and areas of 
cooperation among their citizens. The underpinnings which are clearly provided for in the preamble of the GCC 
Charter, confirm the special relations, common qualities and similar systems founded on the creed of Islam, faith in a 
common destiny and sharing one goal, and that the cooperation among these states would serve the sublime objectives 
of the Arab nation.  
See Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General. (2017). Retrieved from gcc-sg.org: 
http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/Pages/StartingPointsAndGoals.aspx 
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1.4 Economic and Monetary Union 
An Economic Union is a union to which two or more economies belong. Economic 
Unions are established by means of a formal intergovernmental legal agreement among 
sovereign countries/jurisdictions with the intention of fostering greater economic 
integration. In an economic union some of the elements associated with a national 
economic territory are shared among the different countries/jurisdictions. These include: 
• The free movement of goods and services within the Economic Union and a common 
tax regime for imports from non member countries (free-trade zone). 
 
• The free movement of capital within the Economic Union  
 
• The free movement of natural and legal entities within the Economic Union. 
 
Also in an Economic Union, specific regional organisations are created to support the 
functioning of the Economic Union under these three points. Some form of cooperation/ 
coordination in fiscal and monetary policy usually exists within an Economic Union. 
The best existing example of an economic union, which as previously suggested, will be 
considered as the main structure in the attempts of establishing the Arab Economic 
Union. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
99 According to (EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION, 2017), the Eurasian Economic Union is an international 
organisation for regional economic integration. It has international legal personality and is established by the Treaty on 
the Eurasian Economic Union. 
The EAEU provides for free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, pursues coordinated, harmonized and 
single policy in the sectors determined by the Treaty and international agreements within the Union. 
The Member-States of the Eurasian Economic Union are the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation. 
The Union is being created to comprehensively upgrade, raise the competitiveness of and cooperation between the 
national economies, and to promote stable development in order to raise the living standards of the nations of the 
Member-States. 
See EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION. (2017). Retrieved from eaeunion.org: http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about 
&  Wolczuk, R. D. (2017). The Eurasian Economic Union: Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power. London: The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs.  
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1.5 Political Union 
A political union is a type of state which is composed of or created out of smaller states. 
The process is called unification. Unification of states that used to be together and are 
reuniting is referred to as reunification. In this type of union, the individual states share a 
central government and the union is recognized internationally as a single political entity. 
A political union may also be called a legislative union or state union in some regions. 
A union may be affected in a number of forms, broadly categorized as: 
a. Incorporating union: In an incorporating union a new state is created, the former 
states being entirely dissolved into the new state. Examples: South Africa, Spain. 
 
b. Incorporating annexation: In an incorporating annexation a state or states is united 
to and dissolved in an existing state, whose legal existence continues. Annexation 
may be voluntary or, more frequently, by conquest. Examples: Italian unification, 
Prussia and Germany, England formally annexed Wales under the two Laws in 
Wales Acts of 1535 and 1542, Serbia annexed Montenegro in 1918. 
 
c. Federal (or confederal) union: In a federal or confederal union the states continue in 
existence but place themselves under a new federal authority. The federal state alone 
will be the state in international law though the federated states retain an existence in 
domestic law. Example: Australia, Canada, the United Arab Emirates and the USA. 
 
d. Federative annexation: If a state becomes a federated unit of another existing state, 
the former continuing its legal existence, then that is a federal annexation. The new 
federated state thus, ceases to be a state in international law but retains its legal 
existence in domestic law, subsidiary to the federal authority. Examples: British 
Columbia with Canada, Eritrea with Ethiopia, Geneva with Switzerland. 
 
e. Mixed unions: The unification of Italy involved a mixture of unions. The kingdom 
consolidated around the Kingdom of Sardinia. Several states voluntarily united with 
Sardinia to create the Kingdom of Italy. Formally the union in each territory was 
sanctioned by a popular referendum, formally asking the people to agree to have as 
their new ruler Vittorio Emanuele II (the King of Sardinia) and his legitimate heirs. 
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Section (2): Identification of free movement of the Factors of Production 
The orchestrators of the Arab economic integration must observe the European 
development trends. 
The foundation of the single market many years ago, with the opening of borders, is 
considered as one of the major influential forces behind economic growth in Europe. 
Recent globalization created new challenges for the European Union (EU). In order to 
meet these challenges, the Single Market Act proposes to put businesses and Europeans 
at the heart of the single market in order to produce a consistent tool to promote growth. 
The internal market is a single market in which free movement of goods, services, capital 
and persons is assured, and where citizens are free to live, study, work, and do business. 
The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimate that free 
movement has decreased the average unemployment rate across Europe by up to six 
percent (6%). For these reasons and many more, Arabs should crave more in order to 
create a single market after observing the benefits and advantages it brought to Europe. 
 
2.1 Free Movement of Capital 
Free movement of capital can lead to an optimal distribution of resources and an 
integration of open, competitive and efficient financial markets and services. This can 
maintain accountable macro-economic policy and promote growth through direct 
investment. This freedom is defined differently according to citizens, companies of 
various sizes and governments. 
2.1.1 Citizens: freedom means the ability to perform different operations abroad. These 
operations are; opening bank accounts, buying shares in non-domestic companies, 
investing where the greatest return is, buying real estate and many more activities. 
2.1.2 Companies of various sizes: freedom means the ability to invest in, and own, 
other companies and take an active part in management in addition to raising 
money, and to create jobs that consecutively benefit citizens. 
2.1.3 Governments: freedom means lower borrowing rates than before, becoming easier 
to finance expenses on schools, hospitals and other forms of public spending. 
 
89 | P a g e  
 
2.1.4 Capital Movements, between an investor in a union member and a financial 
institution in another union, can be one of the following when performed on a 
cross-border basis: 
a. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
b. Real estate investments or purchases. 
c. Securities investments (e.g. in shares, bonds, bills, unit trusts). 
d. Granting of loans and credits.  
e. Other operations with financial institutions, including personal capital operations 
such as endowments and other forms. 
 
2.2 Free Movement of People 
In her article100 published on BBC on 27th of July 2015, Sonia Sodha asked: “Where did 
the idea of free movement of people come from? The precursor to the EU was formed as 
European leaders came together in the wake of the Second World War, wanting to 
prevent another catastrophic war. The idea was that allowing people to move across the 
continent - from countries where there were no jobs to countries where there were labour 
shortages - would not only boost European growth, but would help prevent war by 
getting people to mix more across borders”. (End of quote). 
“If you wish to create a structure which would stop Germany and France ever going to 
war again, which was at the heart of the original principle,” says Gisela Stuart, the 
Bavarian born Labour MP for Birmingham Egbaston, "you did require a movement of the 
people in that area which would simply mean brother would never take up arms against 
brother again. And that has been achieved." (End of quote). 
Free movement of people mentioned in Rome Treaty Article 45 allows EU citizens to: 
a. Seek a job in another EU country without needing a work permit. 
b. Reside there for the purpose of work and stay even after termination of employment 
c. Treated equally with nationals in access to employment, working conditions and all 
other social and tax advantages. 
d. Have certain types of health and social security coverage. 
e. Benefit from abroad recognition of professional qualifications 
                                               
100 BBC on 27th of July 2015, Sonia Sodha 
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2.3 Free Movement of Services 
Services include industrial and commercial activities, in addition to activities of 
craftsmen and professionals. Such services are normally provided for remuneration 
irrespective of goods, capital or persons.  The scope of services has been significantly 
widened to include tourism, medical, financial, banking building loans, insurance, and 
lotteries. 
For Europe, there was a delay before the implementation of free movement of services, 
although free movement of goods was completed in the late 1960s. The core reason of 
this delayed progress, is that the service sector contains lots of activities; some of high 
importance for society and economy, whereas others are extremely rooted in national 
traditions. 
Free movement of services is provisioned in the following different cases: 
a. Service giver established in State 1 travels to State 2 to provide a service to recipient. 
b. Recipient of a service established in a State 1 travels to State 2 to obtain a service. 
c. Neither giver nor recipient travel, but service itself crosses border between Members. 
d. Recipient and service giver travel to a third Member State, where service is achieved. 
 
2.4 Free Movement of Products and Goods 
Free movement of goods, the first of the four fundamental freedoms of the Internal 
Market, indicates that conforming products can circulate liberally in the Internal Market. 
Legislation in the fields of intellectual property, competition, state aid and public 
procurement are available to ensure a fair and efficient market. 
This aims to ensure normal conditions of competition and removing all restrictions of a 
fiscal nature that may hinder the free movement of goods within the Common Market. In 
EU, for instance, member states have removed customs barriers and introduced a 
common customs policy towards other countries. Moreover, regulations to improve the 
free movement of goods in the community were established. These Regulations have 
direct or indirect effect of placing a product on the market; the modification or additional 
testing of that good before it can be placed on the market; and the withdrawal of that 
product. 
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Reported benefits from the free movement of goods can be divided into: 
Business and Citizens benefits: 
a. Easier access to a various suppliers and consumers 
b. Lower costs of products. 
c. Various commercial opportunities. 
d. Competitive prices 
e. Faster innovation and technological development 
f. Advanced safety standards and environmental protection. 
The Arab countries must benefit from the European experience in free movement of 
factors of production in their economic reform, whereby they must grasp the advantages 
of the system, while and to analysing drawbacks in order to avoid them. 
 
Section (3): Creating a “Trade Union” within the Arab Region. 
 
3.1 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC Model)  
The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf was established in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, on 25th May 1981 by the six Gulf states; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar, State of Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The CGG was meant to be a regional intergovernmental association.  
 
Figure (2)101: Map indicating Gulf Cooperation 
Council member countries and GCC Flag. 
This bloc was not the product of a heated moment 
but of many compact factors that facilitated 
cooperation among these six neighbour states; 
including homogeneous values on economic, 
regulatory, political, social, cultural and religious 
levels. It was sought to be a convenient response 
to the challenges of security and an enhancement 
to economic development and growth in the region. 
                                               
101 Figure (2): Map indicating GCC member countries. 
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3.1.1 The Organisational Structure of CCASG 
The Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council is the highest authority of the 
organisation. It is composed of the heads of the Member States who meet annually. 
Decisions of the Supreme Council are adopted by unanimous approval of all members.  
 
The Ministerial Council, which is consisted of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
Member States, meet quarterly to implement decisions of the Supreme Council and to 
formulate new policies and recommendations. 
The administrative arm of the cooperation is the office of the General Secretariat, which 
prepares special studies relating to cooperation, coordination, planning and programming 
for common action, monitors policy implementation and arranges meetings. 
 
3.1.2 Objectives of the Cooperation;  
The basic objectives as stated in the Article Four in the GCC Chart102 are: 
a. Assembling coordination, integration and inter-connection between member states in 
various fields in order to achieve unity between them. 
b. Deepening and strengthening relations, ties and areas of cooperation between their 
people in various fields. 
c. Formulating similar regulations in various fields including religion, economic and 
financial affairs, trade, customs and communications, education and culture, social 
and health affairs, information and tourism, legislative and administrative affairs. 
d. Fostering scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mining, 
agriculture, water and animal resources by establishing scientific research centres, 
setting up joint ventures and encouraging cooperation of the private sector for the 
good of their people.  
e. Adopting a unified military (Peninsula Shield Force) to protect countries from 
external forces.  
f. Establishing a common currency. 
 
                                               
102 See Fund, S. o. (2016). Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges for the GCC Countries. KSA : IMF. 
& Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General. (2017). Retrieved from gcc-sg.org: 
http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/Pages/StartingPointsAndGoals.aspx 
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3.1.3  Common Economic Agreements 
The Supreme Council adopted the Common Economic Agreement at its second Session 
on November 1981. This Unified Economic Agreement was the basis of the integration 
programs that have been developed after the launching of the GCC, and includes 
a. Achieving economic nationality among the GCC citizens 
b. Achieving the economic integration among Member States in gradual steps, 
starting with the establishment of the Free Trade Area, the Customs Union, the 
Common Market and concluding with the establishment of the monetary and 
economic union and its necessary pertinent common institutions. 
c. Convergence and unification of laws, regulations and strategies in the economic, 
financial and trade areas 
d. Interconnecting the infrastructures in Member States, particularly in areas of 
communications, electricity and gas and promoting the creation of joint ventures. 
 
With the developments of the joint action of the GCC and the global developments and 
challenges in the economic field, the Supreme Council adopted the Economic Agreement 
at its 22nd Session on December 2001. This updated Agreement has become more 
comprehensive, and contains mechanisms for implementation, follow ups and dispute 
settlement, focusing on the following topics: 
a. The GCC Custom Union 
b. The international economic relations between Member States and the other non-
GCC countries, economic groupings and international and regional organisations, 
and the provision of international and regional aids. 
c. The GCC Common Market which specifies the areas of the Economic nationality. 
d. The Monetary and Economic Union. 
e. Improving the investment climate in Member States. 
f. The development integration across Member States, including but not limited to 
the industrial and agricultural development, development of oil and gas and the 
natural resources. 
g. Development of human resources, including education, eradication of illiteracy, 
compulsion of basic education, activation of the population strategy, nationalizing 
and training of labour force and increasing their contribution to the labour market. 
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h. Scientific and technical research, development of scientific, technological and 
informatics database and protection of intellectual property rights. 
i. Integration in the various infrastructure areas, including transportation, 
telecommunications and e-commerce. 
 
3.1.4 Achievements of Cooperation 
a. The Supreme Council at the 29th Session, (Muscat - December 2008) adopted the 
Monetary Union Agreement and the Statute of the Monetary Council pursuant to 
the timeframe approved by the Supreme Council for establishing the Monetary 
Union and introducing the single currency. 
b. Having completed the main prerequisites, the GCC Common Market was 
declared in December 2007 to be launched as of January 2008. 
c. Trade promotion that falls in two stages: a) Establishing a Free Trade Area among 
Member States as of March 1983. This led to the free movement of national 
goods across Member States without customs and duties in accordance to national 
treatment with certain controls, and b) Establishing the GCC Custom Union as of 
January 1st 2003. This Customs Union provides for a common external tariff and 
the free movement of goods across member States without tariff or non-tariff 
barriers. 
d. Concluding the GCC Economic Agreement (2001) that was ratified by all 
Member States. 
e. Adopting general strategies and policies that would serve as the basis of national 
policies in Member States, such as the instruments issued by the Supreme Council 
in the planning, population, industry, oil and agriculture areas 
f. Unification of laws, regulations and procedures in the economic fields. The 
Supreme Council has adopted some 40 standard laws, some of which are binding 
while most of the other laws are for mere reference. 
g. Establishing the GCC joint institutions with a view to emphasizing the technical 
and economic cooperation among Member States and cutting the costs, such as 
Gulf Investment Organisation, GCC Standardization Organisation, Commercial 
Arbitration Centre, Patents Office, Technical Office for Telecommunications and 
the GCC ATM Network. 
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h. Coordination of positions in the international economic arena and the collective 
negotiation and economic dialogue with other countries and economic blocs, such 
as the EU, USA, Japan and China. 
i. Cooperation and coordination in the fields of the physical and nonphysical 
infrastructure projects such as roads, communications and telecommunications 
and in the field of joint projects, and the agreement on the implementation of the 
first phase of the Arab Electricity Interconnection Project103. 
 
3.2 The European Union (EU) Model  
European Union (EU) is an organisation created in 1993 with the aim of achieving closer 
economic and political ties between member states of European Community; it consists 
of 28 European countries and governs common economic, fiscal, monetary social, and 
security policies. In addition, the EU contests social exclusion and discrimination and 
encourages social justice and protection, gender equality, and children’s rights protection. 
 
Figure (3): Map indicating the European Economic Community and joining dates 
 
The current members are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom104. 
                                               
103 See Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development / Projects & Operations / Electricity 
http://www.arabfund.org/default.aspx?pageId=454 
104 See European Commission. (2017). Retrieved from ec.europa.eu: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/enhanced_cooperation_-_already_a_reality_in_the_eu_1.pdf   & Schengen Visa Info. (2017).  
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3.2.1 Objectives of the EU  
As declared by Article (3) of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union’s objectives include: 
a. Promoting of peace and the wellbeing of the Union´s citizens. 
b. Establishing of an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers. 
c. Securing sustainable development based on balanced economic growth and social 
justice. 
d. Setting up a social market economy that is highly competitive and aiming at full 
employment and social progress. 
e. Launching a free single market. 
 
3.2.2 Economic Agreements of EU 
The EU adopted stronger rules that include an international treaty to keep a tighter check 
on public debt and deficits. 
 
The EU built its main tool for safeguarding economic stability, the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP)105, comprehensively strengthening its application by: 
a. Placing greater emphasis on reducing high levels of government debt 
b. Weakening the excessive deficit Procedure so it can be triggered not only by a 
deficit in a given year but also by deeper, underlying developments in government 
debt. 
c. Setting up an annual cycle of economic policy coordination, led by the Commission. 
d. Enforcing stricter enforcement of fiscal rules, which include meaningful penalties 
for euro area countries that breach fiscal rules. 
e. Setting up new arrangements for monitoring risky economic imbalances – such as 
asset bubbles (in house prices, shares, etc.) and weakening competitiveness – and 
addressing them before they threaten the economic stability of a country, or indeed 
the whole euro area or EU. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Retrieved from schengenvisainfo.com: https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/eu-countries/ 
 
105 History of the Stability & Growth Pact 
He Stability and Growth Pact has evolved significantly along with the EU’s economic governance rules. 
See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-
governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact/history-stability-and-growth-pact_en  
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3.3 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) Treaty Figure (4): World Trade Org.  
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an 
international organisation established to supervise 
world trade and resolve trade disputes. It is the 
successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) that was an informal 
organisation that regulated world trade since 
1948. Located in Geneva, the World Trade 
Organisation began operations on January 1, 
1995. Contrary to the temporary nature of GATT, 
WTO is a permanent organisation which has been 
established on the basis of an international treaty approved by participating countries. It 
achieved the international status for some global organisations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction & Development 
(IBRD), however it is not an agency of the United Nations Organisation (UNO)106.  
 
3.3.1 Organisational Structure of WTO107 
The WTO has nearly 153 members accounting for over 97% of world trade. Decisions 
are made by the entire membership structure, typically by consensus. The WTO’s 
agreements have been ratified in all members’ parliaments. Within the WTO, the 
Ministerial Conferences is the top level decision making authority that meets at least once 
every two years. Below this body is the General Council which meets several times a 
year in the Geneva headquarters. The General Council also meets as the Trade Policy 
Review Body and the Disputes Settlement Body. At the second level, the Goods Council, 
Services Council and Intellectual Property Council (Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights - TRIPS) which reports to the General Council.  
Numerous specialized committees, working groups and parties deal with individual 
agreements and areas such as environment, development, membership applications and 
regional trade agreements along with other related agreements. 
                                               
106 See World Trade Organisation . (2017). Retrieved from wto.org: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm 
 
107 See World Trade Organisation . (2017). Retrieved from wto.org: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm 
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3.3.2 Key Functions of WTO: 
a. Sets and enforces rules for international trade. 
b. Provides a forum to negotiate and monitor further trade liberalization.  
c. Resolves international trade disputes.  
d. Increases the transparency of decision making processes.  
e. Cooperates with other major international economic institutions involved in 
global economic management, and  
f. Helps developing countries benefit fully from the global trading system. 
 
3.3.3 Objectives of WTO include: 
a. Improves the standard of living of people in the member countries.  
b. Ensures full employment and broad increase in effective demand. 
c. Supports and supervises production and trade of goods.  
d. Increases the trade of services.  
e. Ensures optimum utilization of world resources.  
f. Protects the environment, and 
g. Accepts the concept of sustainable development. 
 
 
Section (4): League of Arab States 
 
4.1 The welfare of each is bound in the welfare of all *Helen Kettler* 
Founded on March 19, 1945 with a broad mission of strengthening bonds and improving 
coordination between Arab States toward the mutual welfare of all members; 
The League of Arab States is one of the oldest international organisations and perhaps the 
first to call, years ago, for economic integration between its country members. 
In the highly dynamic, increasingly complex, world market led by aggressive 
globalisation trends, technological invasion and emerging excessive de-regulation cross 
borders barriers (e.g. fiscal, financial, and physical) are melting and fading away. 
Economic integration approaches and synergistic deployment of resources adopted by 
many states are promising strategies to cope with global challenges, mitigate risk and 
cease opportunities. 
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The Arab world must imperatively follow the footsteps of the many economic blocs 
formed by now. e.g. the European Union; the Pacific Trade Agreement (PTA); the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the Asian Pacific Economic cooperation 
(APEC) in addition to many other positive economic free trade agreements, customs 
unions, common markets. 
 
As previously mentioned, a practical approach is needed by League of Arab States to 
establish a strategic economic fit for the Arab region and draw an action plan to rebuild 
the necessary platform to establish an economic bloc. In order to promote and build roots 
for commitment, cooperation, flexibility, shared operations and interests among 
unfortunately rival sister states, the LAS and its members must undergo drastic reforms: 
 
4.1.1 Reproduce into an economical politically influencing entity and manage the 
dramatic political risk, the LAS must first amend its charter to allow enforcing 
and most importantly binding to all resolutions and regulations. Decisions 
reached by majority, only biding to accepting states, are significantly 
impairing the institution’s ability to make relevant or sufficient contribution.  
 
4.1.2 Establish necessary and reinforce already existing departments, to draft and 
enable necessary laws, regulations, policies, decrees, sanctions programs; 
economical, legal and financial plans to effectively manage inter-countries 
conflicts, control cross border trade, encourage and implement free trade 
agreements among country members. 
 
4.1.3 Establish processes to organize, monitor implementation, control and evaluate 
its laws and resolutions. Set up a sanction program to penalize non abiding 
members and develop monitoring channels such as working groups and 
reporting teams. 
 
4.1.4 Collaborate more effectively with active Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and remove unnecessary 
restrictions to harvest benefits from CSOs / NGOs integration. 
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4.1.5 Cooperate with business and economy knowledgeable professionals experts in 
the Arab World and encourage incentives for the many professionals residing 
abroad to return to their homelands and benefit their countries and region.   
 
4.1.6 Member States should empower LAS, a step largely dependent on their 
commitment and goodwill to sacrifice part of their national sovereignty. In 
return the LAS should recognise the importance of civil society contributions 
to develop a supporting base standing against its Member States’ narrow 
interests. 
 
4.1.7 Prepare for a suitable political background to build upon the economic merger 
by stressing on resolving the non-ending and ongoing territorial conflicts 
between its members. Through severe, yet fair, sanction programs and 
planned resolutions108.  
 
4.1.8 The LAS must develop an actionable, strategic economic integration plan with 
gradual implementation towards the unified Arabic Economic Union. This 
facilitates facing newly established large international economic blocs 
dictating their political rules and exploiting Arab world resources.  
 
4.1.9 Encourage common custom procedures and elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers between Arab countries, especially that some Arab countries impose 
100 % custom duties on imports from other Arab countries. In addition, it also 
worth mentioning that the US-GCC bilateral trade agreements are even 
stronger that those between GCC states and eventually other Arab countries. 
 
4.1.10 Promote and encourage financial, economical and educational reforms in 
member states and motivate investments diversification in order to build 
stable industrial and agricultural bases to reduce imports dependence, and 
achieve some technological independence. Noting that the potential for 
                                               
108 See (2010). Perspectives on merger integration. McKinsey&Company. 
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achieving growth, industrialization and economic development differs 
significantly between oil rich countries and other countries eventually needing 
stronger financial support.  
  
4.1.11 Encourage and control healthy investment environments and free trade 
agreements such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement, to be 
able to shift to Common Market and diverse the benefits of the large amounts 
of Arab resources invested in foreign stock markets towards the Arab 
expanded market. 
 
4.1.12 Appoint a team of Arab economists, scientists, lawyers, geopolitical experts to 
assess strength, weaknesses, risk and eventually missed opportunity in each 
member state to be able then the deploy resources in a synergistic way.  E.g. 
Oil rich countries with high GDP (Gulf States) and oil rich countries having 
also industrial diversification (Libya, Algeria...) can provide natural resources, 
the industrial base, technology and the know-how.  
 
Countries having no natural resources or unemployed ones (Lebanon, Jordan, 
Syria, Egypt...) can provide the agricultural base, the manpower, the human 
resources and the know-how as well109.  
 
This team would be entrusted in planning, implementing, effectively 
controlling and evaluating economical plans which initiate in the form of free 
trade areas and reach the full economic integration. 
 
The current situation is not favourable for integrating Arab economic forces 
with the bleeding territorial conflicts between member states, or even worse, 
with the populations left behind to face cruel savageries like Palestinians, Iraqi 
and Syrians. The Arab world must take serious actions to reinforce Arab 
solidarity. 
 
                                               
109 See The real wealth of nations. (2012). The Economist. 
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4.2 Viability of creating several Arab trade blocs (Levant - Maghreb - Existing GCC…) 
which represent a prerequisite to the merge process leading to complete unification.  
 
It is about time for the Arab World to mimic the trend and cease the increasingly growing 
importance and opportunity to develop suitable strategic economic plans leading towards 
the establishment of the desired Arabic Economic Union.  
In order to set up the scheme for a comprehensive economic integration, the Arab League 
of States may instigate by supporting the creation of new sub-regional Arab custom 
unions and reinforcing and developing already existing trade blocs to spur transforming 
them in custom unions. Sub-regional blocs, whether already established or newly created, 
can setup the background and proper platform for a gradual merger between sub-regional 
Arab custom unions to reach economic integration and produce the desired AEU. 
 
In addition, the League of Arab States may proceed through taking a series of 
complementary and preparatory steps which include but not limited to: (a) revitalisation 
of sub-regional free trade to strive economic and industrial development in the Arab 
region, (b) Elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, (c) liberalization of investment 
activities, (d) harmonization of custom procedures between countries sharing closer 
borders, and many other steps. History has proven that similar cultures and mutual 
concerns can diffuse scepticism; this would play as an aiding factor for setting the 
platform for sound Arab regional cooperation to build trade relationships shaped by 
mutual trust and sufficient consensus111. Upon the gradual merger, Arab states will aim 
towards the coordination of commercial and economic projects and secure unlimited free 
movement of the factors of production, as well as harmonization of tax and investment 
regulations, all of which will be in favour of the creation of the AEU based on the gradual 
merger of the existing and established sub-regional custom unions in the Arab World. 
Chapter (2)112 which commenced with identifying the theory and practice of an economic 
union formation as well as exploring the actual steps of formation of such union, has 
dealt in the second part with current existing models which may be considered as pillars 
or cornerstones for the establishment of an Arab Economic Union. This chapter paves the 
way to better explore the AEU proposed institutional structure, being topic of Chapter (3) 
                                               
111 See (n.d.). World Bank: Economic Integration. Washington: Office of the Chief Economist: Middle East and North 
Africa Region. Retrieved from World Bank. 
 
112 Chapter (2): Economic Operational Liberty and Free Movement of Factors of Production. 
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CHAPTER (3) 
PROPOSED INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE  
OF THE ARAB ECONOMIC UNION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
3.A Economic Union: Characteristics and Role 
Integration of states that used to be together and are reuniting is referred to as 
reunification. The integration of economies represents one of the most important 
economic developments among countries in a broadly defined geographic area. These 
countries tend to coordinate their policies to benefit from mutual and several advantages. 
This integration consists mainly of four elements: free trade, custom union, common 
market and economic union. Undoubtedly, the political union is regarded as the pinnacle 
of unification and the fifth element on the top of the hierarchy; it is founded when a 
group of smaller states compose a larger state leading to a consolidated group of states 
that share a joint internationally acknowledged government. The most common types of 
political unions include an incorporating union or annexation, a federal union or 
annexation, or mixed unions that have features of both federal and incorporating styles.113 
The economic union, however, which will be discussed below in all its aspects especially 
in the Arab World, represents the last and most advanced step of the economic 
integration process. It is an agreement between two or more countries, which permits the 
free flow of the factors of production, namely capital, labour, goods, and services. The 
participant countries share common financial and international trade policies in addition 
to a unified currency regarded as the highlight of the economic and monetary union.  
The Economic union permits the members to manage effectively their resources to 
increase economic efficiency and establish closer political and cultural links amongst 
themselves. It also secures acquiring goods and services at much lower costs because of 
the absence of tariffs. Citizens and their capital free to move between member states. 
                                               
113 See Political Union. Retrieved from BusinessDictionary.com on 28 May 2011: 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/political-union.html 
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Thus, citizens of an economic union can freely travel, study, work or live in any country 
of their choice. More jobs are generated which will allow graduates to seek opportunities 
and assume highly paid positions. Deprived regions economically will have the chance to 
develop through this cooperation and partnership with the economic union.  
The economic union also encourages the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through the 
remarkable market expansion. In addition, it has a crucial role in ensuring peace and 
security on the soil of all its member states through resolving the conflicts between them. 
 
3.B Importance of an Arab Economic Union (AEU) in light of current security, 
political and economic situations 
The Arab Economic Union (AEU) has been a controversial topic referred to as the “Arab 
Dream” for the past half century. The Arab Region remained under western colonisation 
until the mid-20th century, whereby the mid-1940s witnessed the beginning of an 
independence era for the region’s states. Although the colonizing powers ceased to exist 
physically, their economic and social impact maintained and the region was in continuous 
political and security commotion which impeded the developmental process and 
terminated any unification initiatives in spite of many attempts on the Arab level 
especially the League of Arab States. However, one cannot solely blame western powers. 
 
Prior to World War I (WWI) and namely prior to the 1916 Sikes – Pico Agreement114, the 
Arab World was a de-facto custom union. The factors of production moved freely 
between all Arab states and they shared main resources which included pan Arab 
transport, gas lines and other resources. The boarders did not basically exist and trade 
flourished throughout the region and tariffs were not introduced. The Sikes-Pico 
Agreement was a major turning point whereby the global powers, war lords at the time, 
drew the boarders of the new Arab Region and marked their boarders. The situation 
remained during World War II (WWII), and throughout that period the Arab states were 
under direct colonial control, a fact that made the return to a unified region technically 
                                               
114 Sikes – Pico Agreement officially known as the Asia Minor Agreement was a secret 1916 agreement between GB 
& France, to which the Russian Empire assented. The agreement defined their mutually agreed spheres of influence and 
control in Southwestern Asia.  
See Fromkin, D. (1989). A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern 
Middle East. New York: New York: Owl. 
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impossible. By the end of WWII, the independence chain reaction was initiated and the 
colonial powers mainly the UK, France and Italy, started withdrawing from colonized 
countries almost 70 years ago, theoretically leaving them to decide their own fate. 
 
In the mid-1940s, and parallel to the first wave of Arab revolutions claiming 
independence, many scholars and politicians launched discussions and debates related to 
the necessity of Arab unification after independence. Nevertheless, the newly freed states 
had neither the political experience nor the social and economic infrastructure nor the real 
orchestrated will to initiate a sound unification process based on the proper mechanisms.  
 
Nevertheless, this wave has witnessed remarkable shifts following the first few years of 
independence, and the Arab states started observing the value that unification would 
bring to them, and as a result on March 22nd 1945, the League of Arab States (LAS)115 
was founded; an organisation that consists of independent Arab States on the territory of 
northern and north-eastern part of Africa and southwest Asia. Representatives of the first 
6 member states that initiated the league’s formation signed the Agreement in Cairo were 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Since then, 16 additional states 
have joined the LAS, but due to recent events in Syria and LAS’s decision of suspension, 
LAS now counts 22 Members. 
 
In accordance with the Arab League’s main document, Charter of the Arab League, “the 
organisation’s main goal is strengthening of the relations between the member states, the 
coordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between them and to 
safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs 
and interests of the Arab countries. These affairs and interests include all important 
economic issues, including finances, commerce, business, currency, etc. They also 
include social, cultural and health affairs, communication, transport, travel, the question 
of nationality, visas and passports, and similar elements”. 
                                               
115 Like similar organisations whose goal is to look after their members’ economic, political, cultural, national and 
religious interests, the LAS has been active in helping the Arab world grow economically and culturally, while finding 
solutions to resolve conflicts both within the league and outside of it. 
See Admin1. (2012, September 13). Presentation of the Arab League .  
Retrieved from Arableagueonline.org: http://www.arableagueonline.org/hello-world/#more-1 
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Through various activities, campaigns and using advanced technology, the Arab League 
has shown interest in resolving modern day issues, like encouraging and promoting their 
young talents, supporting women in their struggle for equality, improving child welfare, 
etc. It also tries to solve decades-old problems like the conflict between Palestine and 
Israel, better known as the Arab-israeli conflict. The league has long been trying to draft 
a solution that would end war between israel and the surrounding Muslim countries. 
 
The organisation claims to strive to resolve burning issues among the Arab countries, and 
to improve the overall image of the Muslim states in the world today. Nevertheless, some 
scholars and observers claim that upon monitoring the League’s performance during the 
past few decades, it has become obvious that the League has failed to work within its 
mandates and has neither succeeded in making the required change, nor preserved the 
needed stability for its member countries and Arab citizens. 
 
As elaborated in Chapter (1), the Arab Uprising / Spring116 which is still causing 
turbulence, armed conflicts, war migration leading to refugees and smuggling, sealed 
borders and many other forms of disabilities; reveals the weakness of current structures 
and makes the existence of such a union an ultimate necessity. These several challenges 
represent a great opportunity for all the sectors in the Arab World, political, economic, 
and financial to commence serious steps to accomplish the Arab economic unity.  
 
According to (Manfreda, 2017)117, the term “Arab Spring” was popularized by the 
Western media in early 2011 when the successful uprising in Tunisia against former 
leader Zien El Abidine Ben Ali emboldened similar anti-government protests in most 
Arab countries. The term was a reference to the turmoil in Eastern Europe in 1989, when 
seemingly impregnable Communist regimes began falling down under pressure from 
                                               
116The Arab Spring was a series of anti-government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions that spread across the 
Middle East in early 2011. But their purpose, relative success, and outcome remain hotly disputed in Arab countries, 
among foreign observers, and between world powers looking to cash in on the changing map of the Middle East.  
See Manfreda, P. (2017, February 10). Definition of the Arab Spring. Retrieved from ThoughtCo.com: 
https://www.thoughtco.com/definition-of-the-arab-spring-2353029 
 
117 Primoz Manfreda is a researcher and political risk analyst, advising clients on political and economic 
trends in the Middle East. His love affair with the Middle East started with backpacking trips in 2001, and 
continued through studies, professional work and living experience in the region. 
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mass popular protests in a domino effect. In a short period of time, most countries in the 
former Communist bloc adopted democratic political systems with a market economy. 
 
However, the events in the Middle East took a less straightforward direction. Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Yemen entered an uncertain transition period; Syria and Libya were drawn 
into a civil conflict with the military intervention of foreign powers, while the wealthy 
monarchies in the Persian Gulf remained largely unshaken by the events. The use of the 
term the “Arab Spring” has since been criticized for being inaccurate and simplistic. 
 
According to (Samir, 2013), a research journalist, in his article “Arab Economic Union: 
A Dream or Reality”118, he stated that Arab political integration among Arab countries 
has for long time been a dear hope of nationalists, Nasserites and many other Arabs.  
 
While the economic integration amongst Arab countries seems to be more realistic, it 
remains challenged with the political paradox of power and cooperation. There are 
different views of economists, politicians, and businessmen, ranging between, pessimists, 
realists, and dreamers.  
Samir also claims that the integration of the economies of Arab countries has been a 
dream for about 50 years, and while many efforts have been exerted in this regard, in the 
form of negotiations, meetings, conferences, researches, and even agreements, what 
counts is the outcome, which is very modest, if not a failure, when compared to other 
realised experiences, such as the European Union which began at almost the same time as 
the Arab initiatives. 
 
Such extreme challenges represent real opportunities and potential which must be 
capitalised on. Multi-dimensional development on the national and regional levels have 
become a must to achieve the missing and long waited Arab unity and prosperity.   
 
 
                                               
118 See Samir, S. (2013, February 26). Arab Economic Union: A Dream or Reality? Retrieved from Ssamir.com: 
http://www.ssamir.com/657/arab-economic-union-a-dream-or-reality.html 
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Section (1): Membership: Criteria and Mechanisms 
In this chapter, it will be assumed that the Arab Economic Union (AEU) is in due process 
of establishment, and thus a theoretical policy making process will take place in terms of 
discussing the AEU structure on different levels and from different angles. The research 
will have a constitutional flavour since it narrates to building much stronger and solid 
economic links amongst the sceptical Arab countries. 
 
The current section (1) discusses the criteria and mechanisms for membership of the 
countries in the Arab Economic Union.  
1.1 Criteria for Membership119 
In order to become a member of the suggested AEU, a complex procedure that requires 
processes, negotiations, and meeting condition awaits the applicant state seeking 
membership. Once an applicant country meets the conditions and criteria for 
membership, it must implement AEU rules and regulations in all areas. There would be 
several criteria that define whether a country is eligible to join the AEU or not.  
In light of the above, the following criteria which have been similarly implemented for 
the European Union would also be adopted, developed and tailored by the suggested 
Arab Economic Union Special Accession Committee (AEUSAC).   
In principle the main criteria would require that the applicant state maintains: 
• Its institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights. 
• A functioning market economy in accordance to set standards. 
• An acceptance to the obligations and intent of the AEU. 
New members are admitted only when they can demonstrate they will be able to play 
their part fully as members, namely by complying with all the AEU's standards and rules, 
having the consent of the AEU institutions and AEU member states and having the 
consent of their citizens.120 
                                               
119 Most of the included criteria have been imported from the Copenhagen Accession Criteria which was adopted by 
the EU, nevertheless and once the criterion is stated, what follows is tailored to the AEU. 
120 It is adopted from the European Union model.   
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It is suggested to adopt of a similar process to the Copenhagen Criteria selection of EU, 
which states: “Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and 
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 
Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union”.121 
 
In addition to the above, the formation of the AEU Special Accession Committee 
“AEUSAC” which consists of 23 members and represents all Arab States, was suggested 
for the purpose of this research, whereby each state delegates a senior government 
executive to represent it on the committee. This committee will be responsible for setting 
the criteria and conditions for membership. Below is a detailed and explained list of the 
main criteria proposed to be met for a country to be eligible for membership.  
                                               
121 European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Conditions for membership 
The EU operates comprehensive approval procedures that ensure new members are admitted only when they can 
demonstrate they will be able to play their part fully as members, namely by: 
• complying with all the EU's standards and rules 
• having the consent of the EU institutions and EU member states 
• having the consent of their citizens – as expressed through approval in their national parliament or by referendum. 
Membership criteria – Who can join? 
The Treaty on the European Union states that any European country may apply for membership if it respects the 
democratic values of the EU and is committed to promoting them. 
The first step is for the country to meet the key criteria for accession. These were mainly defined at the European 
Council in Copenhagen in 1993 and are hence referred to as 'Copenhagen criteria'. Countries wishing to join need to 
have: 
• stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; 
• a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in EU; 
• the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union. 
The EU also needs to be able to integrate new members. In the case of the countries of the Western Balkans additional 
conditions for membership, were set out in the so-called 'Stabilisation and Association process', mostly relating to 
regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations. 
What is negotiated? 
The conditions and timing of the candidate's adoption, implementation and enforcement of all current EU rules (the 
"acquis"). 
These rules are divided into 35 different policy fields (chapters), such as transport, energy, environment, etc., each of 
which is negotiated separately. 
Other issues discussed: 
• financial arrangements – such as how much the new member is likely to pay into and receive from the EU budget 
(in the form of transfers) 
• transitional arrangements – sometimes certain rules are phased in gradually, to give the new member or existing 
members time to adapt. 
See Admin. (2016, June 12). European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Retrieved from 
ec.europa.eu: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en 
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1.1.1. Geographical Criteria:  
The geographical criteria is simple and clear whereby any Arab country from the twenty 
two (22) countries (Arab Republic of Egypt, Comoros Islands, Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, Kingdom of Bahrain, Kingdom of Morocco, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Republic 
of Algeria, Republic of Djibouti, Republic of Lebanon, Republic of Mauritania, Republic 
of Sudan, Republic of Iraq, Republic of Yemen, Republic of Tunisia, Republic of 
Somalia, Republic of Libya, State of Palestine, State of Kuwait, Sultanate of Oman, State 
of Qatar, Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Emirates), is entitled to  become a 
member of the AEU, conditional upon respecting the specified post joining criteria, 
principles and rules of the AEU. In addition, the joining member must take into account 
the maintenance of such criteria due to the fact that a continuous monitoring process, 
which will be explained later on, will take place to insure compliance and conformity. 
 
1.1.2. Political Criteria:  
In the light of the extremely turbulent times in the Arab world caused by the Arab 
uprisings, the political factor seems like the most important one. There is no doubt that 
the security situation along with the economic and fiscal deterioration with the ultimate 
social negative repercussions, are highly connected, if not directly caused, by the political 
factor. Therefore, the political criteria rate on the top of the criteria’s hierarchy and is 
consisted of the following elements, similarly to the Copenhagen adopted criteria:  
 
1.1.2.a Democracy: Functional democratic governance requires that all citizens of the 
country should be able to participate, on an equal basis, in the political decision-
making at every single governing level, from local municipalities up to highest 
national level.122 In the Arab world, and although some changes have been made 
concerning democracy, some were peaceful, but the majority took a violent turn and 
were marked with bloodshed after transforming from civil demonstrations into armed 
conflicts (Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen) which came as result of 
                                               
122 Definition of Democracy Available at: 
See What is Democracy? (2004, January 21). Retrieved from Stanford : 
https://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm 
 
Copenhagen criteria. (1993). Retrieved from Reesonomics: 
http://www.reesonomics.eu/themes/Enlargement/Copenhagen%20criteria.html 
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two factors; first the accumulation of anger of citizens from being ruled for decades 
by dysfunctional governments/regimes that crafted laws, education and way of life in 
order to maintain the dictators' hold of power; and second the western intervention in 
cooperation with certain regional and Arab powers to control the countries 
experiencing turbulence and impose western made democracies without looking into 
the special mosaic of the countries subject of such intervention. More importantly, the 
natural resources in the Arab region and the geographical location have always been 
the prime reasons behind the western intervention craving to obtain further power. It 
is believed that genuine democracy requires real change, one accompanied by a solid 
shift in the whole system of governance including crafting new constitutions and 
legislations that will bring their countries into the dawn of the twenty-first century 
and be an active part in the new world system.123 
 
   1.1.2.b Rule of law: The rule of law implies that government authority may only be 
exercised in accordance with documented laws, which were adopted through an 
established procedure. The principle is intended to be a safeguard against arbitrary 
rulings in individual cases124. Countries wishing to join the AEU are compelled to 
insure that their judiciary is independent and impartial (guaranteed access to justice, 
fair trial procedures, adequate funding for courts and training for judges and legal 
practitioners), their government and its officials and agents are accountable under the 
law and that political leaders and decision-makers take a clear stance against 
corruption, and the process by which laws are prepared, approved and enforced is 
transparent, efficient, and fair. Laws and regulations should be clear, publicised, 
stable, fair, and seek to protect fundamental rights125. 
                                               
123 See Zinati, R. (2011, April 08). What is happening in the Arab World? Retrieved from WorldSecurityNetwork.com: 
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Broader-Middle-East/ruba-zinati/What-is-happening-in-the-Arab-World 
 
124 See Marktler, T. (2008). THE POWER OF THE COPENHAGEN CRITERIA. Retrieved from Cyelp: 
http://www.cyelp.com/index.php/cyelp/article/viewFile/23/22 
 
125 See Admin. (2016, June 12). European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations: Rule of Law. 
Retrieved from ec.europa.eu: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/policy-highlights/rule-of-law_en 
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   1.1.2.c Human Rights: Freedom of expression is a basic one. Political interference in 
media, and various forms of harassment, including violence against journalists, are 
serious issues to prevent a country from joining the AEU126.  
 
   1.1.2.d Security/Stability: Countries must have a secure and peaceful environment on 
their territories and with other Arab countries. They must leave behind all the 
sectarian, political, economic conflicts (deportation of Arab citizens, sealed 
borders…) which usually leads to the collapse of any integrated area.  
 
1.1.3. Economic Criteria:  
While the political element is dominant in terms of the decision making for the accession 
of each country, the economic factor is by all means the most important and crucial one, 
since it relates to the accession in a new economic union to be formulated. Many experts 
debate the means of specifying and setting the economic accession criteria, however and 
after thorough observation, the EU appears to have set up a comprehensive set of criteria 
that was the main determinant for the success of the European Union. 
 
The Copenhagen economic accession criteria approved by the European Council in 1993 
are twofold: they require acceding countries to:  
(i) Have functioning market economies, and  
(ii) Have, by the date of accession, the capacity to cope with competition and market 
forces within the EU.  
 
In the Commission, the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs monitors 
and assesses the candidate countries' progress in complying with these two criteria.127 
It requires that candidate countries encompass a functioning market economy and that 
their producers have the capability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the union to maintain the price stability. 
                                               
126 See European Union. (2017). Human Rights. Retrieved from Europa.eu: https://europa.eu/european-
union/topics/human-rights_en 
 
127 See Admin. (n.d.). International economic relations. Retrieved from ec.europa.eu: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/international-economic-
relations_en 
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The above mentioned involves the elements that are applicable to the European Union, 
and therefore and upon observation, a similar criteria process selection could work for the 
desired Arab Economic Union, mainly with the specification of the below criteria:   
 
1.1.3.a) Inflation Rate: No more than 1.5% points higher than the average of the three 
best performing (lowest inflation) member states of the AEU. 
 
   1.1.3.b) Government Finance:  
o Annual government deficit: The ratio of the annual government deficit to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) must not exceed 3% at the end of the preceding fiscal year. 
If not, it is at least required to reach a level close to 3%. Only exceptional and 
temporary excesses would be granted for exceptional cases. 
 
o Government debt: The ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not exceed 60% 
at the end of the preceding fiscal year. Even if the target cannot be achieved due to 
the specific conditions, the ratio must have sufficiently diminished and must be 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace 
 
1.1.3.c) Exchange Rate: Applicant countries should have joined the Arab related 
Exchange Rate Mechanism, which would be established alongside the AEU, for two 
consecutive years with no currency devaluation during that period. 
    
1.1.3.d) Long term interest rate: The nominal long term interest rate must not be more 
than two percent (2%) points higher than in the three lowest inflation member 
states128. 
It is worth pointing out that the Inflation rates and government debts vary between 
one Arab country and another, especially between oil exporting rich gulf states 
(members of the Gulf Cooperation Council) and non GCC countries, which make the 
criteria setting quite challenging in terms of creating a balance, namely with the wide 
gap in the volume of economies and fiscal performance. 
 
                                               
128It is adapted from The Maastricht criteria.  
See Currency, E. D. (2012). Maastricht Criteria. Retrieved from euro-dollar-currency.com: http://www.euro-dollar-
currency.com/maastricht_criteria.htm 
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1.1.4. Institutional Criteria:129 
According to the Copenhagen Criteria set for the EU, the Institutional Criteria lies in the 
ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union. It includes the whole range of policies and 
measures that constitute the acquis of the union which candidate countries must adopt, 
implement and enforce. This requires the administrative capacity to invert Arab Union 
legislation into national law, to implement it and to effectively enforce it through 
appropriate administrative and judicial structures. 
In the case of the AEU, a very similar process may be implemented especially that the 
Arab countries have similar experiences in terms of institutional structures and 
compositions. 
 
1.1.5. Legal and Legislative Criteria:  
In the case of the European Union, and technically outside the Copenhagen Criteria, there 
is an additional requirement that all prospective members must enact legislation to bring 
their laws into line with the body of European law built up over the history of the Union, 
known as the acquis communautaire130. In preparing for each admission, the acquis is 
divided into separate chapters, each dealing with different policy areas.  
This obviously will not be possible for the AEU based on the fact that there is no Arab 
Law in place, which takes us into a completely different discussion and which directly 
relates to the necessity of producing a unified Arab set of laws as a main pillar for any 
unification process. In reality, the process of unification of laws and regulations is 
considered as the master of all the challenges; however, the Arab countries have a better 
chance to succeed in the legal and legislative unification process and the production of 
one regional implemented law for the following reasons: 
                                               
129 See Admin. (n.d.). International economic relations. Retrieved from ec.europa.eu: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/international-economic-
relations_en 
 
130 Acquis Communautaire sometimes called the EU acquis and often shortened to acquis, is the accumulated 
legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute the body of European Union law. The term is French: acquis 
meaning "that which has been acquired or obtained", and communautaire meaning "of the community.  
See EuroVoc. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
http://eurovoc.europa.eu:http://eurovoc.europa.eu/drupal/?q=request&uri=http://eurovoc.europa.eu/210682 
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(i) Most of the Arab countries imported their legal texts from colonising powers and 
mainly France and the Great Britain. This, of course, applied mostly to Egypt, 
Lebanon, Syria, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia since they were pioneers in terms of 
building legal structures, legal educations, constitutions and legislations. 
Afterwards, the rest of the states have adopted what the mentioned states had put in 
place. For over half century now, and since their independence, most Arab states 
have made important changes and adaptations to their legal systems, without 
adequate implementation. While the texts maintained their essence, the legal 
systems themselves lacked sufficient progress due to such lack of implementation. 
 
(ii) The Arab countries share the same culture, language, religion, social apparatus and 
political structure, with some differences depending on each country.  
 
(iii) The Arab countries enjoy a high calibre pool of legal experts and legislators, whom 
have had the chance to obtain their education and experience in their countries and 
in the best academic institutions in the world, and are able to play a vital role in the 
legal unification process on many stages. 
 
1.2 Suggested mechanisms and timelines for joining the contemplated AEU 
The accession process, and in spite of being clear, requires certain parameters to be 
maintained and considered vigilantly. The Arab Economic Union Special Accession 
Committee “AEUSAC”131 shall be responsible for setting the criteria and insuring they 
have been met prior to accession of a state. In addition, the Committee shall also be liable 
to monitor, supervise, evaluate and assess the performance of the joining members post 
accession. In other words, the “Candidate Country Status” does not automatically grant a 
right for a country to join the AEU. A country desiring to join the AEU is required to 
submit a membership application to the AEU Higher Council, which delegates the 
AEUSAC to study it carefully and assess the candidate’s ability to meet the criteria. If the 
Committee issued a positive opinion, the AEU Higher Council must then agree upon a 
negotiating mandate, and that would be considered as the first stage of accession. 
                                               
131 This committee does not exist; however, reference has been made to it as a part of the suggested institutional 
structure. 
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Similarly to the European Union standard process, and once the above is completed, the 
negotiations are then formally opened on a subject-by-subject / topic-by-topic basis. Due 
to the huge volume of AEU rules and regulations each candidate country must adopt 
within its national law, the negotiations are expected to take time and efforts to complete. 
The candidates are supported financially, administratively and technically during this pre-
accession period. This period helps the potential candidates meet the accession criteria 
and bring their institutions and standards in line with the AEU rules.132  
 
The process of joining the AEU (accession) broadly is suggested to consist of 3 stages: 
 
Stage (1): Upon a country’s readiness it becomes an official candidate for membership, 
but this does not necessarily mean that formal negotiations have been initiated. 
 
Stage (2): The candidate moves on to formal membership negotiations, a process that 
involves the adoption of established AEU laws, preparations to be in a position to 
properly enforce it and implement judicial, administrative, economic and other reforms 
necessary for the country to meet the conditions for joining, known as accession criteria. 
 
Stage (3): When the negotiations and associated reforms have been completed to the 
satisfaction of both sides, the country may join the AEU through signing its mandates. 
Similar to European Commission Enlargement and Accession criteria133, Membership 
negotiations may commence once all AEU governments agree on the accession, 
                                               
132 See European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. (2016, June 12). Retrieved from European 
Commission: ec.europa.eu: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/preaccession-assistance_en 
 
133 The accession criteria, or Copenhagen criteria (after the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 which defined 
them), are the essential conditions all candidate countries must satisfy to become a member state. These are: 
- Political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities;  
- Economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces;  
- Administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis and ability to take on the obligations 
of membership.  
The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an 
important consideration.  
The EU reserves the right to decide when a candidate country has met these criteria and when the EU is ready to accept 
the new member. 
 
See Admin. (2016, June 12). European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations: Accession criteria. 
Retrieved from ec.europa.eu: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-
criteria_en 
relations_en 
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conditional upon meeting the criteria, in a unanimous decision by the AEU Council, on a 
framework or mandate for negotiations with the candidate country.  
The unanimous decision condition by itself may create a main impediment in the case of 
the AEU, due to the historically existing political conflicts between some Arab states, and 
specifically following the Arab Spring and the Syrian war and the KSA lead alliance was 
on Yemen. As a result, this condition may be amended to replace the unanimity condition 
by the majority condition. 
 
Negotiations take place between AEUSAC which includes the official delegates from 
every member country and the candidate country seeking accession, in what is called an 
intergovernmental conference. These high level negotiations shall address numerous 
issues on a widely diversified platform; these include but are definitely not limited to the 
free movements of goods, free movement of capital, intellectual property matters, 
information security and media, taxation, environment parameters, financial control, 
energy, fiscal and monetary policy, economic policies, constitutional structures, legal and 
legislative matters, infrastructure, information technology and many other elements. 
 
The duration of these negotiations will depend on the speed of reform and alignment with 
AEU laws that each country undertakes and that would be the main reason of time 
variation from one candidate country to another.  
 
In principal, the negotiations will have no fixed standards, and may vary from one (1) 
year to ten (10) years to be able to gain accession to AEU. Nevertheless, it is suggested to 
specify a maximum duration for a country to meet the criteria of AEU in a form of a cap 
which is suggested to be fixed at ten (10) years. This period may be subject to extension 
upon the unanimous or majority consent of the AEU Council, especially if the delay was 
due to technical reasons. 
 
This mechanism is expected to encourage the country seeking accession to the AEU to 
further develop and establish a sustainable prosperous environment through preserving 
the culture of progress, development and change in favour of joining the Union.  
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Section (2): Location, Branches and Representation 
This section discusses the matters related to geographic location of the Arab Economic 
Union as well as the representation in terms of quotas within the Union and the Union’s 
representation versus other non-Arab countries, trading/ economic blocs and international 
organisations of different sorts and of different nature and type of operations.   
  
2.1  Location of the Arab Economic Union 
Following the successful creation of the structure of the Arab Economic Union, 
allocating the geographic location of AEU becomes a sensitive issue due to specificities 
of each country and since many Arab countries consider that they have the most favoured 
environment for the Arab Economic Union to be based in.  
The organisational structure and different agencies will be set up in more than one Arab 
country to deal with the technical, administrative scientific and managerial tasks. 
Amongst the logical solution to tackle this potential problem, would be the creation of a 
number of regional offices; one in each region as per the categorisation in Section 2.2 
below, of which local branches will generate from.  Each Arab capital will accommodate 
the local branch of the AEU; the regional branch will be larger and will compensate for 
the local branch, and all of which will report to the AEU headquarters in the Emirate of 
Dubai in the United Arab Emirates which is suggested to be the headquarters of the AEU. 
Another choice would be the capital of Lebanon, Beirut, which holds 7000 years of 
heritage and culture and is the mother of legislations in the Arab region and the jewel of 
the Middle East, however and due to its unstable recent history on the political and 
security levels, and since it is surrounded by insecurity and instability, namely in Syria 
and Palestine, many would argue against Beirut being the venue for the AEU 
headquarters. Nonetheless, and based on the developments, Beirut is always a candidate. 
 
According to (Saidi, 2011)134, “Dubai has made decisions that have taken advantage of 
its location midway between Asia and Europe. Situated along the ancient Silk Route, 
Dubai’s ports are now among the most active & efficient worldwide. The United Nations 
Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD) Liner Connectivity Index, a measure of 
                                               
134 See Saidi, N. (2011, September). Joining the dots. Retrieved from Vision.ae: http://vision.ae/focus/joining-the-dots 
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sea-based trade connectivity, ranks Dubai the highest in the region. Meanwhile, Dubai 
has invested heavily in infrastructure and logistics to overcome its comparatively poor 
natural resource base to become a global business, trade & tourism hub” (End of quote). 
 
Based on the section below, and in light of the current situation, Dubai appears to be the 
most convenient, practical and comfortable base for the headquarters of the Arab 
Economic Union135, during the current period. However, Beirut has more heritage and 
history to build on if it was not for the security threats and continuous political shambles.  
 
Why Dubai136 / United Arabic Emirates? 
According to Forbes, “Dubai has invented itself as something bigger than any of those 
narrow identities. It is emerging as a global city, and possibly the emerging markets 
capital of the world. It's one of the five fastest-growing metropolitan areas, according to a 
2015 report from the Brookings Institute  (Jesus Leal Trujillo, 2015)137. The population 
of this United Arab Emirate is more 3.3 million today, up from about 1 million a decade 
ago; about 80 percent of those are expats”. 
 
As stated on Dubai’s government managed website138, the development of Dubai started 
by transforming the city from a small cluster of settlements near the Dubai Creek to a 
                                               
135 The choice of Dubai is a mere suggestion, however other capitals in the Arab World may be very good 
candidates including Beirut, Cairo and others, especially following UAE’s involvement in the Yemen war. 
 
136 Some cities seem to encapsulate a particular moment in time. Dubai seems to represent 3 moments, one more 
important than the other two; First, one of the last gasps of the oil culture; second, the rise of business as a way to 
govern society, and third, and most significantly, the shift in the world's economy from developed markets toward 
emerging markets. 
See McBride, E. (2016, September ). Nine Reasons Dubai Could Be The Most Important City of The 21st Century. 
Forbes .  
 
137 The most populous city in the UAE, Dubai is a global hub for transportation, tourism, trade and professional 
services. Thanks to an ambitious strategy to diversify its economy Dubai no longer relies on commodities to power its 
economic growth, and today the service industry accounts for more than 70 percent of total GDP.  
See Jesus Leal Trujillo, J. P. (2015, February 10). The World’s 10 Fastest Growing Metropolitan Areas. Retrieved from 
Brooking.edu: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2015/02/10/the-worlds-10-fastest-growing-metropolitan-
areas/   
138 Part of this piece is extracted from specialized tourism website of Dubai. 
See Dubai Corporation of Tourism & Commerce Marketing. (2017, May 29). History of Dubai. Retrieved from Visit 
Dubai: visitdubai.com: https://www.visitdubai.com/en/articles/history-of-dubai 
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modern port city and commercial hub through developing the infrastructure that would 
support Dubai's goals to become a leading trade hub.  
 
Rashid Port, Jebel Ali Port, Dubai Dry docks, the widening of the Dubai Creek, and the 
Dubai World Trade Centre (DWTC) were some of the major projects completed at the 
time. However and with the limited supply of oil, Sheikh Rashid, the first ruler of Dubai, 
was determined not to allow Dubai to become dependent on oil, and he was successful.  
 
In 1971, the United Arab Emirates was formed to safeguard the area's prosperity and 
ensure that the vast and newly discovered riches would be distributed fairly. Therefore, 
and since the formation of the UAE, it is fair to say that the country has not looked back. 
 
Dubai is currently considered as the ultimate commercial, trade, tourism and economic 
hub of the region. It boasts a wide foreign trade network extending to 179 states thus 
offering the investor an extensive choice of potential global marketing outlets for a 
diverse portfolio of goods and services. As member of UAE federation, Dubai is also part 
of the world’s third largest export and re-export centre after Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
Over and above and with a GDP growth over 16.7% per annum, it has become one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world, and with an open economy that has diversified 
well beyond energy; All the mentioned and much more has caused Dubai to attract 
legions of foreign investors, serving as a role model for its neighbours on many scales. 
 
According to (Williams, 2016)139 “Dubai is quickly emerging as one of the top global 
cities”. It is full of potential, innovation and the UAE was named one of the freest 
economies by the Cato Institute.” 
                                               
139Dubai is quickly emerging as one of the top global cities. It is full of potential, innovation and the UAE was named 
one of the freest economies by the Cato Institute. Elizabeth MacBride, a contributing writer for entrepreneurs in 
MENA, recently wrote an article for Forbes discussing the top 9 reasons why Dubai could be the most important city of 
the 21st century. In her article, Elizabeth discusses local actions to encourage the best talent in e-Commerce, robotics, 
AI, space and healthcare. A point I found particularly interesting was, "Immigrants tend to be more entrepreneurial than 
people who are native born; the easier their paths are into the economy, the faster they will drive growth." Of the UAE's 
population of 3.3 million, 80% are expats. A few other key reasons to highlight for Dubai's growth as a global city are: 
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Dubai has become amongst the most favourable environments in the business world. 
Multinational corporations, banks, technology companies, consultancy firms and many 
small and medium enterprises have secured a consistent presence in Dubai, and are 
growing more on regular bases. Many consider Dubai’s leisure facilities to be among the 
best in the world, with approximately 50+ malls and shopping centres in a relatively small 
city of 1.5 million people. The crime rate is one of the lowest in the world, and the people 
are very tolerant of religions other than Islam.  
In addition to being a very foreigner friendly environment, Dubai enjoys a constant flow of 
tourists, expatriates also make for over 75% of Dubai’s population count. English is the 
standard language within the business community, and the city has a lively scene with very 
few social barriers. Section (2.2) below specifies the mechanism of distribution, 
preliminarily, in accordance with the current regional categorization of the Arab countries.  
 
2.2 Branches and Representative Offices of the Arab Economic Union: 
 
2.2.1 North Africa140 Office: (Egypt and Sudan) to be based in Cairo, Egypt. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
• Dubai is a gateway city. It is a gateway to 3 regions: Asia, Middle East and Africa. The markets of these 3 regions 
are growing at double the rates of the developed world, according to Mustafa Abdel-Wadood, global head of 
provide equity. 
• The economy is diversified. The biggest sectors of the Dubai economy are trade and tourism, which account for 
more than 28% of the GDP. The next biggest sectors are business and finance and transportation, accounting for 
27% and 14% of GPD, respectively. 
• The commitment to free trade. Dubai is known for its low taxes. It has set up zones, like the International 
Financial Centre, where the laws encourage international investment. 
Dubai is becoming known as a high-tech, innovative and cultural hub. With its desire for foreign investment and 
proximity to some of the most rapid growing markets, Dubai is not a place that businesses should overlook. 
See Williams, N. (2016, April 5). Dubai, the Most Important City of the 21st Century. Retrieved from 
Globalizationpartners.com: http://resources.globalizationpartners.com/blog/dubai-the-most-important-city-
of-the-21st-century 
140 North Africa, region of Africa comprising the modern countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya; It has 
been regarded by some as stretching from the Atlantic shores of Morocco in the west to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea 
in the east, though this designation is more commonly referred to as northern Africa. Others have limited it to the 
countries of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, a region known by the French during colonial times as Afrique du Nord 
and by the Arabs as the Maghreb. The most commonly accepted definition includes the three above-mentioned 
countries as well as Libya but excludes Egypt. The regions encompassed by both second and third definitions and have 
also been called Northwest Africa. 
See Michael Brett, J. M.-N. (2008, September 11). North Africa. Retrieved from Britannica.com: 
https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Africa 
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2.2.2 Maghreb141 Office: (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania) to 
be based in Rabat, Morocco. 
 
2.2.3 Arab Peninsula 142/ Gulf Office: (Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain) to be based in 
Dubai-UAE. 
 
2.2.4 Fertile Crescent (Levant)143: (Lebanon, Syria and Palestine) to be based in 
Beirut - Lebanon. 
 
2.2.5 African Horn144: (Somalia, Djibouti and Comoros Islands) to be based 
Mogadishu – Somalia. 
                                               
141 The Maghreb is a collection of countries within what is commonly termed Northern Africa. The area lies along the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. The modern definition of the Maghreb includes the nations of: Mauritania, 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, although former definitions of the region were not limited to these five 
countries, but were geographically broad, as the word Maghreb simply means “sunset place”, in the Arabic language. 
The people of the Maghreb belong to both Berber and Arab ethno-linguistic groups. 
See The Maghreb Center. (2007, August 19). Fostering Understanding and Development of the Maghreb. Retrieved 
from Newworldencyclopedia.org: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Maghreb 
 
142 The Arabian Peninsula is a peninsula in Southwest Asia at the junction of Africa and Asia consisting mainly of 
desert. The area is an important part of the Middle East and plays a critically important geopolitical role because of its 
vast reserves of oil and natural gas. The coasts of the peninsula are, on the west the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, on 
the southeast the Arabian Sea (part of the Indian Ocean), and on the northeast, the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, 
and the Persian Gulf. 
Its northern limit is defined by the Zagros collision zone, a mountainous uplift where a continental collision between 
the Arabian Plate and Asia is occurring. It merges with the Syrian Desert with no clear line of demarcation. 
Geographically, the Arabian Peninsula includes parts of Iraq and Jordan. Politically, however, the peninsula is 
separated from the rest of Asia by the northern borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  
See Clark Arthur, M. T. (2012, October 25). Arabian Peninsula. Retrieved from Newworldencyclopedia.org: 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Arabian_Peninsula 
 
143 The Levant is the name applied widely to the eastern Mediterranean coastal lands of Asia Minor and Phoenicia 
(modern-day Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine). In a wider sense, the term can be used to encompass the entire 
coastline from Greece to Egypt. The Levant is part of the Fertile Crescent and was home to some of the ancient 
Mediterranean trade centres, such as Ugarit, Tyre, and Sidon. It is the homeland of the Phoenician civilization.  
See Crabben, J. V. (2011, April 28). Levant. Retrieved from Ancient.eu: http://www.ancient.eu/levant/ 
 
144 Horn of Africa, region of eastern Africa. It is the easternmost extension of African land and for the purposes of 
this article is defined as the region that is home to the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, whose 
cultures have been linked throughout their long history. Other definitions of the Horn of Africa are more restrictive and 
exclude some or all of the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. There are also broader definitions, the most 
common of which include all the countries mentioned above, as well as parts or all of Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, and 
Uganda. Part of the Horn of Africa region is also known as the Somali peninsula; this term is typically used when 
referring to lands of Somalia and eastern Ethiopia.  
See The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. (2009, July 22). Horn of Africa. Retrieved from britannica.com: 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Horn-of-Africa 
 
123 | P a g e  
 
2.3 Quotas and levels of representation of countries within the Arab Economic Union 
There are several formulas on the regional and global levels with reference to the 
quantification and distribution of quotas. Amongst the main factors to identify the quota 
or stake of each country in an economic bloc are population sizes, Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP145) or sometimes size and geographical location. Similar economic blocs 
and other international organisations have resorted to different scales and formulas to set 
up the quotas. Such examples include but are not limited to the European Union, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations bodies and others. 
 
One clear example is the quota matter at the International Monetary Fund146, whereby 
quota subscriptions are central to the IMF’s financial resources. Each member country of 
the IMF is assigned a quota, based broadly on its relative position in the world economy.  
A member country’s quota determines its maximum financial commitment to the IMF, its 
voting power, and has a bearing on its access to IMF financing. Quotas play several key 
roles in the IMF147, namely in terms of subscriptions, voting powers and access to 
                                               
145 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the broadest quantitative measure of a nation's total economic activity. More 
specifically, GDP represents the monetary value of all goods and services produced within a nation's geographic 
borders over a specified period of time. The equation used to calculate GDP is as follows: 
GDP = Consumption + Government Expenditures + Investment + Exports – Imports 
See Gross Domestic Product (GDP). (2017). Retrieved from InvestingAnswers.com: 
http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/economics/gross-domestic-product-gdp-1223 
 
146 When a country joins the IMF, it is assigned an initial quota in the same range as the quotas of existing members of 
broadly comparable economic size and characteristics. The IMF uses a quota formula to help assess a member’s 
relative position. The current quota formula is a weighted average of GDP (weight of 50 percent), openness 
(30 percent), economic variability (15 percent), and international reserves (5 percent). For this purpose, GDP is 
measured through a blend of GDP—based on market exchange rates (weight of 60 percent) and on PPP exchange rates 
(40percent). The formula also includes a “compression factor” that reduces the dispersion in calculated quota shares 
across members. Quotas are denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the IMF’s unit of account. The largest 
member of the IMF is the United States, with a current quota (as of March 2017) of SDR82.99 billion (about 
US$113 billion), and the smallest member is Tuvalu, with a quota of SDR2.5 million (about US$3.4 million). 
 
The conditions for implementing the quota increases agreed under the 14th General Quota Review were met on 
January 26, 2016. As a result, the quotas of each of the IMF’s 189 members will increase to a combined SDR477 
billion (about US$652 billion) from about SDR238.5 billion (about US$326 billion). As of March 2017, 179 of the 
189 members had made their quota payments, accounting for over 99 percent of the total quota increases, and total 
quotas stood at SDR475 billion (about US$650 billion). See IMF. (2017, April). IMF Quotas. Retrieved from imf.org 
 http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/14/12/21/IMF-Quotas 
 
147 Member's quota determines that country’s financial and organisational relationship with the IMF, including: 
Subscriptions: A member's quota subscription determines the maximum amount of financial resources the member is 
obliged to provide to the IMF. A member must pay its subscription in full upon joining the IMF: up to 25 percent must 
be paid in SDRs or widely accepted currencies (such as the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, or the British pound 
sterling), while the rest is paid in the member's own currency. 
 
Voting power: The quota largely determines a member's voting power in IMF decisions. Each IMF member’s votes 
are comprised of basic votes plus one additional vote for each SDR100,000 of quota. The 2008 reforms fixed the 
number of basic votes at 5.502 percent of total votes. The current share of basic votes in total votes represents close to a 
tripling of their share prior to the implementation of the 2008 reforms.  
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finance, and although it does not apply to the economic bloc in its totality, the way the 
IMF deals with quotas could help as an indication or benchmark to adopt a formula. 
 
Throughout the below part which mainly consists of detailed analytical tables, there is an 
attempt to provide different scenarios in order to try to come up with the most favoured 
model or mechanism to specify the distribution and structure of quotas.  
 
Logically, a successful and fair quota distribution and level of representation of countries 
should be proportional to the population and to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
each state in the first place. The population for every Arab country (in thousands) is listed 
in the table 1148; Algeria, Egypt and Sudan149 top the ranking with the largest populations. 
In consequence, Bahrain, Djibouti and Qatar come at the bottom of the list with the 
smallest populations. 
 
A simple calculation was conducted to provide a quotas representation proportional to 
population. First, the population was divided by lowest population among countries, then 
a percentage is calculated, and finally considering the number of members as 56 
members, it became feasible to calculate the quotas for every country after accession. For 
the accuracy and feasibility of distribution, a correction was made for countries with 
population equal to 15 million citizens or below. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Access to financing: The amount of financing a member can obtain from the IMF (its access limit) is based on its 
quota. For example, under Stand-By and Extended Arrangements, a member can borrow up to 145 percent of its quota 
annually and 435 percent cumulatively. However, access may be higher in exceptional circumstances. 
How quota reviews work: The IMF's Board of Governors conducts general quota reviews at regular intervals (usually 
every five years). Any changes in quotas must be approved by an 85 percent majority of the total voting power, and a 
member’s quota cannot be changed without its consent. There are two main issues addressed in a general quota review: 
the size of an overall increase and the distribution of the increase among the members.  First, a general quota review 
allows the IMF to assess the adequacy of quotas both in terms of members’ balance of payments financing needs and in 
terms of its own ability to help meet those needs. Second, a general review allows for increases in members’ quotas to 
reflect changes in their relative positions in the world economy. Ad hoc increases outside general reviews do not occur 
often, but the increases in quotas for 54 member countries approved under the 2008 Reform are a recent example.  
See IMF. (2017, April). IMF Quotas. Retrieved from imf.org: 
 http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/14/12/21/IMF-Quotas  
 
148 In 2011, Sudan was split and South Sudan became an independent state on 9th of July, following a referendum that 
passed with 98.83% of the vote. It is a United Nations member state, a member state of the African Union of the East 
African Community and of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. In July 2012, South Sudan signed the 
Geneva Conventions.  South Sudan has suffered ethnic violence and has been in a civil war since 2013; as of 2016 it 
has the second highest score on the Fragile States Index 
See Escwa . (2013, December 24). The Demographic Profile of the Arab Countries. Retrieved from UN Escwa: 
https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publications/files/e_escwa_sdd_13_tp-14_e.pdf 
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Table (2.1): Arab Population Size and Growth150 
 
                                               
150 See “Arab Development Report” / Research Paper Series / Population Levels, Trends and Policies in the Arab 
Region; Challenges and Opportunities. www.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/report/Population%20Levels,Trends.pdf 
P.S: This Table (2.1) has only been updated till of 2013 which was the date of  writing this chapter. 
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Table (2.2): Countries populations reflecting number of representatives at the AEU:151 
The quotas representation proportional to the population is showed in table 2.2 below.
  
 
                                               
151 Suggested quotas based on actual populations of Arab countries. 
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Table (2.3): GDP at Current Market Prices:152 
 
The GDP in USD millions is listed in the table 3; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Arab Republic of Egypt (Egypt) rank at the top of the 
list for having the highest GDPs. In consequence, Comoros Islands, Somalia and 
Palestine (with unknown GDP due to Palestinian – Israeli conflict and since Palestine is 
forced to use the shekel being the israeli currency) have ranked at the bottom of the list. 
                                               
152 Table 2.3 represents Arab Countries GDP 
See World Bank Group. (2017). Arab World. Retrieved from Worldbank.org: http://data.worldbank.org/region/arab-
world 
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Table (2.4): Countries GDPs reflecting number of representatives at the AEU: 
In this Table (2.4), a simple calculation was conducted in order to provide a quotas 
representation proportional to the GDP. First the GDP was divided by the lowest GDP 
among the countries, then a percentage is calculated, and finally considering the number 
of members as 56 members we can calculate the quotas for every country after joining 
the AEU. A correction was made for countries with GDP equal to 5000 million or below. 
The quotas representation proportional to the population is showed in table 2.4 below. 
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Table (2.5): Number of representatives for each country in the AEU: 
As a final result, a total of 112 members will sit on the General Assembly of AEU and 
the quotas representation of countries after joining the AEU is provided in table 2.5: 
 
Each country shall appoint its own representatives; whereby the communication process 
shall be facilitated based on the fact that all countries’ representatives speak the Arabic 
language. Although the Veto system will probably hold negative repercussions and it 
defies the principal of justice and fairness in the opinion of many, however and based on 
the size of each country and its economic volume and population size, a “Veto System” 
may be set up. In this case the “Veto power” would be granted to Egypt, KSA, UAE, 
Algeria, Syria and Iraq. Veto power, similar to other global organisations, maybe 
exploited by Veto holders in to impede a legislation or decision proposed by the AEU.  
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2.4 Representation of the Arab Economic Union towards Third Parties 
As an independent economic bloc, the AEU should have proper representation towards 
third parties through its multiple bodies which include committees, organisations and 
sub-divisions. Each of these bodies shall have a clear organisational hierarchical 
structure. These bodies are nominated by the Arab Higher Council (AHC)153 and are 
consistent with the natural and historical links amongst them, and to provide the best 
conditions for flourishing their economies, developing their resources and ensuring the 
prosperity of their countries. The members of the AEU ought to unite on the economic 
front on all economic related issues.  
The first form of AEU representation will be towards its neighbouring countries, mainly 
the non-Arab African countries, especially that ten of Arab countries are located in the 
African continent. The AEU can cooperate with the African countries to maintain the 
peace and security, to help in case of natural or health crisis and other pressing matters. 
In addition to the neighbouring African countries, the AEU should build strong links with 
main regional powers such as Iran and Turkey, and other global powers including China. 
The second form of AEU representation will be its engagement in bilateral and 
multilateral agreements with other economic blocs and organisations. For instance, AEU 
should be represented towards various bodies for example, the EUROMED154 (Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership), especially since eight of the Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Syria (currently suspended), and Tunisia are 
current members of Union for the Mediterranean launched in 2008.  
Another very important form of AEU representation towards third parties should occur 
with regional and international organisations such as the United Nations, World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), G20, World Health Organisation and many others. 
                                               
153 The Arab Higher Council (AHC) is the highest ranking body within the Arab Economic Union hierarchy. The 
specifics of the AHC will be explained later during this chapter. 
 
154 EUROMED’s key objective of the trade partnership is the creation of a deep Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, 
which aims at removing barriers to trade and investment between both the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries 
and between Southern Mediterranean countries themselves. Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements are in force 
with most of the partners (except Syria and Libya). The scope of these agreements is essentially limited to trade in 
goods. These ongoing or future negotiations are related to further liberalisation of trade in agriculture, liberalisation of 
trade in services, accreditation and acceptance of industrial products and regulatory convergence. 
See Euro-Mediterranean partnership. (2017, February 22). Retrieved from European Commission: ec.europa.eu: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-partnership/index_en.htm 
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Section (3): Administration and Management 
3.1 Administration and Operation of the AEU 
While the suggestion of the AEU is quite revolutionary, the current set up and structure 
of the Arab League could play as a good example in terms of the basic structure. The 
AEU shall be based on the rule of law; this means that every action taken by the AEU 
will be based on regulations, treaties, conventions and similar texts, and should therefore 
be approved voluntarily and democratically by all AEU member countries. The aims set 
out in the AEU treaties, conventions and agreements are achieved by several types of 
legal activities, some of which are binding, while others could be in a form of 
memorandum of understanding or non-binding agreements. Similar to the European 
Commission, some elements of the treaties and conventions might not apply to certain 
countries, such as the visa status. A good example to the above mentioned would be the 
Schengen Area155 which was created by the Schengen Agreement, of which the UK along 
with Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, and Romania remain out of, in spite of the fact 
that they are a part of the European Commission. Therefore, one of the implications of 
such opting out (in some cases) and not allowed in (in other cases) is that visitors are in 
need of a country specific visa rather than the general European inclusive Schengen visa.  
One of Schengen Agreement’s main achievements, which may be adopted by the AEU 
(explained at later stages of research), is the creation of a free movement of factors of 
production in all parts of Europe156, which is considered fundamental for economic unity. 
                                               
155 The free movement of persons is a fundamental right guaranteed by the EU to its citizens. It entitles every EU 
citizen to travel, work and live in any EU country without special formalities. Schengen cooperation enhances this 
freedom by enabling citizens to cross internal borders without being subjected to border checks. The border-free 
Schengen Area guarantees free movement to more than 400 million EU citizens, as well as to many non-EU nationals, 
businessmen, tourists or other persons legally present on the EU territory. 
See Euro-Mediterranean partnership. (2017, February 22). Retrieved from European Commission: ec.europa.eu: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-partnership/index_en.htm 
 
156 Originally, the concept of free movement was to enable the European working population to freely travel and settle 
in any EU State, but it fell short of abolishing border controls within the Union. A break-through came in 1985 when 
cooperation between individual governments led to the signing, in Schengen (a small village in Luxembourg), of the 
Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at common borders, followed by the signing in 1990 of the Convention 
implementing that Agreement. The implementation of the Schengen Agreements started in 1995, initially involving 
seven EU States. Born as an intergovernmental initiative, the developments brought about by the Schengen Agreements 
have now been incorporated into the body of rules governing the EU. Today, the Schengen Area encompasses most EU 
States, except for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom. However, Bulgaria and 
Romania are currently in the process of joining the Schengen Area. Of non-EU States, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein have joined Schengen Area. 
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Another important goal behind the creation of a Schengen Area, which may also be 
adopted by the AEU upon it creation, is the preservation of “Freedom and Security for 
Travellers157”. Here it is essential to point out that joining the Schengen Area is not 
merely a political decision. Countries must also fulfil a list of pre-conditions158 to be able 
to join. This could well be a good example for the AEU when setting up the “Conditions 
to join the AEU”. Nevertheless, it is important to clarify the distinction between a 
“treaty” which is a formal agreement between two or more states in reference to peace, 
alliance, commerce, or other international relations and “recommendations and opinions” 
which comprise recommendations that lack legal force but are negotiated and subject to 
voting according to the appropriate procedure. Recommendations differ from regulations, 
directives and decisions, in that they are not binding for Member States. Though without 
legal force, they do carry political weight. They encompass instruments of indirect action 
                                                                                                                                            
Any person, irrespective of nationality, may cross the internal borders without being subjected to border checks. 
However, the competent national authorities can carry out police checks also at the internal borders and in border areas, 
provided that such checks are not equivalent to border checks. This is valid for cases when, in particular, the checks do 
not have border control as an objective and are based on general police information and experience. It's also valid when 
the checks are carried out in a manner clearly distinct from systematic border checks and on the basis of spot-checks If 
there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security, a Schengen country may exceptionally temporarily 
reintroduce border control at its internal borders for, in principle, a limited period of no more than thirty days. If such 
controls are reintroduced, the other Schengen countries, the European Parliament and the Commission should be 
informed, as should the public. 
See MIGRATION AND HOME AFFAIRS. (2017, May 29). Retrieved from European Commission: ec.europa.eu: 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en 
 
157 The Schengen provisions abolish checks at the Union's internal borders, while tightening controls at the external 
borders, in accordance with a single set of rules. These rules cover several areas: 
▪ a common set of rules applying to people crossing the EU external borders, including the types of visa needed and 
how checks at external borders have to be carried out 
▪ harmonisation of the conditions of entry and of the rules on visas for short stays (up to three months) 
▪ enhanced police cooperation (including rights of cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit) 
▪ stronger judicial cooperation through a faster extradition system and transfer of enforcement of criminal 
judgments 
▪ establishment and development of the Schengen Information System (SIS) 
▪ documents needed for travelling in Europe. 
See European Commission. (2013, July 1). MIGRATION AND HOME AFFAIRS: Schengen Area. Retrieved from 
Europa.eu: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en 
 
158 Joining the Schengen Area is not merely a political decision. Countries must also fulfil a list of pre-conditions, such 
as be prepared and have the capacity to: 
▪ take responsibility for controlling the external borders on behalf of the other Schengen States and for issuing 
uniform Schengen visas 
▪ efficiently cooperate with law enforcement agencies in other Schengen States in order to maintain a high level of 
security once border controls between Schengen countries are abolished 
▪ apply the common set of Schengen rules (the so-called "Schengen acquis"), such as controls of land, sea and air 
borders (airports), issuing of visas, police cooperation and protection of personal data 
▪ connect to and use the SIS. 
Applicant countries undergo a "Schengen evaluation" before joining the Schengen Area and periodically thereafter to 
ensure the correct application of the legislation.  
See MIGRATION AND HOME AFFAIRS. (2017, May 29). Retrieved from European Commission: ec.europa.eu: 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en 
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aiming at preparation of legislation in Member States, differing from the directive only 
by the absence of obligatory power. Thus, the first is a binding agreement between AEU 
member countries which sets out AEU directives and decisions and the relationship 
between the AEU and its member countries; while the “recommendations” are not 
necessarily binding, since they are suggestions to improve the plan of action into the 
AEU but without imposing legal obligations on involved members. 
 
3.2 Management and Internal Set up of AEU 
As explained in Section (2) of this chapter, the Arab Economic Union’s administrative 
setup will entail the creation of a number of regional offices; one in each region as per the 
categorization in sub-section (2.2) above, of which local branches will generate from.  
Each Arab capital will accommodate one local branch of the AEU; the regional branch 
will be larger and will compensate for the local branch, all of which will report to AEU 
headquarters, in the Emirate of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (previously suggested 
as the headquarters of the AEU), or Beirut in case political stability was achieved.  
With about (22) local offices and five regional offices and one headquarters in addition to 
the various bodies and institutions which comprise the union, the workforce of the AEU 
will exceed three thousand (3000) employees and executives. All local and regional 
offices are inter-linked together with the headquarters in order to insure better services 
and to facilitate tasks and save time. The (112) government appointed members by their 
governments will comprise the voting members of the Arab Commission in the AEU. 
The first and most important advantage of the AEU is that all countries speak Arabic, in 
consequences no translation service is needed and ease of communication should be 
reached. As mentioned above, the League of Arab States could form the main pillar to 
establish the AEU especially from a structural and institutional perspective. There are 
currently several bodies at the League of Arab States159 which if well expanded and re-
structured could result in the formation of the required bodies which comprise the AEU. 
                                               
159 Through institutions, such as the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation (ALECSO) and the 
Economic and Social Council of the Arab League's Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU), the Arab League 
facilitates political, economic, cultural, scientific, and social programmes designed to promote the interests of the Arab 
world It has served as a forum for the member states to coordinate their policy positions, to deliberate on matters of 
common concern, to settle some Arab disputes and to limit conflicts such as the 1958 Lebanon crisis. The League has 
served as a platform for the drafting and conclusion of many landmark documents promoting economic integration. 
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Section (4): Organisational Structure and Hierarchy 
Prior to drawing a clear picture to specify each body within the AEU and explain its 
mandates, it is important to note that the first point of impact is the Arab Economic 
Union Special Accession Committee (AEUSAC), that plays a primary role in accession 
process. The AEUSAC has been referred to at the beginning of this chapter, and below 
will further elaborate the nature, mandates, objectives and operations of the AEU’s main 
bodies. 
 
4.1 Arab Commission (AC) 
The suggested Arab Commission will be the AEU’s executive body and represents the 
interests of the AEU as a whole. It drafts proposals for new Arab legislations which it 
presents to the Arab Parliament and Council. It manages the AEU's funds and programs.  
The Commission will also play its role as "the guardian of the treaties" making sure that 
all countries abide by the AEU treaties and laws. It also has the authority and power to 
act against breaches and infiltrators, as per its articles and policies. 
 
The Commission will consist of one Commissioner from each AEU country. The 
president of the Commission is elected by the AEU governments in accordance (pro-rata) 
to their voting quotas, and endorsed by the Arab Parliament. The other Commissioners 
will be nominated by their national governments in consultation with the incoming 
president, and must be approved by the Arab Parliament for a mandate of five (5) years.  
                                                                                                                                            
One example is the Joint Arab Economic Action Charter, which outlines the principles for economic activities in the 
region. Each member state has one vote in the League Council, and decisions are binding only for those states that have 
voted for them. The aims of the league in 1945 were to strengthen and coordinate the political, cultural, economic and 
social programs of its members and to mediate disputes among them or between them and third parties. Furthermore, 
the signing of an agreement on Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation on 13 April 1950 committed the signatories 
to coordination of military defence measures. In March 2015, the Arab League General Secretary announced the 
establishment of a Joint Arab Force with the aim of counteracting extremism and other threats to the Arab States. The 
decision was reached while Operation Decisive Storm was intensifying in Yemen. Participation in the project is 
voluntary, and the army intervenes only at the request of one of the member states. The growing militarization of the 
region and the increase in violent civil wars as well as terrorist movements are the reason behind the creation of the 
JAF, financed by the rich Gulf countries. In the early 1970s, the Economic Council of the League of Arab States put 
forward a proposal to create the Joint Arab Chambers of Commerce across the European states. That led, under the 
decree of the League of Arab States no. K1175/D52/G, to the decision by the Arab governments to set up the Arab 
British Chamber of Commerce; which was mandated to "promote, encourage and facilitate bilateral trade" between the 
Arab world and its major trading partner, the United Kingdom.  
See  Nations Online. (n.d.). Retrieved from Nations Online: All Countries of the World: 
 http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/arab_league.htm%20/%20https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_League 
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The President’s mandate will be to define the policy direction for the Commission, which 
enables the Commissioners together to decide strategic objectives, and produce the 
annual work program. Decisions are taken based on collective responsibility.  
All Commissioners will be equal in the decision making process and equally accountable 
for these decisions since they do not have any individual decision-making powers, except 
when authorized in certain situations. The Commissioners will elect AEU Vice Presidents 
following the President’s approval. They act on behalf of the President when applicable 
and in accordance with the AEU regulations and coordinate work in their area of 
responsibility, together with several Commissioners. Priority projects are defined to help 
ensure that the Commissioners work together in an orchestrated and smooth manner. 
 
4.2 Arab Parliament (AP) 
The suggested Arab Parliament will be elected every four (4) years by members of 
parliament (MPs) in the member countries of the AEU to represent their interests. The 
main task of the Parliament is to pass laws and legislations on the basis of proposals 
presented by the Arab Commission.  
Similar to the European Parliament160, the Arab Parliament will have 3 main roles: 
 
   4.2.1. Legislative Role (similar to the EU Parliament161): 
- Passing AEU laws, together with the Council of the AEU, based on Arab 
Commission proposals.  
- Deciding on Enlargements162. 
- Reviewing the Commission's work program and asking it to propose legislation. 
                                               
160 The European Parliament acts as a co-legislator, sharing with the Council the power to adopt and amend legislative 
proposals and to decide on the EU budget. It also supervises the work of the Commission and other EU bodies and 
cooperates with national parliaments of EU countries to get their input. See how it all works here. 
See Parliament, E. (n.d.). European Parliament: About Parliament . Retrieved from europarl.europa.eu: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00002/Home 
 
161 The ordinary legislative procedure gives the same weight to the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union on a wide range of areas (for example, economic governance, immigration, energy, transport, the 
environment and consumer protection). The vast majority of European laws are adopted jointly by the European 
Parliament and the Council. 
The co-decision procedure was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992), and extended and 
made more effective by the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). With the Lisbon Treaty that took effect on 1 December 2009, 
the renamed ordinary legislative procedure became the main legislative procedure of the EU´s decision-making system. 
See Parliament, E. (n.d.). European Parliament: About Parliament . Retrieved from europarl.europa.eu: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00002/Home 
 
162 The process of expanding the Arab Economic Union -AEU through the accession of new member states; 
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   4.2.2. Supervisory and Regulatory Role: 
- Electing the Commission’s President and approving the Commission as a body. 
- Observing the elections as per the internal policies of the AEU.  
- Scrutinising the AEU institutions democratically.  
- Examining citizens' petitions and setting up inquiries. 
- Questioning Commission and Council. 
- Possibility of voting a motion of censure, obliging the Commission to resign. 
- Granting discharge, i.e. approving the way the AEU budgets have been spent. 
- Discussing monetary policy with the Arab Central Bank. 
 
   4.2.3. Budgetary Role: 
- Establishing, together with the Council, the AEU budget. 
- Approving the AEU long term budget. 
 
The President of the Parliament represents the Parliament before other AEU institutions 
and third parties of similar nature, and gives the final go ahead to the AEU budget. 
The number of members in the Arab Parliament for each country is roughly proportionate 
to its population. Members of Arab Parliament (MAPs) may formulate parliamentary 
groups, not by nationality. The Parliament's work comprises two main stages: 
- Stage 1: Committees to prepare legislations: 
   The Committees examine proposals for legislation, and MAPs may put forward 
amendments or propose rejecting bills. 
- Stage 2: Plenary sessions to pass legislations: 
     This occurs when all the MAPs gather in the chamber to give a final vote on the 
proposed legislation and/or the proposed amendments. 
 
4.3 Arab Dispute Settlement Council (ADSC) 
One of the main tasks parallel to establishing the Arab Economic Union is the 
formulation or development of an already existing dispute resolution body. This body 
will be called the Arab Dispute Settlement Council (ADSC). The ADSC’s main mandate 
will be to resolve disputes which occur between member states, by clarifying the rules of 
the AEU. The council aims to reach an amicable settlement prior to involving the 
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disputing parties in the alternative dispute resolution163 (ADR) mechanisms which are 
usually concluded by the arbitration procedures which is the final stage of the ADR 
mechanisms, it cannot legislate or promulgate new rules. Dispute settlement is 
administered by a Dispute Settlement Council. The ADSC has the authority to look into 
all disputes referred to it either by the disputing parties or by the Commission. It may 
establish panels, appoint experts, adopt panel reports, maintain surveillance of 
implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of 
concessions and various other obligations, depending on the specifies needs. 
 
Similar to other dispute resolution bodies in other parts of the world, when a member 
country believes that another party has taken an action that impairs “benefits accruing to 
it directly or indirectly”, it may request consultations to resolve the conflict through 
informal negotiations. If mutual consultations failed to reach an agreement after a certain 
set number of days, members may request the formation of a panel to resolve the dispute.  
 
Such panels typically consist of three individuals with expertise in law and policy; these 
panellists hear the evidence and present a report to the ADSC recommending a course of 
action within a certain specified period of days, which may be up to six (6) months. All 
deliberations and communications are confidential. Once panel reports have been 
prepared, they are presented to ADSC, which either adopts the report or decides by 
consensus not to accept it. Alternatively, if one of the involved parties decides to appeal 
the decision, the report will not be considered for adoption until the appeal process ends. 
 
                                               
163 Any method of resolving disputes other than by litigation. Public courts may be asked to review the validity of ADR 
methods, but they will rarely overturn ADR decisions and awards if the disputing parties formed a valid contract to 
abide by them.  Arbitration and mediation are the two major forms of ADR. Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") 
refers to any means of settling disputes outside of the courtroom. ADR typically includes early neutral evaluation, 
negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. As burgeoning court queues, rising costs of litigation, and time 
delays continue to plague litigants, more states have begun experimenting with ADR programs. While the two most 
common forms of ADR are arbitration and mediation, negotiation is almost always attempted first to resolve a dispute. 
It is the preeminent mode of dispute resolution. Negotiation allows the parties to meet in order to settle a dispute.  
Mediation is also an informal alternative to litigation. Mediators are individuals trained in negotiations, who bring 
opposing parties together and attempt to work out a settlement or agreement that both parties accept or reject. 
Arbitration is a simplified version of a trial involving limited discovery and simplified rules of evidence. The 
arbitration is headed and decided by an arbitral panel. To comprise a panel, either both sides agree on one arbitrator, or 
each side selects one arbitrator and the two arbitrators elect the third. Arbitration hearings usually last between a few 
days to a week, and the panel only meets for a few hours per day. The panel then deliberates and issues a written 
decision, or arbitral award.  
See Cornell Law School. (n.d.). Retrieved from law.cornell.edu: 
 https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution 
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4.4 Arab Ministerial Council (AMC) 
While it is different from the League of Arab States Ministerial Councils,164 the 
suggested Arab Ministerial Council (AMC) is composed of the foreign affairs ministers 
of all the Member States or other ministers representing them or delegated by the 
Member State. The Council is presided over by the Member State which presided over 
the last ordinary session of the Arab Supreme Council (explained below). It convenes its 
ordinary sessions on quarterly bases. An extraordinary session can be convened at the 
invitation of any one Member State seconded by another Member State. A session is 
valid if attended by two thirds of the Member States. 
The functions of the Ministerial Council include, among other things: 
- Formulating policies and making recommendations for promotion of cooperation 
among the Member States. 
- Achieving coordination among Member States for implementation of ongoing projects 
- Submitting decisions in form of recommendations for Supreme Council’s approval. 
- Organising and holding meetings of the Supreme Council and preparing agendas. 
 
4.5 Arab Senate House (ASH) 
While there has been no real Arab affiliated experience with the constitutional formation 
of a senate, the US Senate165, and for the purpose of this research, was used as a reference 
                                               
164 The Ministerial Councils at the League of Arab States comprise of 12 bodies (1) Arabs Minister of Housing and 
Construction (2) Arab Ministers of Social Affairs, (3) Arab Ministers of Transport, (4) Arab Ministers of 
Telecommunications and Information, (5) Arab Ministers of health, (6) Arab Ministers of Justice, (7) Arab Ministerial 
Water Council, (8) Arab Minister of Youth and Sports, (9) Arab Ministerial of Electricity, (10) Arab Interior Ministers, 
(11) Arab Ministers of Media, (12) Arab Ministers Responsible for the Environment, (13) Arab Ministerial of Tourism. 
 See League of Arab States . (n.d.). Retrieved from lasportal.org: 
 http://www.lasportal.org/en/councils/ministerialcouncil/Pages/default.aspx 
 
165 The United States Senate is the upper chamber of the United States Congress which, along with the United States 
House of Representatives, the lower chamber, composes the legislature of the United States of America. 
The composition and powers of the Senate are established by Article One of the United States Constitution. The Senate 
is composed of senators who represent each of the several states, with each state being equally represented by two 
senators, regardless of their population, serving staggered terms of six years; with fifty states presently in the Union, 
there are 100 U.S. Senators. From 1789 until 1913, Senators were appointed by legislatures of the states they 
represented; following the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, they are now popularly elected. The 
Senate chamber is located in the north wing of the Capitol, in Washington, D.C. As the upper house, the Senate has 
several powers of advice and consent which are unique to it; these include the ratification of treaties, the confirmation 
of Cabinet secretaries, Supreme Court justices, federal judges, other federal executive officials, flag officers, regulatory 
officials, ambassadors, and other federal uniformed officers. In addition to these, in cases wherein no candidate 
receives a majority of electors for Vice President, the duty befalls upon the Senate to elect one of the top two recipients 
of electors for that office. It further has the responsibility of conducting trials of those impeached by the House. The 
Senate is widely considered both a more deliberative and more prestigious body than the House of Representatives due 
to its longer terms, smaller size, and statewide constituencies, which historically led to a more collegial and less 
partisan atmosphere. 
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model to adopt in terms of structure and only to certain extents. In the US, the Senate 
Oath166 clarifies the role. 
 
While the main mandate of the Arab Senate is to initiate debates and vote on legislation, 
it is regarded as one of the main constitutional bodies of the AEU. The members of the 
suggested Arab Senate constitute all Member Countries and voting is proportional to the 
population of the countries, or other indicators depending on the agreements. 
 
The chairmanship of the Arab Senate shall be rotatable between states with Veto powers, 
if required. The mandate for the Arab Senate Members will be set to four-year terms.  
 
Regarding proposals, every proposal is referred to a specialised committee within the 
Senate for consideration.  
 
4.6 Arab General Secretariat (AGS) 
The functions of the Arab General Secretariat are broadly the preparation of special 
studies relating to cooperation, coordination, planning and programming for common 
action, preparation of reports and studies on the demand of the Arab Ministerial Council.  
The General Secretariat is composed of the following: 
A. The Secretary General is appointed by the Supreme Council for a term of three (3) 
years renewable for another term. 
B. The Assistant(s) Secretary General are mandated to deal with the functional areas, 
like political, economic, security. They are appointed by the Ministerial Council on 
the nomination of the Secretary General for a renewable term of four (4) years. 
                                                                                                                                            
The presiding officer of the Senate is the Vice President of the United States, who is President of the Senate; in their 
absence, the President Pro Tempore, who is customarily the senior member of the controlling party, presides over the 
Senate. In the early 20th century, the practice of majority and minority parties electing their floor leaders began, 
although they are not constitutional officers. 
See United States Senate . (n.d.). Retrieved from senate.gov: https://www.senate.gov/ 
 
166 The Constitution requires that senators take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution. Congress has 
prescribed the following oath for all federal officials (except the President), including Senators: 
I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all 
enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, 
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the 
office on which I am about to enter. So help me God 
See United States Senate . (n.d.). Retrieved from senate.gov: https://www.senate.gov/ 
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4.7 Arab Supreme Council (ASC) 
The similar existing form to the suggested Arab Supreme Council is currently the 
existing UAE Federal Supreme Council167. The Functions of the ASC will be later set by 
the Arab Commission and Arab Parliament. Thus, and while UAE’s Council is Federal 
and deals with all elements including political, the ASC shall be more oriented to serve 
the AEU under its mandates, adopting economic approaches rather than a political ones. 
 
4.8 Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) 
The (AMF)168 is an existing regional Arab organisation. It is a working sub-organisation 
of the LAS. Due to the fact that the AMF is one of the few currently efficient Arab 
institutions, its importation under the AEU would be considered as a very favourable 
scenario. The Arab Monetary Fund is regarded as the most relevant to the suggested AEU 
since it deals with all sorts of economic, financial, monetary and fiscal matters.  
                                               
167 The Federal Supreme Council (Arabic: داحتلال ىلعلأا سلجملا) is the highest constitutional authority in the United Arab 
Emirates, being the highest legislative and executive body. It establishes general policies and sanctions federal 
legislation. It is the First Federal Authority in terms of ranking in the hierarchy of the Five Federal Authorities 
prescribed in the Constitution: Federal Supreme Council, Federal President and Federal Vice President, Federal 
Cabinet, Federal National Council, Federal Judiciary.  
The Supreme Council of the Union has the following functions: 
1. The general policies in all matters entrusted to the Union by this Constitution and to consider what would that 
achieve the objectives of the Union and the common interests of the member Emirates. 
2. The ratification of the various federal laws before they are issued, including the laws of the annual general 
budget of the Union and the final account. 
3. The ratification of the decrees on the subject matters under the provisions of this Constitution for the ratification 
or approval of the Federal Supreme Council prior to the issuance of these decrees by the Federal President. 
4. Ratification of institutions and agreements are ratified by decree. 
5. To approve the appointment of the Federal Prime Minister and the Federal Cabinet and the acceptance of their 
resignation and removal from office upon the proposal of the Federal President. 
6. To approve the appointment of the President and Judges of the Federal Supreme Court and the acceptance of 
their resignations and dismissal in the circumstances prescribed in the Constitution. Are all decrees. 
7. High control over the affairs of the Union in general. 
8. Any other functions stipulated in this Constitution or federal laws. 
See FEDERAL SUPREME COUNCIL. (2017). Retrieved from UAE: uaecabinet.ae: 
https://www.uaecabinet.ae/en/federal-supreme-council 
 
168 Arab Monetary Fund is a Regional Arab Organisation, Founded in 1976, and has started operations in 1977. 
Member Countries (22) are: Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syria, Somalia, Iraq, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Yemen, Comoros.  
The member States shall co-operate among themselves and with the Fund for the realisation of the goals of the Fund 
and each member shall, in particular. 
1. Reduce the restrictions on current payments among member States and the restrictions on the transfer of capital 
and the transfer of profits therefrom, with a view to the total elimination of the said restrictions. 
2. Endeavour to achieve the necessary degree of co-ordination between Arab economic policies, particularly 
financial and monetary, in a manner that will contribute to Arab economic integration and assist in creating the 
necessary conditions for the establishment of a unified Arab currency. 
See THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE ARAB MONETARY FUND. (2013, April 3). Retrieved from Arab 
Monetary Fund: http://www.amf.org.ae/en/page/objectives-and-means 
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The Arab Monetary Fund's main objectives are to correct and balance the payments of its 
member states, remove payment restrictions between members, improve Arab monetary 
cooperation, encourage the development of Arab financial markets (paving the way for a 
single Arab currency), and to facilitate and promote trade between member states. 
 
The principal organs of the AMF are the Board of Governors, the Board of Executive 
Directors, and the Director General. In the Board of Governors (General Assembly) each 
member state is represented by a Governor and a Deputy Governor.  
 
The Board of Executive Directors, composed of eight directors of renewable three-year 
terms, is chaired by the Director General, who is appointed to the board for a renewable 
five-year term and also holds the position of Managing Director of the AMF. The 
organisation distributes its work through offices, departments, committees, and divisions. 
 
As mentioned in the AMF Objectives, “the Fund shall cooperate with similar Arab 
institutions to achieve its objectives, likewise, when necessary, it shall cooperate with 
similar international organisations”. 
 
In addition, “AMF shall provide technical assistance and services in the financial and 
monetary sphere to member States, which conclude economic agreements aimed at 
attaining a monetary union between them leading the realisation of the goals of the Fund. 
 
4.9 Arab Central Bank (ACB) 
In spite of many Arab unification efforts, not only on the economic level but also on the 
political level, to date there has not been a serious attempt to establish an Arab Central 
Bank. For the purpose of the creation of the Arab Economic Union, the closet model to 
observe and explore is the European Central Bank (ECB)169. Table (2.6) below shows the 
                                               
169 The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank of the 19 European Union countries which have adopted the 
euro. Our main task is to maintain price stability in the euro area and so preserve the purchasing power of the single 
currency. The ECB is an official EU institution at the heart of the Eurosystem as well as the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism for banking supervision. Find out how we are organised and learn who is who in the Governing Council, 
the main decision-making body. The European Central Bank and the national central banks together constitute the 
Eurosystem, the central banking system of the euro area. The main objective of the Eurosystem is to maintain price 
stability: safeguarding the value of the euro. 
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full organisation structure of the ECB, whereby the plan would be to build up the ACB in 
a parallel structure to the ECB. 
 
The Arab Central Bank (ACB) mandate will be to implement the AEU’s economic, fiscal 
and monetary policies. Its main aim is to keep prices stable, thereby supporting economic 
growth and job creation. The Arab Central Bank will work in close cooperation with the 
Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) as a leading Arab financial institution. 
 
The roles of the ACB will be continuously developing, however and upon the AEU’s 
initiation, some of its roles may be identified as follows: 
 
1. Controlling money supply and inflation. 
 
2. Managing the buying or selling of currencies to balance exchange rates. 
 
3. Ensuring that financial markets and institutions are well supervised.  
 
4. Ensuring that authorities and that payment systems work well. 
 
5. Ensuring the safety and soundness of the Arab banking system. 
 
6. Monitoring price trends and assesses risks to price stability.  
 
7. Regulating and supervising the national central banks. 
 
The ACB will also work with the national central banks of all AEU member states as a 
chaperone to ensure the maintenance of common economic and fiscal policies as well as 
the control of supply and support for the Arab unified currency to be discussed later. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
The European Central Bank is responsible for the prudential supervision of credit institutions located in the euro area 
and participating non-euro area Member States, within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which also comprises the 
national competent authorities. It thereby contributes to the safety and soundness of the banking system and the 
stability of the financial system within the EU and each participating Member State. We at the European Central Bank 
are committed to performing all our tasks effectively. In so doing, we strive for the highest level of integrity, 
competence, efficiency and accountability. We respect the separation between our monetary policy and supervisory 
tasks. In performing our tasks we are transparent while fully observing the applicable confidentiality requirements. 
See European Central Bank. (2017). Retrieved from ecb.europa.eu: 
 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/html/index.en.html 
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Table: (2.6): Organisational Chart of the European Central Bank170: 
 
 
 
                                               
170 Organisation Chart of the European Central Bank 
See European Central Bank: Organisation Chart of the ECB. (2017). Retrieved from ecb.europa.eu: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/orgachart/html/index.en.html 
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Table (2.7) - Continued: Organisational Chart of the European Central Bank171: 
 
 
 
                                               
171 Table 2.7: Organisation Chart of the European Central Bank 
See European Central Bank: Organisation Chart of the ECB. (2017). Retrieved from ecb.europa.eu: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/orgachart/html/index.en.html 
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Section (5): Functions 
While the structure of the Arab Economic Union has been categorised in departments and 
sections, each department or organisation in the AEU will have its own functions. While 
a full picture on the functions cannot be provided “in globo” at such an early stage, I will 
convey in the below parts the functions of some of the AEU organisations: 
 
5.1 Internal Functions of the AEU: 
 
5.1.1 The Arab Parliament:172(Previously elaborated) 
 
The Arab Parliament has three main functions: legislative, supervisory and budgetary.  
a) Legislative Functions, which include but not limited to the following:  
- Setting up the AEU laws and legislations in accordance to a proposal designed 
by the Arab Commission.  
- Monitoring and reviewing the program of the Arab Commission and requesting 
it to propose legislations when required. 
 
b) Supervisory, which include but not limited to the following: 
- Examining, in a sound manner, of all AEU institutions. 
- Electing the Commission President and approving the Commission as a body. 
- Approving how AEU budgets should be spent. 
- Discussing the monetary policy with the Arab Central Bank. 
- Questioning the Arab Commission and Council. 
- Observing the elections.  
 
c) Budgetary, which include but not limited to the following: 
- Establishing the AEU budget, together with the Council. 
- Approving the AEU's long-term budget. 
 
5.1.2 The Arab Commission: (Previously elaborated) 
The Arab Commission has several main internal functions in the AEU including: 
- Suggesting new laws in order to protect interests of the AEU and its citizens. 
                                               
172 Arab Parliament was elaborated and explained in Section 4. 
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- Managing the policies of the AEU and assign the AEU funding: 
- Setting the AEU expenditure priorities, in coordination with Council and 
Parliament. 
- Setting the annual budgets to be approved later by the Parliament and Council. 
- Enforcing AEU laws, legislations and regulations to all the member countries. 
 
5.1.3 The Arab Council: (Previously elaborated) 
- Decides the overall direction and political priorities of the AEU without 
passing legislations. 
- Deals with complex and sensitive issues that cannot be resolved at lower levels 
of intergovernmental cooperation. 
 
5.1.4 The Arab Central Bank: (Previously elaborated) 
- Sets the interest rates therefore can control the money supply and inflation. 
- Ensures that financial markets and institutions are well supervised by national 
authorities, and that payment systems work well. 
- Ensures the safety and soundness of the Arab banking and monetary system. 
- Monitors price trends and assesses risks to price stability. 
 
5.2 External Functions of the AEU: 
 
5.2.1 The Arab Parliament173 
- Conducting revisions and making decisions with reference to international 
agreements, conventions, bilateral & multilateral treaties and partnerships. 
- Revising of enlargement requests, and making decisions with reference to the 
acceptance or refusal of enlargements (regarding new members joining the AEU). 
 
5.2.2 The Arab Commission174 
- Representing the AEU on the international arena. 
- Representing all AEU countries in the international organisations and 
conferences, in particular in areas of trade policy and humanitarian aid. 
- Negotiating the international agreements for the AEU. 
                                               
173 Explained in Section 4 of this chapter. 
174 Explained in Section 4 of this chapter. 
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5.2.3 The Arab Council (explained in Section 4): 
- Sets the AEU's common foreign and security policy, taking into consideration the 
AEU strategic interests and defense implications. 
 
5.2.4 The Arab Foreign Affairs Service: 
- Supports the AEU High Representative in conducting the AEU foreign and 
security policy 
- Manages diplomatic relations / strategic partnerships with non-AEU states 
- Works with the national diplomatic services of AEU countries, the UN and other 
international organisations and leading global powers and decision makers. 
 
5.3 Administration of Functions: 
As detailed in the previous section, each organisation in the Arab Economic Union holds 
responsibility for a specific external or internal function. The Arab Parliament, the Arab 
Commission, the Arab Council, the Arab Central Bank, the Arab Foreign Affairs Service 
and many others are responsible for the different functions in the AEU. 
 
Section (6): Objectives, Partnerships and Affiliations of the AEU 
The main entity which is considered the corner stone of the establishment of the Arab 
Economic Union is the Economic Unity Agreement approved on June 3, 1957, the 
Council of Arab Economic Unity, as per its charter, aims to "Organize and consolidate 
economic relations among the States of the Arab League on bases that are consistent with 
the natural and historical links among them; and to provide the best conditions for 
flourishing their economies, developing their resources and ensuring the prosperity of 
their countries." The bases of economic relations between states in the Council of Arab 
Economic Unity, and which may well be adopted as the bases for the establishment of the 
Arab Economic Union, are outlined in Chapter (1), Articles ‘1’ and ‘2’ of the Economic 
Unity Agreement175: 
                                               
175 Agreement on Arab Economic Unity (previously explained in the body of the thesis and elaborated further in the 
footnotes) 
  
The Agreement on Arab Economic Unity was signed on 3 June 1957 and came into force on 30 April 1964.  The 
original signatory States were Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahirija, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and the Arab Republic of Yemen. Mauritania, Palestine and 
Somalia subsequently also became signatories to the Agreement.  
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6.1 Objectives of the AEU 
The objectives of the Arab Economic Union have been elaborated during the description 
of the structure of the AEU; however, it is important to point out the two prime articles. 
Article (1), identifies the core of economic unity, outlines each member's rights to 
personal and capital mobility, free exchange of goods and products, exercise of residence 
and economic endeavours, transit & use of ports / airports and possession & inheritance. 
Article (2), harmonises Article (1) as it encourages and orients the signatories of the 
Economic Unity Agreement to work towards the objectives specified in Article (1) 
through various steps, which include merging into a unified custom area, unifying import 
and export policies and regulations with regard to transit, jointly negotiating agreements 
with other states, unifying and coordinating legislations to achieve equal conditions of 
agriculture, industry and trade among Member States, coordinating labour and social 
security legislation, coordinating monetary and fiscal policies and adopting any other 
measures consistent with the objectives of Articles (1) and (2). 
                                                                                                                                            
The Governments of: Kingdom of Jordan; Tunisian Republic; Republic of Sudan; Republic of Iraq; Saudi Arabia; the 
Syrian Arab Republic; United Arab Republic; Lebanese Republic; United Libyan Kingdom; Yemenite Kingdom; 
Kingdom of Morocco; and State of Kuwait; In pursuance of their desire to organize and consolidate economic relations 
among the LAS on principles conforming with the natural and historical ties among them, and with view to creating the 
best conditions for the advancement for their economy, for promoting their wealth and ensuring the welfare of their 
peoples, have agreed on setting up a complete unity among themselves to be achieved gradually with the speed 
commensurate with effecting their transfer from the present to the desired situation without detriment to its vital 
interests, in accordance with the following stipulations:  / Chapter 1: Objectives & Methods: 
Article 1: A complete economic unity shall be established among the Arab League States. The member states and their 
nationals are guaranteed the following on equal footing:  
1. Freedom of movement of persons and capital.   
2. Freedom of exchange of domestic and foreign goods and products. 
3. Freedom of transport and transit and of using means of transport, ports and civil airports.  
4. Freedom of residence, work, employment and exercise of economic activities.   
5. Rights of ownership, of making one's will and of inheritance.  
Article 2: For attaining the unity mentioned in Art (1) the contracting states shall work for accomplishing the following:  
1. The Arab States should be made one customs zone subject to a single administration. Customs' tariffs, legislation 
and regulations applied in these states should be standardized. 
2.  The Arab States should work for standardizing regulations thereof.  
3. Standardizing transport and transit systems.  
4. Concluding collective trade agreements and payments agreements with third countries.  
5. Coordinating agriculture, industry, and internal trade policies. Economic legislations should be standardized to 
ensure equal terms to all nationals of contracting countries working in agriculture, industry, and other professions.  
6. Co-ordinating labour and social insurance legislation.  
7.  a. Co-ordinating legislation concerning government and municipal taxes and duties and all other taxes pertaining 
to agriculture, industry, trade, real estate, and capital investments in a manner ensuring equal opportunities.  
         b. Avoiding double taxation and duties levied on the nationals of the contracting parties.  
8. The co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policies and all regulations thereof [in] the contracting countries should 
be undertaken as a prerequisite for the standardization of the currency.  
9. Standardizing the methods of the classification of statistics.  
10. All necessary measures should be taken to ensure the attainment of goals specified in Art 1&2 of the Agreement.  
It is, however, possible to circumvent the principle of standardization in respect of certain circumstances and certain 
countries subject to the approval of the Council of Arab Economic Unity. 
See General Secretariat . (1957). AGREEMENT ON ARAB ECONOMIC UNITY. Council of Arab Economic Unity. 
 
149 | P a g e  
 
The signatory Member States will agree to establish an inclusive economic unity amongst 
them to be achieved through a gradual method and at such a timely manner so that the 
transfer of their countries from the status quo to the future developed status is 
accomplished without rendering any damage to their basic interests, in accordance with 
several associated and imperative provisions. The fact is that economic unity does not 
necessarily diminish sovereignty; on the contrary, it will enhance it if well structured.  
 
6.2 Economic Partnerships and Affiliations of the AEU 
Similar to any other economic bloc, the desired Arab Economic Union should seek to 
build strong economic and partnerships and affiliations with other economic blocs and 
countries depending on the need and the nature of the partnership. Based on the 
experiences of other blocs of similar nature, it is always preferable to instigate with 
building the economic and financial relations since they tend to pave ways and open 
doors to achieve political confidence and lead to building robust political relationships, 
which will support the continuity, sustainability and effectiveness of the Union. 
Once again and through the already existing committee under the Arab League of States, 
and which is suggested to be imported to the AEU, the later should consider and seek 
building economic partnerships and affiliations on the global scale, especially that the 
platform already exists.  These already existing committees include but not limited to: 
▪ The Monetary and Financial Committee, which considers the handling of affairs 
pertaining to monetary and banking matters, taxes, duties and other financial affairs.  
▪ The Economic Committee, which considers the affairs pertaining to agriculture, 
industry, trade, transport, communications, labour and social insurance. In addition, 
the Council may set up other committees whenever necessary. 
▪ The Council of Arab Economic Unity, which has been previously detailed, shall 
exercise the functions and powers that are specified in their Agreements that are 
deemed necessary for ensuring implementation of economic partnership.  
This research shall not go through specific suggestions related to economic partnerships 
and affiliations, simply since there are numerous bodies in the form of economic blocs, 
organisations and many more which fit to be partners of added value to the AEU. 
Nevertheless, the indispensable choice would be to launch negotiations to build a strong 
partnership, or affiliation to say the least, with the European Union, a step which shall 
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bring unlimited added economic value for both unions and regions respectively. Prior to 
engaging in any form of negotiations with potential economic partners or establishment 
of affiliations, the AEU shall identify criteria for such relations which aim to safeguard 
the AEU and protect it from any unfair competition, non-reciprocal benefits or lack of 
mutual advantages, while at the same time securing the principles of openness which will 
only bring progress and development to the union and its member countries at all times. 
It is well known that the economic union is not the final stage of unity176. The phases of 
“unity” starts with a simple free trade agreement and finally concludes and materialises 
with a successful political union which, as explained, is a type of state that is composed 
of smaller states, referred to as political unification. It is also the last stage of the 
multinational integration process which involves common home and judicial policies and 
a common foreign and security policies, added to all the economic integration criteria. 
Unification of states that used to be together and are reuniting would be referred to as 
reunification. The clear examples on political unions are currently the United States of 
America (USA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while former examples and the 
Soviet Union (USSR) which collapsed in 1990 and the United Arab Republic (UAR) 
which collapsed in 1961 after less than three years from formation. While this is neither 
the objective of this research, nor the core of it, the pinnacle of success of any economic 
union is actually reaching full political integration to form a political union, “one nation”. 
 
Chapter (3) is considered integral in terms of the institutional structure where there is an 
attempt, and in spite of the fact that the Arab Economic Union is an idea, to draw an 
almost complete structure for the functions and administration and hierarchy of the AEU. 
While this Chapter presents details on the actual construction of the union, it also 
develops the factors and elements of the organisational structure from a substance, 
technical and logistical perspective. Therefore, and based on the discussion of the 
structure and all its elements (membership, location, administration, management, 
organisational structure, hierarchy, functions, objectives, partnerships and more), the 
attempt to draw a frame for Arab economic integration by looking at unions of similar 
functions around the world, while taking into account the Arab specificities and culture, 
proved to be a sound step towards achieving successful results for this this research.  
                                               
176 This point was elaborated thoroughly in the previous chapter where levels of trading blocs were explored. 
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Chapter (4) 
The Role of Arab Workers’ Remittances to enhance the Development of 
an Arab Economic Union 
“Lesson from Lebanon” 
 
PART 4.A: "Institutional and Regulatory Framework Analysis" 
 
Section (1): Introduction 
 
With the high levels of emigration which have been taking place in the Arab Region for 
several decades, and the severe "Brain Drain"178 entailing the relocation of the educated 
youth who aim for higher returns, higher living standards and more secure and stable 
living environments, the phenomenon of remittances in the Arab Region has become a 
cornerstone for developing economies with a large volume of emigrants, namely Lebanon 
which has ranked an average of about eight (8) Billion USD in 2015, while the real 
volume of the remittances’ inflow through unofficial channels may be larger. Such 
financial transfers remained stable and consistent during war, financial crisis and other 
times of commotion in Lebanon and even source countries. 
 
Remittances have created a financial sanctuary for families as their regular income on the 
microeconomic level, in addition to the positive effects on the macroeconomic indicators 
in recipient countries and especially Lebanon in our case, and the expansion of human, 
physical and financial capitals. Nevertheless, the real extent of their impact on financing 
development in Lebanon is still not crystallized, especially that a major part of remittance 
inflows spurs the demand, causing inflationary pressures. 
                                               
178 “Brain drain in Arab World”  
There is no dearth of talented people in the Arab world. But if that talent is not explored and utilized effectively and not 
given due respect, recognition and above all not provided with an environment conducive to proper learning, we will 
eventually experience brain drain. Where would they go? Ironically, they would look for greener pastures in countries 
we usually consider as conspirators, who are working to destroy us. Is it very puzzling to see the finest Arab brains 
leaving for the West? No, it is not. It has become a destination where talented Arabs can work with others and get 
highly paid, earn more respect, enjoy social equality and most importantly, they feel happy, I mean very happy. They 
can vote, nominate themselves to top scientific positions and have no fear. Before I forget, Arab scientists, doctors and 
researchers in the United States have much higher incomes than the national income average.  
Abdulateef Al-Mulhim | Published — Wednesday 24 December 2014 
See: http://www.arabnews.com/columns/news/678926 
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Therefore, an urge has generated to come up with a long term development strategy for 
the management of remittances as a significant source of long term development finance. 
Such strategy is vital in the build-up of Arab national economies which will 
automatically play an important role in supporting the establishment and development of 
the Arab Economic Union, since remittances are regarded as an external source of 
income which represent a backbone for the non-oil economies in the Arab countries, and 
could make up for the gap in wealth amongst Arab countries, facilitating the Arab 
Economic Union to be established from the perspective of fiscal volumes of countries. 
 
In an attempt to reach this goal, the first section of this chapter provides information on 
the state of remittance inflows in the Arab Region, taking Lebanon as a study case, in 
order to help understand how the wealth of remittances is handled at all levels, namely by 
addressing the regulatory and legislative position. While it is true that there is no one size 
that fits all, the fact remains that the economies of Arab countries are quite similar (with 
the exception of the GCC oil producing and capital exporting countries). For this very 
reason, Lebanon could well serve as the ideal study case and a “lesson to learn from” 
with reference to the role of remittances and development. The Lebanese scenario may 
well be applied to the rest of the MENA Region in that context. 
 
In addition, this chapter provides a useful tool for a broader audience such as 
practitioners, academics, students, donors and anyone interested in understanding the 
context of the remittances. The comprehensive research179 undertaken on remittances in 
Lebanon aims at proposing policies and programs in the form of policy 
recommendations, in an attempt to enhance the impact of remittances on financing 
sustainable economic development in the country, and create a “Lesson to Learn” for 
other Arab countries and as a supporting tool along their path to achieve gradual 
economic integration resulting in the establishment of the Arab Economic Union. 
 
The analysis originates from the fact that there is an ultimate need for a national strategy 
based on solid economic and regulatory plans to create a proper framework for migrants’ 
                                               
179 The statements of politicians and professionals quoted in this paper were extracted from published interviews. Other 
interviews were conducted under the condition of nondisclosure, thus the scrutiny herein was based on such interviews. 
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affairs on broad terms and specifically remittances, in order to secure the sound allocation 
of such fiscal resources in sustainable economic sectors, while stimulating the economic 
cycle. Once this national strategy is produced and implemented, the favoured course to 
adopt is to share the Lebanese experience with other Arab countries, which succeeded in 
managing the field of migration and development and namely the Maghreb countries 
(specifically Tunisia and Morocco), which will pave the way to roll out the experience 
towards the rest of the Arab countries with the intension to produce an Arab Regional 
Migration Strategy.    
 
Part (2) of this chapter which is the factual report about remittances and the involved 
stakeholders, was based on the conviction which applies to all Arab countries (but in this 
present case Lebanon), that recipient countries suffered from the lack of a proper 
infrastructure for migration strategy and affairs’ organisation, including the remittances 
factor of course. It was clear that there neither was a unified national strategic plan for 
migration in Lebanon, nor were there economic and regulatory structures to cater for 
migrants and plan the proper utilisation and making use of the remittances they transfer. 
 
As a result, Part (2) introduces the “National Factual Report for Lebanon” which 
crystallises the current situation by revealing what currently exists on ground, what is 
misplaced and what is missing. It also suggests that there is a need to duplicate this report 
and roll it in the rest of the Arab countries, to finally be able to compile them in a unified 
master report, to serve in the process of achieving a unified Arab Migration Strategy and 
a set of related regulations which will play a major role in forming Arab economic unity. 
 
This was managed by compiling several thematic institution-specific factual reports, of 
which were compiled with the rest of the thematic institution-specific factual reports to 
come up with a comprehensive national factual report that would facilitate drawing the 
roadmap for action, towards constructing the National Strategy for Migration and 
Development in Lebanon, in support of dealing with the flow of remittances and its 
proper channelling. Similarly to Part (1), this report should be produced in each of the 
Arab countries in order to facilitate the production of a regional developed Arab report on 
migration and remittances, which will be a main pillar to form the Arab Economic Union. 
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Section (2): Introduction to Emigrants’ Remittances - Case of Lebanon  
Lebanon has a long history of migration, whereby modern migration from Lebanon dates 
back to the second half of the 19th century and can be divided into four main eras: 
1. First wave of migration to West Africa as well as the Americas: 1870 - 1940s. 
2. Second wave of migration to West Africa, North America, South America, 
Australia, Arab Gulf States and Western Europe: 1940s - 1974. 
3. Third wave of migration (civil war) increased to all the regions: 1975 - 1989. 
4. Fourth wave of migration increased for highly skilled migrant workers towards 
the Gulf States: 1990 - present.  
 
Recent migration waves comprise mostly of young individuals who are usually educated 
and highly qualified, which cause a serious and large scale “Brain Drain”. The 
feminisation of migration marks a recent trend in migration from Lebanon. Indeed, more 
women are attempting to migrate independently in order to seek employment 
opportunities abroad. There are internal and external "Push Factors" which influence 
Lebanese migration, which are mainly triggered by political, socio-economic, and 
security circumstances. The cause of modern migration from Lebanon may be found in a 
combination of political, financial and social factors. According to the paper “MTM - A 
Dialogue in Action” published by the joint ICMPD-IOM Project, the factors influencing 
the Lebanese emigration are as follows180: 
 
Table (4.1): Push and Pull Factors 
 
 
                                               
180 See ICMPD. (2010). A Dialogue in Action: Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices. ICMPD-IOM. 
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2.1 Definition and History: 
The World Bank globally defines personal remittances as the sum of personal transfers 
and compensation of employees of a certain country living and working abroad. Personal 
transfers include all current transfers in cash or in kind between resident and non-resident 
individuals, independent of the source of income of the sender (and regardless of whether 
the sender receives income from labour, entrepreneurial or property income, social 
benefits and other sources and transfers) and relationship between the households 
(regardless of whether they are related or unrelated individuals).181 
 
Lebanon is currently under the burden of a large financial public debt exceeding 62 
billion USD which represents around 150% of the GDP, while unemployment has risen 
to more than 17%, and the number of displaced Syrians (who form a significant 
economic burden) has officially exceeded 1.15 million according to the UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR)182, while the unofficial number has soared over two million displaced. 
Lebanon benefits from its large, cohesive, and entrepreneurial Diaspora.  
 
Over the course of time, emigration has yielded Lebanese "commercial networks" 
throughout the world. As a result, remittances from expatriates and immigrants to family 
members within the country total $8.2 billion and account for one fifth of the country's 
economy in 2014183 
 
The historical trend of the Lebanese migration reveals a clear shift from the traditional 
countries of migration such as South America, the United States of America and Europe 
to oil-producing countries in the Arabian Peninsula, primarily the KSA, the UAE and 
Qatar; due to many reasons, including but not limited to, the high level of income and 
geographical location. During the years of the civil war (1975 - 1990), the plethora of 
Lebanese expatriates in the Arab Gulf Region, educated for the most part, cultured, and 
                                               
181 See World Development Indicators.(n.d.). How do you define remittances? Retrieved from 
datahelpdesk.worldbank.org:  
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114950-how-do-you-define-remittances 
 
182 See UNHCR. (2016, December 31). Syrian Regional Refugee Response . Retrieved from http://data.unhcr.org: 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122 
 
183 See BI-ME staff. (2010). Middle East economic growth to rebound to 3.7% in 2010, says World Bank. BI-ME.  
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high income earners, were generally operating in the fields of construction followed by 
trade, tourism, transport and communications, banking, and public service sectors.184  
 
In May 2006, (Fargues, 2006) estimated that 51.8% of Lebanese emigrants had a 
university education185. 
During the July 2006 war, remittances increased as migrants feared for the safety and the 
security of their family and friends back home. According to (Hourani & Dabbous, 
2007), in a study conducted on migrant families abroad, 17% of the migrant Diaspora 
claimed they had notably increased their remittances to family and friends in Lebanon in 
July 2006. Furthermore, slightly more than one third of Lebanese residing in Lebanon 
34.9% claimed that they had noticed an increase in the amount of remittances that they 
would ordinarily have received.186 
 
2.2 Economic facts and Socio-economic Impacts of Remittances in Lebanon 
According to the 2013 “Investment Climate Statement" published by the Bureau of 
Economic and Business Affairs at US Department of State in February 2013, Lebanon 
places no restrictions on the movement of capital in or out of the country, whether for 
investment or other purposes. The government permits the free exchange of currencies, 
precious metals, and monetary instruments, both domestically and internationally.  
 
According to the World Bank’s estimates, remittance inflows to Lebanon remained 
almost constant at $7.6 billion for 2011, or 19.1% of total remittances to the MENA 
region. Lebanon is considered by the World Bank to be one of the top recipients of 
remittances relative to the size of its economy. Remittances as a share of GDP reached 
18% in 2011, the highest in the region and among the highest in developing countries.187 
                                               
184 See Labaki, B. (1987). Lebanese Emigration During the War (1975-1989), in the Lebanese World: A Century of 
Emigration, Albert Hourani and Nadim Shehadi. London: The Center of Lebanese Studies . 
  
185 See Fargues, P. (2006). INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE ARAB REGION:. Beirut: United Nations 
Secretariat  
 
186 See Hourani, G., & Dabbous, E. (2007). Insecurity, Migration and return: The case of Lebanon 
following the Summer 2006 War. Florence : European University Institute, RSCAS. 
 
187 See BEBA. (2013). 2013 Investment Climate Statement - Lebanon. Beirut: BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND 
BUSINESS AFFAIRS. 
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In addition, according to the World Bank numbers, in 2012, Lebanon ranked 10th among 
developing economies and 16th globally as the largest recipient of remittances. Of the 
global inflow of remittances, the remittance inflows to Lebanon were around 1.6% in 
2009, 1.8% in 2010, 1.6% in 2011 and 1.5% in 2012. Lebanon was also the second 
largest recipient of remittances among 42 Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs).  
 
The Lebanese Diaspora plays a large role in influencing economic growth and 
development in Lebanon. According to Tabar, “Not only do remittances significantly 
enhance the economic status of many Lebanese who have family members in the 
Diaspora, but they also play a key role in promoting and maintaining stability in the 
Lebanese economy.”188 
 
Transfers or inflows to Lebanon are often used to buy real estate, cover individual private 
education, make personal items' purchases which include clothing and vehicles, or to 
make bank deposits. However, the lack of a comprehensive plan impedes the 
development course of the country and hinders linking the Lebanese Diaspora to their 
homeland, which would facilitate the creation of new jobs and provide sustainable 
income to support the Lebanese youth to cling on to their land and refrain from 
immigrating. Between 1998 and 2001, FDI in Lebanon, which should represent one of 
the main pathways of foreign financing of the nation, reached US$250 million. 
Remittances, however, reached US$1.6 billion dollars, ahead of exports and tourism, 
which averaged US$740 and US$840 million respectively189.  
 
The numbers and statistics stated are evidence on the importance of sustaining and 
developing the framework for remittances. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
188 See Tabar, P. (2010). Lebanon: A Century of Emigration and Immigration . Beirut: Institute for Migration Studies, 
LAU Press. 
 
189 See GMMP. (2010). Middle East Global Media Monitoring Project: Regional Report. South Africa : GMMP 2010. 
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Section (3): Regulatory and Legislative Framework 
The previous two sections have clearly indicated the importance of the inflow of 
remittances and its impact on the Lebanese socio-economic wellbeing. Nevertheless, the 
absence of a sound regulatory plan has caused the loss of unprecedented opportunities at 
a time where the country is at its peak of need for economic transformation and 
regeneration. This section addresses this issue. 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Lebanon, a politically turbulent country, continues to experience insecurity, which highly 
affects sound policy making and reflects the socio-political and economic situation of the 
country, thereby hindering the decision to formulate a concrete framework for the 
drafting, ratification and amendment of relevant and sufficient laws, policies and 
regulations which should govern the inflow of remittances in Lebanon. 
The below sub-sections will explore (i) the Existing key legislations in Lebanon, mainly 
the ones comprising incentives aimed at encouraging transfers of financial resources, and 
(ii) the adequacy of the regulatory framework in Lebanon and its impact on the economic 
development and sustainable growth. 
  
3.2 Existing key legislations in Lebanon 
With reference to the national legislations, various legislative and regulatory frameworks 
pertaining to Lebanese migrant communities have been introduced in Lebanon. However, 
a single comprehensive policy concerning Lebanese migrant communities does not exist.  
Although to date no genuine steps were taken in terms of the progress of a national 
immigration strategy, the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants reports 
that a long term strategy involving the Lebanese emigrants is being developed190.  
In addition to the governmental and Central Bank legislations related to the transfer of 
money that have a direct effect on remittances191, the table below shows the two main 
legislations which directly relate to the transfer of financial resources, and play the role of  
incentive providers which enhances the business-doing and encourage migrant workers to 
explore better ways to invest in Lebanon in economically viable fields.  
                                               
190 Interview with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants; and Answer to joint ICMPD-IOM Questionnaire 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants. 
 
191 Annex 1 - national and main central bank legislations. 
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3.2.1 Legislations promoting incentives to encourage transfer of financial resources192 
Table (4.2): Lebanese legislations with incentives to transfer financial resources193 
  
3.2.2 Regulations which generate financial and monetary incentives 
With the beginning of the new millennium, the Lebanese Government passed several 
laws and decrees in an attempt to boost the business environment and investment in 
Lebanon. Such legal incentives include but are not limited to the following: 
o Legislative Decree No. 11614 of 1969 as amended by Law No. 296 of 2001 on 
the Foreign Acquisition of Property and Property Rights in Lebanon:  
 It defines the access to real estate for Lebanese and foreign nationals and eases 
legal restrictions on foreign property ownership, thus encouraging investments in 
Lebanon, particularly in industry and tourism. 
o Law No. 318 of 2001 on Combating Money Laundering  
o Law No. 440 - 2002 on Arbitration between State and Private Entities in Lebanon 
                                               
192 See ICMPD-IOM. (2010). Linking Emigrant Communities for More Development. ICMPD. 
 
193 The Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) is the national investment promotion agency that was 
established in 1994 with the aim of promoting Lebanon as a key investment destination, and attracting, facilitating and 
retaining investments in the country. See http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/en/about_us 
Lebanese legislations incorporating incentives aimed to encourage  financial resources transfer  
Legislation Description 
Legislative Decree No. 
11614 of 1969 / amended 
by Law No. 296/2001 on  
Foreign Acquisition of 
Property & Property 
Rights in Lebanon 
It defines access to real estate for Lebanese and foreigners and eases 
legal restrictions on foreign property ownership, thus encouraging 
investments in Lebanon, particularly in industry and tourism. The 
law further lowers real estate registration fees for both Lebanese and 
foreign nationals.  
 
Law No. 360 of 2001 on 
Investment 
Development in 
Lebanon   
It regulates investment promotion of domestic and foreign entities in 
Lebanon and stipulates a series of incentives, such as tax exemptions 
granted for investments in fields of technology, information, 
telecom, media, tourism, industry, and agriculture. The law foresees 
the division of Lebanon into three investment zones located outside 
Beirut. It further established the public agency (IDAL), which is 
entrusted with the development of a program aimed at encouraging 
and attracting Lebanese emigrants to invest in Lebanon.  
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3.2.3 International & foreign instruments relevant to inflow of remittances to Lebanon  
As a country with a significant migrant community, Lebanon has, inter alia, ratified the 
following international conventions relating to international migration: 
 
o 49 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions, including seven 
fundamental conventions; 
 
o Lebanon has not ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families of 1990; 
 
o International Narcotics Control and Strategy Report on Money Laundering and 
Financial Crimes (INCSR) - March 21, 2000; 
"U.S. Department of State issued its Int’l Narcotics Control and Strategy Report 
on ML and Financial Crimes (“INCSR”).194 According to the report, Lebanon’s 
“long tradition” of bank secrecy, its cash-intensive economy, heavy use of foreign 
currency, and the influx of remittances from Diaspora expatriates, makes the 
country vulnerable to money laundering. Although the report acknowledges 
Lebanon’s efforts to improve the regulatory environment, such as its repeal of a 
law authorizing offshore banking and its requirement that banks establish internal 
audits and procedures, it finds that Lebanon needs to make additional strides". 
 
o The State Department issued the INCSR, including its section on Money 
Laundering and Financial Crimes (Volume II) - March 1, 2010. 
"The State Department issued the INCSR, including its section on Money 
Laundering and Financial Crimes (Volume II)195. It notes: “Lebanon has a 
substantial influx of remittances from expatriate workers and family members, 
estimated by the World Bank at $7 billion per year. It has been reported that a 
number of these Lebanese abroad are involved in underground operations." 
                                               
194
 See INSCR. (2000). Money Laundering and Financial Crimes. New York: INSCR. 
The report also acknowledges that in 1999 the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
lead a team from the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and 
the Fed Board of Governors that conducted a weeklong money laundering and training assessment in Lebanon. 
195 See INSCR. (2000). Money Laundering and Financial Crimes. New York: INSCR. 
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3.3 Adequacy of the regulatory framework and impact on economic development 
Regrettably, in Lebanon, there are no real attempts at managing monetary inflows and 
providing a well-structured framework for remittances to spur economic development. 
Due to the huge volume of remittances, it has become essential for developing nations, 
namely Lebanon, to develop policies and regulations to prevent manipulation and loss of 
remittances in the future. In spite of the clear indications of the importance of the 
"remittances pillar" in the Lebanese economy, Lebanon is still in its infant stages 
regarding the deployment of the full advantages of remittances by implementing a 
national action plan for remittances, which leads to a sound migration policy. 
 
According to (Hourani, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: IMPACT ON 
LEBANESE EXPATRIATES IN THE GULF, 2009): “Lebanon does not have a 
migration policy. Only one activity has been reported in regard to interventions 
pertaining to the global financial crisis, that of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO). The ILO has announced a technical cooperation initiative with the Ministry of 
Labour. This initiative, which is being funded by the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), aims at strengthening the capacity of the public 
employment services to better deal with Lebanese migrant returnees, particularly from 
the Gulf countries, who are seeking jobs in Lebanon. UNDP and ILO found that Lebanon 
needs major reforms to reduce unemployment".196 
 
In spite of the serious attempts to develop several national regulations as well as the 
ratification of international instruments to serve the migrant community at a macro level 
and the flow of remittances on a more specific front, it has become evident that there is 
still a lack of sufficient legislations and policies which address the phenomenon of 
remittances. This creates an unorganized and turbulent economic cycle, instead of a solid 
framework which would ensure that such a large inflow of capital (representing almost 
20% of the GDP) is exploited under a practicable and viable plan that would guarantee 
economic sustainability and wide monetary growth. 
 
                                               
196 See Hourani, G. (2009). THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: IMPACT ON LEBANESE EXPATRIATES IN THE 
GULF. Cairo : AUC, Egypt. 
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Section (4): Role of institutions in the management of remittances 
 
4.1 National Stakeholders 
 
4.1.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants197 
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants is the primary national authority 
responsible for questions relating to Lebanese citizens residing abroad. The former 
Ministry of Emigrants was created by Law No. 213 of 1993. As the Law No. 247 of 
2000 came into force, the Ministry of Emigrants was incorporated into the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to become the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants.  
 
The original structure of the Ministry of Emigrants was preserved within the newly 
established Ministry and was renamed as the Directorate of Emigrants, which has 
become the main player for the relation between the Lebanese Government and the 
Lebanese Diaspora all around the world. 
In the context of Lebanese migrants, the main objective of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Emigrants is to protect the interest of Lebanese citizens living abroad and to 
foster their ties with Lebanon. To achieve this objective, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Emigrants has established a framework for linking up with Lebanese nationals 
abroad based on the following principles: 
1. Sincerity and transparency in communication with Lebanese emigrants: Embassies 
and consulates represent Lebanon abroad, protect the interests of Lebanese 
emigrants, and play an important role in facilitating linkages between Lebanon and 
Lebanese emigrants. 
2. Public and Private Sectors: The Government of Lebanon acknowledges the positive 
role of emigrant communities in development. Among policies used to link 
emigrants to the development of Lebanon, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
encourages close cooperation between private and public sectors. 
3. Educational ties of emigrants: Maintaining the link between the young generation of 
Lebanese emigrant communities with Lebanon by establishing Lebanese schools and 
institutes teaching the Arabic language. 
                                               
197 See ICMPD-IOM. (2010). Linking Emigrant Communities for More Development. ICMPD.  
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4. Emigrants’ Associations: Encouraging Lebanese emigrants to create Lebanese local 
unions, associations and clubs, in order to consolidate links among Lebanese 
emigrants. Through Lebanese embassies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Emigrants organizes cultural and social events to promote Lebanon’s cultural 
heritage. The Government of Lebanon also provides grants to the World Lebanese 
Cultural Union for its cultural activities. 
5. Role of Remittances: Remittances from Lebanese emigrants are of considerable 
economic importance to Lebanon. The Government does not interfere in the inflow 
of remittances from Lebanese emigrants. Through its support to the “UNDP LIVE 
LEBANON” initiative, the Government of Lebanon, however, has been increasing 
its efforts to channel parts of the contributions of Lebanese emigrant communities 
into development projects. 
6. Dual Citizenship: The role of dual citizenship has been an important factor in 
strengthening cultural, social and economic links between Lebanese emigrants and 
their home country.” 
 
4.1.2 Directorate of Emigrants 
As a section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate of Emigrants was 
established in 2000 by Law No. 247. Its main objective is to enhance cultural and 
educational bonds with Lebanese migrants. Outreach activities of the Directorate of 
Emigrants are carried out mainly through Lebanese diplomatic representations abroad. 
The authority participates in various international dialogues and research networks 
addressing emigrant affairs. Moreover, the Directorate of Emigrants cooperates with 
international organisations in the domain of Lebanese migration. 
 
The Directorate of Emigrants, has, since 1993, accomplished remarkable leaps in terms 
of establishing solid platforms of communications and relations with the Lebanese 
Diaspora, whereby the reach out and communication and coordination for the 
immigration power and Diaspora in general is conducted through various channels, 
mainly as follows:  
a. The official indirect communication through embassies and consulates: Whereby 
the communities are reached through official channels, mainly embassies and 
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consulates, on several matters such as of the organisation of general elections, 
serving of legal notifications, passing of governmental accords and similar issues 
are coordinated for the immigrants. 
b. The direct relationship and communication through associations and communities' 
representatives, whereby coordination occurs between the Directorate of 
Emigrants and representatives of communities as well as Lebanese associations, 
clubs, organisations, groups and other similar channels and individual initiatives. 
 
The General Director of the Directorate of Emigrants, and while being interviewed for 
the purpose of this research in his office in Beirut, stressed the fact that there needs to 
be more governmental support for the migration status, especially that the power of 
Diaspora, if well exploited, would bring huge benefits to the country and its citizens.  
 
He reflected the importance of keeping destructive politics away from migration affairs, 
in addition to the crucial necessity for a strategic plan to cater for the migrants' needs. 
More importantly, he stated that all efforts should unite to secure the issuance of an 
"Migration Law" to regulate all the matters related to migration. 
 
The Directorate objective is to cater for the needs of the Lebanese Diaspora, while at 
the same time to realise the importance of the contribution of the migrants to the 
Lebanese economy through remittance inflows. As a result, the Directorate has been 
calling for more protection for the migrant individuals who should be treated as a de 
facto investor and should provide them with safeguarding measures that represent main 
incentives for them to further contribute in various Lebanese economic sectors.  
 
The Directorate, which continuously participates in events related to migration around 
the world, is in continuous discussion regarding the challenges faced by migrants, and 
calls for further improvement and for policy recommendations for the benefit of all 
stakeholders. In spite of the above described performance, the road still appears to be 
furnished with spikes and the Directorate needs to do much more in terms of 
coordination and collaboration in order to place the Diaspora relations management on 
all levels on the right track. 
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Table 4.3: Table elaborates the various channels of communication mentioned:198 
 
4.1.3 Directorate of Political and Consular Affairs 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants created the Consular Section at the 
Directorate of Political and Consular Affairs in order to provide protection and 
assistance to Lebanese citizens residing abroad. The Consular Section, through 
Lebanese Embassies and Consulates, provides Lebanese citizens living abroad with 
crucial services including, but not limited to, the following:  
o Renewal and authentication of official documents and passports 
o Information on investment opportunities as well as on political and economic 
developments in Lebanon; in addition to providing information on tourism;  
o Recording and registration of all personal status related matters such as  Lebanese 
citizenship, birth, death, divorce, marriage and other similar procedures 
o Information on activities organized in Lebanon and/or the respective destination 
country addressing Lebanese residing abroad;  
o Registration for outside country voting in Lebanese elections. 
                                               
198 Source: Institutional Practices / Directorate of Emigrants / www.emigrants.gov.lb / IDAL and WLCU 
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4.1.4 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) involved with Lebanese migrant communities199 
According to the 2013 Joint ICMPD-IOM Project "Linking Emigrant Communities for 
More Development Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices", the large 
numbers of community-based national and international migrant organisations reflect 
the solid tradition of support to Lebanese emigrants. The Lebanese NGOs are involved 
in main sectors such as local infrastructure support, social services, education, health, 
cultural activities, and religious endowments, among other sectors. 
 
4.1.4 (a) Civil society and non-governmental organisations, as well as Lebanese 
research institutions are the primary collectors of statistics on Lebanese emigration. 
The main Lebanese research institutions addressing emigrant affairs include: 
o The Lebanese Emigration Research Centre (LERC) - Notre Dame University. 
o The Institute for Migration Studies (IMS) - Lebanese American University. 
o The Saint Joseph University in Beirut (USJ); and 
o The Lebanese Institute for Economic and Social Development (ILDES). 
In addition to the above, there is a large number of NGOs working on ground in 
supporting migrant communities through initiatives aimed at Lebanese Diaspora.  
 
4.1.4 (b) The World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU) has played an important 
role in organizing Lebanese migrants worldwide. WLCU was established as a non-
profit non-political organisation in 1959 aiming to consolidate links among 
Lebanese migrants and promoting cultural linkages with Lebanon. WLCU has 
established an elaborate network with representations around the world, and 
although moderately active at present, it provides a model for fostering ties between 
emigrants from different ethnic or sectarian communities and their home country. 
Although the entities listed above reveal a certain level of progress in the array of 
Diaspora services, there still seems to be a major gap represented by the lack of 
coordination among the private sector on one hand, and between the public sector 
and the private bodies, organisations and individuals on the other hand. 
                                               
199 See ICMPD-IOM. (2010). Linking Emigrant Communities for More Development. ICMPD. 
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There is a critical need for the development of an inclusive "National Strategic Plan 
for Lebanese Migrants", a matter which has recently become the main focus of the 
Directorate of Emigrants. Besides, it is important for all counterparts and 
stakeholders to take part in such an initiative to be able to tackle all stressing issues 
and draw a road map to address all challenges in conformity and unity.  
 
4.2 Involved investors and financial institutions 
 
The financial institutions are main players in teaming up to draw a road map for 
economic regeneration of any country. The remittances in developing countries, namely 
Lebanon, constitute a prime source of income and a main factor for economic restoration. 
The financial playfield able to channel those inflows consists of (i) the Central Bank of 
Lebanon; (ii) the public sector through the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy 
and Trade; (iii) the private sector represented by the commercial banks and the 
association representing them; and (iv) specialized bodies such as the Investment 
Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL). 
 
The Central Bank, "Banque Du Liban (BDL)", is referred to as the backbone of the 
country's economy. Many sceptics oppose the BDL performance for being too rigid in 
terms of imposing strict regulations on financial institutions while not making sufficient 
efforts to capitalize on important sources of income such as the inflow of remittances.  
 
During the past five years, the commercial banks have commenced developing special 
banking services for Lebanese migrants and expatriates through offering tailored 
financial packages suitable to their needs. This can be perceived as a good step towards 
creating incentive schemes to attract more capital and revive the link of expatriate 
Lebanese with their homeland. Nevertheless, the public sector remains the weakest link 
among the financial players in their mission to incentivise the expatriates to invest in 
Lebanon.  
To date, there are no visionary attempts to make the Lebanese government a pioneer in 
catering for its citizens abroad by offering them what many other countries offer to their 
national migrants in terms of economic and financial opportunities. 
168 | P a g e  
 
4.2.1 Role of Central Bank (BDL) & the Association of Banks in Lebanon 
According to a report published by the Association of Banks in Lebanon titled "The 
Lebanese Banking Sector - Pillar of Lebanon's Stability", it states that, in 2011, the 
BDL issued Intermediate Circulars 273 and 274 imposing greater restrictions on 
financial intermediation entities that engage in the cross-border movement of funds and 
currencies. It also sets out in the 27/5/2011 circular provisions to be followed by 
auditors to ensure the highest levels of compliance with anti-money laundering rules. 
Most recently, Lebanon has been recognized for its progress in efforts to mitigate the 
risks of money laundering and terrorism-financing in the banking sector. As of 
February 2012, Lebanon remains excluded from a list of 40 jurisdictions designated by 
the "Financial Action Task Force" (FATF) as either subject to counter-measures by the 
international regulatory bodies, or cited for not having made sufficient progress in 
addressing the deficiencies in Anti Money Laundering and Combating Financing 
Terrorism AML/ CFT.200 
 
4.2.1(a) The Central Bank’s policy towards remittances:  
According to (Aoun), in his published paper "Immigration: Opportunities & 
Losses"201, the Central Bank of Lebanon is considered to be the main engine 
stimulating migrant remittances and encouraging the emigrants to transfer money via 
formal channels and agents. The primary steps employed at this level are: 
1. Guiding the banking sector to keep track of international standards regarding 
availability, liquidation and transparency, while remaining in full compliance. 
2. Using state of the art technologies for banking processes through transfers, 
settlements and compensation, ensuring safety and speed. Nevertheless, some 
banks have signed agreements with Lebanon electronically, thus simplifying and 
reducing the cost of money transfer. 
3. Adopting a policy to promote banking mergers that produce strong institutions 
able to spread in countries with Lebanese presence; i.e. providing financial 
services to the community and endorsing immigrant services like housing loans 202 
                                               
200 See Association of Banks in Lebanon. (n.d.). The Lebanese Banking Sector: Pillar of Lebanon Stability. Beirut: 
Association of Banks in Lebanon. 
 
201 See Aoun, L. (n.d.). Lebanese Immigration: Opportunities & Losses. Beirut: Lebanese Roots / Maronite Academy. 
 
202 See Aoun, L. (n.d.). Lebanese Immigration: Opportunities & Losses. Beirut: Lebanese Roots / Maronite Academy. 
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4.2.1 (b) The need for a larger role of the Association of Banks in Lebanon 
While the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL) is well aware of the importance of 
remittances for the wellbeing of the economy on one hand, and the difficulties and 
challenges induced by the management of remittances on the other hand; no serious 
attempt can be spotted concerning the orchestration of the inflow of remittances. 
However, the ABL has the ability to influence the agenda of local banks regarding 
remittances due to the fact that it benefits from a large influence in the banking sector 
and consequently the country. 
 
4.3 Role of the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) 
 
The Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) describes itself as the 
national investment promotion agency of Lebanon. It was established in 1994 with the 
aim of promoting Lebanon as a key investment destination, and of attracting, facilitating 
and retaining investments in the country. The main relevant law is the Investment Law 
No.360 enacted in 2001, and is considered the prime reinforcement for IDAL’s mission 
that mainly plays the following roles: 
1. Providing a framework for regulating investment activities in Lebanon. 
2. Providing investors with a range of incentives and business support services. 
3.  Identifying a set of priority sectors that showed the most promising opportunities 
in terms of their investment potential and their impact on socio-economic growth, 
mainly in the sectors of Communication, Industry, Technology Agriculture, 
Media, Tourism, Agro-Industry, Information and other sectors.  
IDAL is also entrusted with the development of a program aimed at encouraging and 
attracting Lebanese emigrants to invest in Lebanon. As a result, and in its attempts to 
implement its objectives, IDAL is continuously developing projects which target 
Lebanese expatriates.  IDAL coordinates regularly with the Directorate of Emigrants to 
insure better results. In terms of the implementation of its goals, IDAL realizes that the 
Directorate has direct and strong links with the migration population. It is however worth 
mentioning that IDAL is not a regulating body, and only has the capacity to operate under 
the current existing regulations and legislations in order to utilise them to the best extent 
to reach desirable packages for investors. Nevertheless, many experts believe that IDAL 
should spend more efforts on tailoring investment opportunities for Lebanese expatriates. 
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Table (4.4)203, in addition to the above, reveals the relevant national authorities with 
competencies regarding emigration:  
 
4.4 Initiatives by Institutions related to Remittances and Migrants Investments 
Many observers debate that the Lebanese government has the ability develop more plans to 
invest in more efforts, under the leadership of the Central Bank (as a regulating body), to 
leverage on the source of income, which comprises 20% of the country's GDP, in 
collaboration with the private sector being the channel for implementation. The primary 
step should be to introduce new laws and legislations at the national level, instead of 
focusing on quantifying and tracing the inflow of remittances. It is important to build up a 
lucrative scheme for such inflows to be allocated in sustainable eco-sectors. 
                                               
203 Source: Directorate of Emigrants website. 
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Table (4.5): Initiatives by Institutions on Remittances & Migrants’ Investments204 
 
 
 
                                               
204 Source: *Final report (2010) of the Joint ICMPD-IOM Project: Linking Emigrant Communities for 
More Development – Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices. 
 
Initiatives by National & International Institutions Related to Remittances & Migrants’ Investments 
 
Agency Initiative Coop. Aim 
 
Directorate of Lebanese 
Emigrants in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and 
Emigrants * 
 
Conferences for 
Lebanese business 
men abroad 
 
N/A 
 
To provide Lebanese business men 
living abroad with information on 
investment opportunities in Lebanon 
 
Investment Development 
Authority in Lebanon 
(IDAL)  
 
Bi-yearly conference 
  
 
N/A 
 
To encourage Lebanese abroad to 
invest in the country 
 
The Lebanese International 
Business Council (LIBC)  
 
Planet Lebanon (EN) 
 Lebanese-Arab 
Expatriates 
Networking 
Conference 
 
Directorate 
of Emigrants 
- MOFAE 
(EN) 
 
The conference aims to develop and 
advance business opportunities by 
strengthening the links between 
Lebanese and Arab business 
communities 
 
The Federation of Chambers 
of Commerce Industry and 
Agriculture in Lebanon and 
the Lebanese Int'l Chamber 
of Commerce  
 
Data collection 
 
N/A 
 
To collect data that contributes to the 
development of investment 
opportunities (national authorities) 
 
Source: *Final report (2010) of the Joint ICMPD-IOM Project: Linking Emigrant Communities for More 
Development – Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices. 
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Section (5): Challenges and Opportunities  
Lebanon continues to experience insecurity, which affects the socio-political and 
economic situation of the country and consequently impinges on the Diaspora’s decision 
to return to their homeland. However, challenges and difficulties may be well observed at 
as golden opportunities to initiate the change which the country surely needs in terms of 
creating economically viable opportunities. In other words, the country's main financial 
and regulatory key players must join efforts and overcome political and sectarian 
differences in order to set up feasible plans to manage the genuine and stable sources of 
income, such as remittances. 
Lebanon has ranked 18th in largest recipient countries for remittances globally and 12th 
among developing economies in 2013, in addition to being the second largest recipient of 
remittances among 16 Arab countries. Establishing a national scheme for managing the 
capital inflows to Lebanon must be an ultimate priority due to its immense potential. 
"The field of law is the father of all fields" thus the development of relevant laws and 
regulations through proper scientific legislations in favour of engineering and 
orchestrating remittances and acquiring the maximum economic, fiscal and social value 
and impact has become inevitable.  
In light of the above, it has become necessary to identify some of the main challenges and 
opportunities regarding remittances in view of transforming them into opportunities. 
 
5.1 Challenges 
5.1.1 The non-existence of a Migration Law which regulates the migrants' affairs and 
represents a cornerstone for building a comprehensive framework for Diaspora 
contribution in local economy, especially in terms of taking advantage of the 
Lebanese migration strength, including investment and remittances. 
 
5.1.2 Lack of a sound legal framework which addresses the issue of remittances 
from various angles, namely transfers, taxation, investment and similar fields.  
 
5.1.3 According to the DG of the Directorate of Emigrants, the politicisation of the 
migrants' transfers and intervention of politicians in the process of the 
organisation and regulation of the migrants' investments and remittances pose a 
real threat and danger to the ability to positively capitalise this potential. 
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5.1.4 The underperformance of the government and the Central Bank in issuing the 
relevant legislations/regulations which would protect Lebanese migrants while 
serving the national economy. 
 
5.1.5 Lack of banking regulations, which provide an incentive for expatriates to take 
full advantage of remittances to achieve economic progress at macro level. 
 
5.1.6 The humble efforts and initiatives taken by commercial banks to contain the 
large flow of remittances and encourage senders and recipients to invest them. 
 
5.1.7 The lack of an official vehicle for tracking and regulating remittance inflows.  
 
5.1.8 The random nature of capital inflow and the lack of a national plan to allocate 
the proceeds of remittances while creating maximum desired economic impact. 
 
5.1.9 The obligation placed on Lebanese banks to conform their regulations to 
international regulations upon dealing with global financial markets and 
correspondent banks, especially in the midst of the heavy foreign banking 
(namely US based) over-regulation wave and the continuous emergence of new 
laws. The lack of implementation of adopting such regulations leads to heavy 
banking sanctions and penal measures. 
 
5.1.10 The high costs associated with money transfer which causes the decrease  
remittance; in addition to lack of incentives or tax exemptions to encourage 
Lebanese migrants to increase their remittances and investments. 
 
5.1.11 The 2011 Central Bank Intermediate Circulars 273 and 274, imposing greater 
restrictions on financial intermediation entities that engage in the cross-border 
movement of funds and currencies and May 2011 circular to be complied with 
by auditors to ensure highest levels of compliance with AML rules. 
  
5.1.12 Heavy and aggressive implementation of foreign and international financial 
regulations connected to Money Laundering, Terrorism Financing, Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), Common Reporting Standards (CRS) 
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5.2 Opportunities 
5.2.1 The highly skilled nature of migrants, paves the way for Lebanese institutions 
to take advantage of their capabilities and capitalise on their knowledge and  
technical and scientific value to better develop the country in general, through 
maintaining strong links with specialized entities in Lebanon and abroad. 
 
5.2.2 The emergence of projects related to social development in Lebanon and which 
encourages migrants to invest in Lebanon, such as "Live Lebanon" and "South-
South Program” are key elements towards spreading the knowledge of the 
migrants and the proper allocation of their financial resources in a structured 
manner for community-led economic development purposes. 
 
5.2.3 According to the General Director of Emigrants in Lebanon, who was 
interviewed for the purpose of this research, the enhanced relationship with the 
foreign countries, where the Lebanese Diaspora (through official Lebanese 
channels such as the Directorate of Emigrants) has taken genuine steps to serve 
host communities, including, but not limited to, (1) the training of bankers in 
West Africa; (2) the provision of academic scholarships for the students' force 
in West Africa; and (3) the unprecedented success of the individuals of 
Lebanese origins to get engaged at the highest levels in the political and 
economical fields, namely in the Americas.  
 
5.2.4 Remittances have proven to be strong and stable in times of crises, since the 
numbers did not drastically fall even amid global financial crisis and civil wars. 
 
5.2.5 Remittances often lead to additional liquidity mainly deposited in the local 
Lebanese banks in the form of savings, which results in banks increasing their 
lending schemes to the public as well as the private sector. 
 
5.2.6 The profile of the country’s Diaspora network: its size and wealth, how well 
organized it is and how easily it can be tapped into.  
 
5.2.7 The relationship between the Diaspora and its home government: patriotism, 
i.e., the emotional tie to the homeland and the national identity. 
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Section (6): Opinions and Feedback – Interviews with Public Officials   
 
6.1 Interview with Mr. Alain Hakim: Minister of Economy and Trade205 
HE Hakim stated that the size of foreign investments rose in Lebanon, as well as the 
size of the flow of capital. In an interview with Al Araby press on 17/4/17, he said: 
Q: In your opinion, does economic growth in Lebanon reflect the well-being of all 
citizens or is it limited to few financiers?  
A: Growth affects all citizens, institutions, society and State, but our economy is 
based on the three main pillars only, which leads to the creation of weaknesses in 
the underpinnings of other sectors. In Lebanon, there are three growing sectors: the 
banking sector, the private sector and the remittance inflows, all of which form 
safeguards for the economy. In 2013, Lebanon received a capital of US$14.5 
Billion, including US$7.5 billion in remittances from Lebanese expatriates. 
Q: Do you consider remittances as an economic pillar? Aren't these inflows 
converted from the Lebanese youth force that decided to run away from bad 
economic policies?  
A: The fiscal policy of the country and the strategy of distribution of funds have 
taken this trend. Emigration results from a lack of educational planning that leads to 
migration. 
 
6.2 Eng. Gebran Bassil: Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants206 
During his participation in a conference entitled "Effective Diplomacy - Economic, 
Expatriate & Political Branches" in Beirut on 30 April 2014, Minister Bassil stated 
that remittances to Lebanon reached US$ 8 billion per year, with profits up to more 
than US$ 50 billion a year, pointing out that this gives expatriates a pivotal role in 
the economic diplomacy. He said economic diplomacy must prioritize developing a 
methodology to attract foreign investment to Lebanon and especially companies 
and institutions related to Lebanese migrants, in addition to stressing the need to 
focus on oil resources and energy as the primary source of investment in Lebanon.  
                                               
205 See Hakim, A. (2014, April 16). (R. A. Zaki, Interviewer) 
 Note: Mr. Hakim was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants at the time of the interview; however he  
 is not a part of the cabinet at the time of the submission of this thesis. 
206 See Bassil, G. (2014). Effective Diplomacy. Economic, Expatriate & Political Branches. Beirut. 
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6.3 Mr. Haitham Jumaah:207 The General Director of the Directorate of Lebanese 
Emigrants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants 
In an interview conducted with him in 2016 for the purpose of this research, in his 
office at the Directorate of Emigrants in Beirut, Mr. Jumaa explains that the concern 
is not limited to remittances, investment or contribution of expatriates, but more 
importantly on the governmental role in helping the migration population by 
catering for their needs and by deploying resources. This could only be 
accomplished through the introduction of a broad policy to serve the expat 
community. 
 
Mr. Jumaa touched upon an important issue, when he explained that throughout the 
past 25 years, the Lebanese migrants were mostly highly educated with substantial 
professional and technical expertise, and have been playing important roles in the 
development of the countries hosting them. Such a work force is part of Lebanon's 
valuable intellectual property, a matter which should be further explored as it holds 
a great value for host states.  
 
The Director also explained the structure of the Directorate and the important 
network that it has established since its inception mainly through official direct and 
indirect channels among various others. This is more elaborated through the 
projects which the Directorate is involved in such as "Live Lebanon" and "South - 
South" both of which aim to secure socio-economic development.  
 
Furthermore, he elaborated that the Directorate ensures the strengthening of the 
relationships between expats and their host countries, by delivering technical and 
professional assistance to several countries, especially developing ones. 
He stressed on the need to amend the existing regulations related to migration on 
one hand, and the necessity of introducing an "Emigration Law" on the other hand.  
More importantly, he has revealed the necessity for the development of an inclusive 
"National Strategic Plan for Lebanese Emigrants" to provide the tools for all 
stakeholders to develop a structure for apprehending the role of national migrants.  
                                               
207 Mr. Juma has been in position for over 20 years, he has built robust connections with Lebanese communities abroad 
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6.4 Dr. Joseph Torbey208: Chairman of the World Union of Arab Bankers (at the time) 
In an interview in 2015 in Beirut, Dr. Torbey referred to two dangers: the first is of 
an economic nature as a result of migration and the second is the imbalance of the 
national demography, warning of dwindling demographic weight in the national 
equation. He also stated that the activity of banks led to attract $180 billion USD to 
date, thereby causing excess liquidity which is not being properly utilised due to the 
current political situation, and that banks have succeeded in improving the image of 
Lebanon in attracting deposits despite the instability.  
 
6.5 Mr. Mohamed Choucair 209- President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, 
Industry and Agriculture in Lebanon 
In his interview with the "Executive Economic Magazine" he stated that 50% of 
remittances from Lebanese expatriates emanate from the KSA, which is the largest 
foreign investor in his country Lebanon. He added that there should be a specific 
plan to specifically administer the inflow of remittances in order to allocate them 
soundly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
208 Dr. Joseph Torbey is the Chairman of the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL), Chairman and General Manager 
of Credit Libanais and Chairman of the World Union of Arab Bankers (WUAB) since 2006. 
 
209 Mr. Choucair is also Honorary Consul of the Republic of San Marino; He held responsibilities in several 
professional associations and contributed in the foundation of some of them. 
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PART 4.B: Factual Report on Migration, Remittances & Development 
 (Case of Lebanon) 
 
Section (1): Introduction and Background 
 
1.1 Regional Outlook: 
This chapter titled “Strengthening Capacities to Utilize Workers’ Remittances for 
Development”210, and which consists of two parts, mainly aims to shed the light on 
strengthening capacities of government officials and financial institutions in Lebanon and 
enable them to formulate and adopt strategies, policies and programs to tap into part of 
the Lebanese expatriates’ pool of finances. This serves to finance long term 
developmental projects in priority sectors in Lebanon, followed by rolling out the 
experience in other Arab countries in order to, inter alia, support achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in selected Arab states, which can help in the 
establishment of an Arab Economic Union. This would require providing relevant 
technical support while working closely with policy makers in the Arab World to achieve 
the desired results. However, this Part comes in a form of a factual report specifically on 
remittances, migration and development in Lebanon, as an example, since it is the largest 
recipient of remittances in the MENA region211, and among the largest in the world. 
 
Over the past two decades and more precisely  the current one, the majority of the MENA 
countries have become in desperate need for this initiative since it has a direct impact on 
poverty reduction and reconstruction, due to numerous factors including but not limited 
to (i) Meeting the “Post 2015 Sustainable Development Goals”, (ii) Financing the USD 
$3.6 Trillion Financing Gap in the Arab Region, and (iii) The Arab Region countries’ 
crave to serve independent financial resources to fill the abovementioned gap since 90% 
of remittances are channelled to consumption instead of economic sustainable sectors. 
                                               
210 See United Nations. (2017). Strengthening Capacities to Utilize Workers’ Remittances for Development. Retrieved 
from Unescwa.org: https://www.unescwa.org/SCUWRD 
 
211 As per the ESCWA and World Bank numbers, Palestine ranks first in the scale of remittances recipients, 
however due to its classification as “Palestinian Territories”, Lebanon ranks first among sovereign Arab 
States with 19% of the GDP. 
 See United Nations. (2017). Strengthening Capacities to Utilize Workers’ Remittances for Development. Retrieved 
from Unescwa.org: https://www.unescwa.org/SCUWRD 
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1.2 Lebanon Outlook 
Lebanon is a notable case of an economy largely dependent on remittances, with a steady 
outflow of emigrants that ensures regular inflows of remittances. Some estimates state 
that Lebanon has an overseas Diaspora of around 14 million people (more than three 
times the size of its domestic population) that continues to send billions of dollars back 
home every year.  
 
The majority of those migrants comprise skilled or highly skilled labour. Subsequently, 
Lebanon ranks 18th amongst recipients of remittances globally and the third among 48 
Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs); Remittance inflows to Lebanon reached $47.7 
billion in 2014, constituting an increase of 1.6% from 2013212. These remittances 
constitute 16.2% of GDP and rank 13th for the highest ratio in the world. Lebanese 
expatriates in GCC constitute the highest proportion of Lebanese expatriates remittances 
and provide the largest share at 66.3% of total remittances received by Lebanon.   
 
Remittances of Lebanese expatriates are directed mostly towards household expenses: 
56% are utilised for living expenses, 24% for education, 5% for real estate and 10% 
towards direct investment. Surprisingly, and despite the importance of remittances to the 
Lebanese economy, Lebanon does not have a specific policy in place that would attract 
remittances towards productive investments.  
 
Although the Lebanese financial sector remains one of the most developed in the region, 
with over 54 active commercial banks and 10 specialized medium and long-term credit 
banks managing an equivalent of $175 billion in assets nationwide, such numbers are not 
translated into creating better conditions for financial access to expatriates.  
Moreover, remittances are essential for supporting the solvency of Lebanon’s banks, thus 
consolidating the potential of the banks to finance the economy; in particular their ability 
to purchase Lebanese treasury bonds. This promotes monetary stability, the only source 
of stability in a country buffeted by the region’s political and security crises.  
                                               
212 See United Nations. (2017). Strengthening Capacities to Utilize Workers’ Remittances for Development. Retrieved 
from Unescwa.org: https://www.unescwa.org/SCUWRD 
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Section (2): Objectives and Expected Outcomes of this Part (4.B) “the Report” 
 
This Part Two which comes in a form of a report which represents the findings of all 
theme-specific reports which consist of separate reports from all Lebanese stakeholders 
in both public, private and non-governmental sectors, that are involved in working with 
migration from all angles. The merged and comprehensive report conveys the sum of 
services and products offered by the public, private and NGO sectors in Lebanon for the 
Lebanese migrants, specifically and in the fields of migration and remittances within the 
Lebanese territory and outside Lebanon, but with Lebanese migrants from different 
generations on a larger scale. 
 
The objective of this Part Two is to serve as an assisting tool to set the platform for the 
production of a National Strategy for Migration in Lebanon, in an attempt to finally reach 
the formulation of a National Strategy for Lebanese Migration, to be merged with other 
Arab national migration strategies, in order to eventually come up with the “Arab 
Strategy for Migration” which will pave the way and aims to produce laws, legislations 
and regulations strictly related to migration and remittances, eventually facilitating the 
structuring and establishment of the Arab Economic Union.  
 
Such final objective may only be met upon revealing the current situation on ground, 
namely through shedding the light on all types of services provided by the government as 
well as the private sector, to Lebanese migrants and mainly expatriates from eco-social 
and investment perspectives. 
 
It is anticipated, that any government or entity who gets involved in the development of 
services to enhance migration contribution in any society would seek to own the 
information which relates to what has been previously implemented, in order for such 
parties to conduct realistic evaluation and assessment for what currently exists and what 
is further required. Such evaluation will aid any involved or interested party to soundly 
allocate its resources in accordance to needs based on the gaps identified.   
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Section (3): List of Main National Stakeholders  
 
In addition to the main national stakeholders of which roles have been elaborated and 
explained in details in this [Chapter (4) / Part One / Section Four / Sub-section (4.1)]; 
Another set of involved stakeholders which will be listed later in Chapter (4) along with a 
brief listing of the main national stakeholders previously addressed. 
 
3.1 Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants (MoFAE)213 
3.1.a General Directorate of Emigrants214 
3.1.b Directorate of Political and Consular Affairs 
 
3.2 Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organisations involved with Emigrants 
 
3.3 Involved Investors and Financial Institutions 
 
3.4 Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) 
Section (4): Services, products, activities and initiatives offered in Lebanon by all 
involved parties and stakeholders in different sectors relating to Migration and 
Remittances 
 
4.1 Existing laws, regulations, legislations, policies, decrees, orders and texts related to 
Lebanese migration in general  
The Lebanese history has been marked by numerous emigration waves since 1840215.  
In spite of the significant contribution of the remittances inflow to the wellbeing of 
the Lebanese economy (18% of the GDP), the continuous turbulence in Lebanon and 
its politically instable environment have prevented the establishment of a 
comprehensive policy to increase the national integration of the Lebanese Diaspora. 
During the thorough research which was conducted by the Beirut Bar Association 
(BBA) and an independent team of researchers in order to identify the laws, 
                                               
213 See ICMPD. (2010). A Dialogue in Action: Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices. ICMPD-IOM. 
 
214 The GDE was an independent “Ministry of Emigrants”, but it was merged with MoFA in 2000. 
215 See Fersan, E. N. (n.d.). Syro-Lebanese Migration (1880-Present): “Push” and “Pull” Factors. Beirut : Middle 
East Institute Viewpoints. 
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regulations, decrees, decisions and legislation related to emigration and specially 
remittances in Lebanon, there clearly appeared a deep lack of a legal framework 
addressing immigration issues. However, a group of researchers has responded to the 
request made to BBA and undertook a research effort to identify all legal texts that 
relate directly or indirectly to emigrants and migration. 
 
Nevertheless, the Lebanese authorities have set as priority the improvement of the 
investment climate in Lebanon. For this purpose, serious efforts were deployed to 
modernize the regulatory framework of investment in order to offer the most suitable 
climate to foreigners and citizens desiring to invest in Lebanon. The most recent 
legislative changes introduced new legislative acts and treaties, as detailed below: 
 
4.1.1 National Legislation 
In spite of the lack of concrete legislations directly addressing the Lebanese 
migration and more specifically remittances, there appears to be various 
regulatory texts pertaining to Lebanese emigrant communities. 
 The following represents the main regulatory texts relating to migration. 
 
a. 2001 Law amending the 1969 law on the acquisition by foreigners of real estate 
and real estate rights in Lebanon (section I): 
All non-Lebanese persons, whether legal or natural persons, and Lebanese legal 
persons considered by the Law as non-Lebanese as defined by Article 2 (at least 
one share owned by a non-Lebanese), willing to acquire any real estate right on 
the Lebanese territory are required to obtain a license granted by decree from the 
Council of Ministers upon proposal of Finance Minister. 
 
b. Law on combating Money Laundering (section III):  
Lebanon is aware of the necessity to combat money laundering particularly 
under the Banking Secrecy Law, which could be used as a means for such illegal 
operations. In this respect, the Lebanese Parliament endorsed on April 20, 2001 
Law No. 318 on combating money laundering. 
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c. 2002 Law amending the Lebanese law on civil proceedings regarding arbitration 
(section IV):  
The most interesting amendment (Law No 440 dated August 1, 2002) related to 
investment climate is the clear statement allowing the Lebanese as well as 
foreigners to seek either internal or international arbitration to settle a dispute 
related to a contract, whatever is the nature of this contract. However, the 
amending law added that in the case of an administrative contract, for instance a 
concession granted by contract, the arbitration clause should obtain prior 
approval by decree issued by the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of the 
relevant minister or the relevant guardian authority. 
 
d. Dual Citizenship: 
i) Decree No. 15 of 1925 (EN), as amended by Law of 11/1/1960 (EN), also 
known as the “Lebanese Nationality Law”. This law defines Lebanese 
nationality and lays out procedures to be followed by foreign women married 
to Lebanese men desiring to acquire the Lebanese nationality. 
ii)  Law of 1946 (EN), as amended by Decree No. 10828 of 1962 (EN), regulates 
the acquisition of foreign citizenship and loss of Lebanese nationality. Article 
1.1 states that Lebanese citizenship can be renounced by Lebanese citizens 
having obtained a foreign nationality only through authorisation by decree.  
iii) Decree No. 10828 of 1962 (EN) facilitates the acquisition of a foreign 
nationality in countries, where acquisition of the local citizenship requires 
Lebanese citizens to renounce other citizenships. Subsequently, another 
Decree issued at the request of this same person allowing re-acquisition of 
the Lebanese citizenship. Article 2 elaborates on the conditions set for a 
person of Lebanese origin wishing to acquire the Lebanese citizenship: “Any 
person of Lebanese origin who is residing outside Lebanon and who has 
opted not to take Lebanese citizenship, may, in the event that he returns 
permanently to Lebanon, apply to be considered as a Lebanese and the 
Cabinet is authorized to issue a regulation to that effect.” 
iv) Law No. 25 of 2008 (EN) allows emigrants to vote parliamentary elections 
even if they are non-residents. The main parts of the articles are: 
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Article 106 
Upon the ratification of this law, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants 
invites, via Lebanese embassies and consulates, all the Lebanese non-resident 
natives fulfilling the abovementioned conditions, to voice their wish to 
participate in voting from their country of residence. They proceed by 
registering their names either personally or by a duly registered letter submitted 
to the embassy or consulate of their choice, including all the relevant 
information on their identity and register number. The timeframe for 
registration shall not exceed the 31st of December of every year preceding the 
parliamentary elections. After this date, the non-resident Lebanese natives’ 
right to vote in the subsequent parliamentary elections ceases to be valid.  
Article 107 
The concerned embassies and consulates shall consecutively send at the end of 
every week, the names of persons registered to the Ministry of Interior and 
Municipalities, via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants. 
The Ministry of Interior shall verify the registration of those names on the 
voters rolls and shall, after the expiry of the registration timeframe, prepare 
independent voters rolls for each embassy or consulate, including the names of 
eligible voters, distributed on basis of electoral districts. However, the number 
of registered voters in one electoral district shall not be less than 200 voters.  
Article 108 
Ministry of Interior shall send, via Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Emigrants, 
the independent voters' rolls to all concerned embassies and consulates.  
Article 109 
The ambassador or consul coordinates with the Ministry of Interior and 
Municipalities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants to form the 
panel of each polling station. Party agents may be present during the voting, 
counting of votes and announcement of results.  
Article 110 
Voting outside Lebanon shall be made 10 days at the most prior to the Election 
Day, according to electoral districts, using of opaque sealable envelopes of one 
type adopted and stamped by the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. 
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e. The Law of “Reacquisition of Lebanese Citizenship to the Descendants of 
Lebanese migrants”: 
 
Law titled “The Reacquisition of Lebanese Citizenship to the Descendants of 
Lebanese Emigrants216,” to grant those of Lebanese origin the nationality on the 
basis of certain procedures and legal pathways.  
 
This law has marked a quantum leap in the history of Lebanese policy making 
and legislative drafting in spite of the large and shameful loophole related to 
acquiring the nationality through motherhood. As for this new law, and twelve 
years after the submission of the law proposal to reinstate Lebanese nationality 
to immigrants, and four years after its endorsement by the Cabinet during the 
mandate of former President Michel Suleiman, the Parliament finally approved 
it during its session on 12/11/2015 after it was placed on the Parliament agenda 
following intense negotiations217. The text of the law reads as follows: 
 
Article I  
Every natural person who meets one of the two eligibility requirements has the 
right to reclaim his/her Lebanese nationality. 
i.If the records of the 1921 census at the Ministry of the Interior and 
Municipalities, and the records of emigration clearly indicate that he/she or any 
direct paternal ancestral/predecessors or next of kin to the fourth degree were 
present in the Republic of Lebanon, as registered by the 1921 census records at 
the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities (that will prove the emigration 
to a direct paternal/ancestral predecessor. 
ii.If he/she or the above mentioned ancestral predecessors or next of kin were 
naturalized as Lebanese citizens according to the law of naturalization 
promulgated in January 19, 1925, and has neglected to claim or reclaim his/her 
citizenship. In other words, most emigrants required little more than their 
emigration papers that listed origins, which luckily were preserved in Beirut. 
                                               
216 See Ferzli, A. (2011). Translation of the Draft Law that Extends the Reaquisition of Lebanese Citizenship to the 
Descendants of Lebanese Emigrants. Beirut . 
 
217 See Hourani, G. (2011). New Lebanese Draft Law Extends the Reaquisition of Lebanese Citizenship to the 
Descendants of Lebanese Emigrants. Beirut . 
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Article II  
This draft intends to verify the “actual presence of Lebanese relatives in the town, 
village or neighbourhood,” which an individual would claim, including the degree 
of kinship, along with any ownership/holding of rights to real property that may 
have been “devised, bequeathed, or inherited from a Lebanese citizen.” 
Once approved, and according to article 8, a successful candidate for citizenship 
would take the following oath of allegiance before an ambassador or Consul-
General (if overseas), or before the court of competent jurisdiction where his/her 
records are present in the Republic of Lebanon. Although bureaucratic in nature, 
this aspect of the proposed law was meant to encourage associations with the 
land, a defining feature of Lebanese nationality. The draft law would allow 
grandchildren of Lebanese paternal grandfathers to apply for citizenship. The 
latest draft law would help Lebanese expatriates take part in future Lebanese 
parliamentary elections by voting at Lebanese embassies. The number of 
Lebanese living outside the country is thought to be at least triple the residents. 
 
f. Legal texts involving financial incentives: 
Since 2001, the Lebanese Government passed a number of laws and decrees to 
encourage investment in Lebanon. These laws comprise legal incentives, and aim 
to promote investment in Lebanon. Such laws include: 
 
i) Legislative Decree No. 11614 of 1969 as amended by Law No. 296 of 2001 
on the Foreign Acquisition of Property and Property Rights in Lebanon: 
 Regulating real estate access for Lebanese and foreign nationals and eases legal 
restrictions on foreign property ownership, thus encouraging investments in 
Lebanon, particularly in industry and tourism. The law also decreases real 
estate registration fees for both Lebanese and foreign nationals. 
 
ii) Law No. 318 of 2001 on Combating Money Laundering. 
 
iii) Law No. 440 - 2002 Arbitration State Vs Private Entities in Lebanon. 
 
iv) Law No. 360 of 2001 " the investment Law": regulates the investment 
promotion of domestic and foreign entities in Lebanon and stipulates a series 
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of incentives, such as tax exemptions granted for investments in fields of 
technology, information, telecom and media, tourism,  industry and agriculture.  
 
The law divides Lebanon into three investment zones located outside Beirut 
that are subject to different regulations. This law also established the public 
agency Investment Development Authority of Lebanon IDAL entrusted to 
develop a program encouraging and attracting Lebanese emigrants to invest in 
Lebanon. In this context, IDAL is preparing the project entitled Targeting 
Lebanese Expatriates (TLE), which targets encouraging Lebanese emigrants to 
invest in Lebanon. 
 
g. Agreements related to International investment promotion and protection:  
These Agreements provide a legal framework for the investments of Lebanese 
citizens residing abroad and whom spread along the five continents. 
 
i) Instructions number 521/s2:  The tax treatment of amounts paid to residents 
of countries associated with Lebanon agreements to avoid double taxation. 
 
ii) Instructions number 1071/s1: The mechanism of the tax treatment of interest 
and dividends paid to a resident in France so that this resident will not pay 
twice the taxes in Lebanon and France (Double taxation).. 
 
iii) Order of the minister number 349/s1: Exemption of deposits and other bank 
liabilities in foreign currency belonging to non-residents from Income tax on 
the benefits. 
 
iv) Instructions number 1479/s1: Terms of the application of the exemption from 
VAT for operations financed from external sources to departments and public 
interests and municipalities. 
 
v) Decree number 7837: Determine the application of the provisions of articles 
of the law No. 379 of 14 (VAT) relating to taxable non-resident in Lebanon. 
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4.1.2 International Legislations 
Lebanon has, inter alia, ratified the following international conventions relating to 
international migration and migrants abroad; (49) International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) Conventions, including seven fundamental Conventions: (1) Forced Labour 
Convention, (2) Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, (3) Equal 
Remuneration Convention, (4) Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, (5) 
Discrimination (Employment) Convention, (6) Minimum Age Convention, and (7) 
Forms of Child Labour. The Law ratifying the 1965 Washington Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and nationals of other states 
(section V): The law No 403 dated June 5, 2002 ratified Lebanon's adhesion to the 
Washington Convention, which became effective for Lebanon on 25/04/03. Adhesion 
to International Centre for Settlements of International Disputes (ICSID)218 aims to 
facilitate the settlement of investment disputes between governments and foreign 
investors in view of helping promoting increased flows of international investment. 
 
4.1.3 Migration related Bilateral Agreements: 
Lebanon signed the sole bilateral agreement on labour migration with Syria (1994). Entry 
into force of bilateral investment agreements and tax conventions (section VI): A number 
of bilateral investment promotion and protection agreements and bilateral tax conventions 
between Lebanon and other countries entered into force since 2001, which included 
investment agreements with Austria, Belarus, Cyprus, Hungary, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Yemen; as well a tax conventions 
with Belarus, Kuwait, Morocco, and Sultanate of Oman. 
                                               
218 The ICSID Convention is a treaty ratified by 153 States. It entered into force on 14/10/66, 30 days after ratification 
by the first 20 States.  Article 6 of the ICSID Convention requires the Administrative Council of ICSID to adopt rules 
of procedure for arbitration and conciliation and for the administrative and financial regulation of the Centre. 
The Convention: 
• creates the ICSID Administrative Council, Secretariat, Panels of Arbitrators and of Conciliators, and the status, 
immunities and privileges of the Centre (Chapter I); 
• establishes ICSID’s jurisdiction (Chapter II); 
• authorizes conciliation (Chapter III); 
• authorizes arbitration (Chapter IV); 
• addresses replacement and disqualification of conciliators and arbitrators (Chapter V); 
• discusses the cost of proceedings (Chapter VI); 
• deals with the place of proceedings (Chapter VII); 
• provides for disputes between Contracting States (Chapter (VIII); 
• provides for an amendment procedure (Chapter IX); and 
• includes final provisions such as processes for signature, ratification, and denunciation of the Convention (Ch X). 
See: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Convention.aspx 
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4.2 Financial products and services offered by Lebanese commercial banks and 
dedicated to Lebanese migrants and mainly expatriates.  
The banking sector continues to be the backbone of the Lebanese economy: it is 
known to be stable, highly liquid and exceptionally sound, ranking 27th worldwide 
with a score of 5.8/7 in terms of Soundness of Banks indicator.219 
Remittance, a key component of bank deposits, has been continuously increasing, to 
reach a value of approximately USD 9 billion in 2014 (Figure 4). In terms of GDP, 
Lebanon is one of the most remittances dependent countries in the world, with 
remittances inflows constituting 18% of GDP in 2013, continuously increasing. 
 
Lebanese banks cover commercial banking, retail banking, investment banking and 
private banking activities. The banking sector consists of small, medium and large-
size privately owned banks; medium and long-term credit and investment banks; 
Islamic banks as well as an Arab and foreign banks presence through branches and 
representative offices. The country counts over 70 commercial banks, 55 financial 
institutions, 325 money exchange and 10 foreign bank’s representative offices. 220 
 
Lebanese banks have also expanded to Arab countries, GCC, Europe, Africa and 
USA with more than 80 branches, affiliated companies, subsidiaries, sister banks and 
representative offices around the world. Banks and other financial institutions in 
Lebanon fall under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank, as the regulatory authority. 
 
4.2.1 Expatriate Banking Products and Services in Lebanon with a window on the 
Arab Banking 
Expatriate packages provided by Arab banks remain limited with the majority of 
banks merely offering money transfer/remittance services and expatriate housing 
loans. The Union of Arab Banks has produced a report which sheds light on the 
expatriate banking products and services provided by banks in Lebanon which 
received the most remittance inflows in 2014. The report is intended to be updated. 
                                               
219 See (n.d.). Financing your Business - Financial System Overview / P2.  
https://investinlebanon.gov.lb/Content/uploads/SideBlock/151021093122955~Financial%20System%20Overview%20
2015.pdf 
220 See (n.d.). Financing your Business - Financial System Overview / P5.  
https://investinlebanon.gov.lb/Content/uploads/SideBlock/151021093122955~Financial%20System%20Overview%20
2015.pdf 
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Table 1 below shows the top 10 Arab countries in terms of remittance inflows as well as 
the top 10 banks (by assets) operating in each country.  
Table 4.6: Top 10 Banks in the Top 10 Countries Ranked by Remittance Inflows in 
2014221 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 
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BankMed 
SociétéGén
érale 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Bank 
Yemen 
Bank for 
Reconstruct
ion and 
Developme
nt 
Banque de 
L'Habitat 
Housin
g Bank 
for 
Trade 
and 
Financ
e 
Banque de 
Développe
ment Local 
Tadamon 
Islamic Bank 
Banque 
du Caire 
SocieteGene
rale de 
BanqueLiba
n 
BanqueMar
ocaine Pour 
Le 
Commerce 
et 
L'Industrie 
Cairo 
Amman 
Bank 
National 
Bank of 
Yemen 
Attijari Bank 
Quds 
Bank 
Al Baraka 
Bank 
Algeria 
Farmer's 
Commercial 
Bank 
HSBC 
Bank of 
Beirut 
Credit du 
Maroc 
Bank of 
Jordan 
Yemen 
Commercia
l Bank 
Arab Tunisian 
Bank 
The 
Nation
al 
Bank 
Gulf Bank 
Algeria 
Al Nile Bank 
For Commerce 
and 
Development 
Faisal 
Islamic 
Bank 
BanqueLiba
no-
Francaise 
Créditimmo
bilier et 
hotelier 
Bank Al 
Etihad 
Yemen 
Kuwait 
Bank 
Banque de 
Tunisie 
Palesti
ne 
Islamic 
Bank 
Arab 
Banking 
Corporatio
n Algeria 
El Nilein Bank 
Alex 
Bank 
Credit 
Libanais 
Fondsd’Equ
ipement 
Communal 
Capital 
Bank 
Shamil 
Bank of 
Yemen and 
Bahrain 
Union 
Internationale de 
Banques 
Arab 
Islamic 
Bank 
Housing 
Bank for 
Trade and 
Finance 
Algeria 
Sudanese 
French Bank 
Credit 
Agricole 
Egypt 
Bank of 
Beirut and 
Arab 
Countries 
Bank Al 
Amal 
Internati
onal 
Islamic 
Arab 
Bank 
Islamic 
Bank of 
Yemen 
Union Bancaire 
pour le 
Commerce et 
l'Industrie 
Palesti
ne 
Invest
ment 
Bank 
Trust Bank 
Algeria 
Blue Nile 
Mashreq Bank 
 
*Syria Ranks 9th in the Arab Region in terms of remittance inflows but is excluded from the list due to unavailability of bank data. 
Qatar ranks 10th in the Arab Region in terms of remittance inflows. Source: World Bank and The Banker, 2015 
                                               
221 This table was a part of the report submitted by the Union of Arab Banks in its capacity as a member of the 
ESCWA’s Lebanese National Committee on Migration & Development. 
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Table 4.7 showcases a sample of banking products and services dedicated to expatriates, 
offered by leading banks in each country 
Table 4.7: Expatriate products/services provided by some Lebanese banks222 
 
 
Arab Bank 
 
Arab Bank introduces services designed to meet the needs of Lebanese Expats, 
residing and working in the UAE (see below) 
 
• Savings back home through Arab Bank dual account  
 
• Free money transfers  
 
• Access to retail products in UAE 
o Payroll Accounts  
o Credit Cards 
✓ Internet shopping card 
✓ Visa classic, Visa gold and Visa Platinum credit cards 
✓ MasterCard titanium credit card  
 
• Loans 
✓ Personal Loan 
✓ Auto Loan 
✓ Non-Resident Lebanese home loan 
 
• Elite Banking 
✓ Financial security  
✓ Network access 
✓ Lifestyle benefits  
 
Arab Bank introduces services designed to meet the needs of Lebanese Expats, 
residing and working in Bahrain (see below) 
 
• Savings back home through Arab Bank dual account  
• Free money transfers  
• Non-resident home loans  
• Access to retail products in Bahrain 
o Payroll Accounts  
o Credit Cards 
o Loans 
 
 
                                               
222 This table (4.7) was a part of the report submitted by the Union of Arab Banks in its capacity as a 
member of the ESCWA’s Lebanese National Committee on Migration & Development in 2016. 
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Arab Bank introduces services designed to meet the needs of Lebanese Expats, 
residing and working in Qatar  
 
• Savings back home through Arab Bank dual account  
• Free money transfers  
• Non-resident home loans  
• Access to retail products in Qatar 
o Payroll Accounts  
o Credit Cards and Loans 
o Remittance Services 
✓ Standing Instructions 
✓ Bill Domiciliation 
✓ Purchase/Collection/ Transfers 
 
 
Banque Libano-Française 
 
• Benefit from the following advantages for USD 7 per month:  
o Two free Cash Platinum debit cards 
o A Premium Platinum card for USD 150 instead of USD 300 
o Free Point SMS service to track your card transactions 
o 50% discount on your Euro Blue card 
o Incoming transfers at a flat fee of USD 4 
o Free standing orders for your automatic transfers 
o Free E-Banking and Call Center services to manage account remotely 
o Free settlement of all utility bills in Lebanon 
o Special conditions on housing loans to expatriates in USD & LBP 
 
• Expatriates Housing Loans in LBP and USD\ 
 
• Renovation Housing Loan for Expatriates 
 
 
BLC Bank 
 
 
Financial Services 
• Expatriates account 
• Housing loans 
• Time Deposit Account 
• Land purchase Loan 
 
Non-Financial Services 
• Airline Tickets  
• Hotel packages  
• Rent a car 
• Taxi Companies 
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Bank Med 
 
• Free monthly incoming transfers  
• Free international debit card for the first year 
• Free monthly statement of account 
• Free cash withdrawals from any BankMed ATM network 
• Free SMS notification alert on international debit card 
• Free credit card for the first year 
• Free SMS notification on credit debit card    
• Free credit card e-statement  
• Free monthly utility domiciliation fee on landline bill 
• Free 24/7 electronic banking services via MedPhone, MedMobile 
• Attractive interest rate on saving account 
• In-principle approval within 2 working days on housing loan 
 
 
Byblos Bank 
 Services provided by Byblos Bank S.A.L. – Abu Dhabi Representative Office:  
Consumer Banking  
• Expatriate housing loan  
• Auto loan  
• Cards  
• Online banking  
Commercial Banking   
Correspondent Banking  
 
Countries Served 
• United Arab Emirates  
• Qatar  
• Bahrain  
• Oman  
• Yemen 
Services provided by Byblos Bank Representative Office Nigeria Ltd.:  
Consumer Banking  
• Expatriate housing loan  
• Auto loan  
• Cards  
• Online banking  
Commercial banking  
Correspondent banking  
 
Countries served 
• Nigeria  
• Ghana  
• Ivory Coast  
• Senegal  
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• Other West African Countries 
Services provided by Byblos Bank RDC S.A.R.L. – Congo 
Mainly commercial lending, transfers and payments, letters of credit, letters of 
guarantee, and documentary collection services. 
 
 
Credit Libanais 
• Fixed Term Deposit Account 
• Expatriates housing loan 
• Visa Card in Euro 
• Bancassurance products 
o Motor insurance  
o Travel insurance  
o Personal accident  
o Retirement  
o Children's education 
 
Fenicia Bank 
• Full range banking accounts available in major currencies  
• International cards  
• Investment and commercial loans with advice from specialist advisers  
• Housing loans 
 
 
Bank of Beirut 
Non-Resident Lebanese Expatriate Financial Package – Dubai 
• Non-Resident Lebanese Expatriate Account 
• Non-Resident Lebanese Expatriate money transfers 
Non-Resident Lebanese Expatriate Financial Package – Qatar 
• Managing finances  
• Consumer loans 
• Transferring money  
• Housing Loan for Lebanese Expatriates in LBP and USD 
• Bancassurance Products 
o Educational saving schemes 
o Retirement saving schemes 
• Credit card  
• Personal credit facilities 
 
 
Lebanon and Gulf Bank 
• LBP Home Loan 
• UAE Dirham Card 
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4.2.2 Financial products and services offered by Lebanese financial institutions to 
Lebanese migrants 
The Lebanese financial institutions which work under full regulation and supervision 
of the Central Bank of Lebanon have developed many schemes and financial products 
for the benefit of the Lebanese migrant body all of which are offered by commercial 
banks and dedicated to Lebanese expatriates.  
The Central Bank of Lebanon (BDL), and in its capacity as the chaperone for the 
Lebanese banking sector and all Lebanese financial institutions have identified all the 
financial products and services offered by Lebanese financial institutions to emigrants 
by resorting to the complete list of banks posted on BDL website which includes all 
the 71 banks operating in Lebanon (Lebanese commercial banks, branches of foreign 
banks, specialized banks and Islamic banks). 
The research results (shown in the below table), show that out of the 71 banks; it was 
revealed that 17 banks have specific expatriate services or products offered to 
Lebanese Expatriates. Whereas the rest do not explicitly mention any products 
designated to expatriates. In spite of the comprehensive feedback, the research 
revealed that further research and analysis should be conducted in order to understand 
the relationship between expatriates and financial institutions and mainly banks. 
Some of these issues include the following: 
a. Services provided by Lebanese banks to expatriates through their network of 
branches outside Lebanon. 
b. Services consumed by expatriates regardless of whether the service/product is 
especially designed to expatriates. 
c. Services provided by investment banks to non-residents including expatriates 
regarding all forms of wealth management and special funds. 
d. Services used by expatriates to repatriate money to Lebanon whether through 
bank transfers, online banking, or wire transfers either through banks or Money 
Business Services. 
e. Statistics regarding the historical development of expatriates programs and all 
other services consumed by them (volume and value) in order to assess the 
efficiency and analyze trends. 
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4.3 Governmental related investment initiatives for migrants and expatriates 
The Lebanese government did not do much in terms of providing the expatriates with 
investment initiatives or opportunities compared to other Arab neighbouring countries. 
Nevertheless, the most relevant legislation which relates to investment initiatives for 
residents as well as emigrants would be “Investment Law No.360” which was enacted in 
2001 and has reinforced the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon223 (IDAL)’s 
mission, providing a framework for regulating investment activities in Lebanon, and 
providing local and foreign investors alike with a range of incentives and business 
support services. Law No.360 identified a set of priority sectors that showed the most 
promising opportunities in terms of their investment potential and impact on socio-
economic growth. The identified priority sectors include industry, agriculture, 
agroindustry, tourism, information technology, technology, telecom and media. 
Foreign and local companies investing in Lebanon can benefit from a set of financial and 
non-financial incentives depending on the sector in which they operate in.  
The previously discussed Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL), 
Lebanon’s national investment promotion agency, provides companies operating in 8 
economic sectors with a set of financial and non-financial incentives. Other governmental 
and non-governmental institutions also provide a set on incentives that create benefit. 
 
4.3.1 Investment initiatives offered by IDAL 
 
A. Objectives and activities of IDAL: 
As explained in the previous chapter, IDAL is main national agency 
responsible for promoting investment in Lebanon, and as a part of its 
mandates, offers the following services which play a major role in attracting 
investment to Lebanon in general including Lebanese migrants’ investments.  
                                               
223 IDAL is the national investment promotion agency that was established in 1994 with the aim of promoting Lebanon 
as a key investment destination, and attracting, facilitating and retaining investments in the country. In addition to its 
role as investment promotion agency, IDAL is entrusted with the active promotion and marketing of Lebanese exports 
including but not limited to agricultural and agro-industrial products. 
See IDAL. (2017). IDAL - WHO WE ARE. Retrieved from Investinlebanon.gov.lb: 
http://www.investinlebanon.gov.lb/en/about_us  
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a. Providing economic, commercial, legal, industrial and other information 
relevant for investment decisions. 
 
b. Identifying and promoting investment opportunities in various growth 
promising sectors. 
 
c. Mediating contacts between investors and entrepreneurs to identify 
potential joint-venture opportunities. 
 
d. Providing information on economic sectors with investment potential. 
 
e. Granting various types of fiscal exemptions and fees reduction to 
investment projects as stipulated in Investment Law No. 360. 
 
f. Participating in the capital of joint-stock companies in specific fields. 
 
g. Facilitating issuance of permits and licenses required for starting and 
operating a business through coordinating with corresponding public 
institutions. 
 
h. Providing advice on issues affecting the investment climate in Lebanon. 
 
i. Arranging for business meetings with officials from private and public 
sectors. 
 
j. Providing after-care service for investment projects. 
 
B. Specialized Incentive Schemes: 
IDAL grants a set of incentives for investments in key sectors including: 
Industry, Agriculture, Agro-Industry, Tourism, Information Technology, 
Technology, Telecommunication, and Media. 
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4.4 Governmental Non-financial related initiatives / incentives to increase the bonds and 
linkages between Lebanese migrants and their homeland 
4.4.1 Role of MoFA and GDE: 
 
The General Directorate of Emigrants (GDE) is the main directorate in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) which deals with issues related to emigration, Diaspora 
and remittances. The GDE has been setting the platform to develop a structure for the 
National Strategic Plan for Migrants in Lebanon. In addition the MoFA, through all 
of its directorates and mainly the GDE, undertakes many initiatives and programs to 
increase the bond and linkage between migrants and their homeland Lebanon. 
 
Several initiatives were undertaken by the MoFA and the GDE beginning with the 
foundation or support of several emigrant clubs, associations and institutions 224 in 
many countries so migrants can communicate while abroad to develop social and 
economic relationships and discuss and support their home country Lebanon. Media 
institutions and educational schools225 are also considered amongst the prime means 
to secure the links between the Lebanese Diaspora. 
 
The newly developed website of the GDE is marked with an interactive nature. The 
nature of the website allows proper management and follow up of personal affairs of 
the Lebanese communities in various deployment states. It deals with different 
activities (social, cultural, scientific, literary and economic) and provides the General 
Directorate of Emigrants feedback and news of these activities to be displayed on the 
website to enrich and benefit the migrant community while browsing for information. 
 
                                               
224 See MoFA. (n.d.). Monistry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from Emigrants.gov.lb: 
http://www.emigrants.gov.lb/Emigrants.aspx?CID=1#.WVzl7oiGPIV 
 
225 See MoFA. (n.d.). Monistry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from Emigrants.gov.lb: 
http://www.emigrants.gov.lb/Emigrants.aspx?CID=1#.WVzl7oiGPIV  
& (2015, May 21). Retrieved from foreign.gov.lb: http://www.foreign.gov.lb/arabic/general-informations/education-and-
higher-education/lebanese-educational-institutions-abroad 
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A. The main Lebanese transactions abroad facilitated by the authority are:  
- To renew a passport while abroad. 
- To obtain a new passport while abroad. 
- To obtain a passport for a minor under seven years of age. 
- To obtain a passport for a minor 7 years and did not exceed 18 years. 
- To obtain a passport to the adopted child, 
- To obtain a passport for illegitimate born children. 
- To replace regular passports and passports which contained errors. 
- To report the loss of passport. 
- To request annexation passports. 
- To request the codification of the profession on the passport. 
- To request the ratification of photocopies of passport pages. 
- To allow the possession of more than one passport. 
- To request Special Passport Numbers. 
 
Additional services are also facilitating immigrants business through: 
- Legislation of University certificates issued from North American countries 
(USA & Canada) and from UK or other countries. 
- Application for the registration of divorce documents. 
- Marriage registration. 
- New born baby registration. 
- Legislation of the personal status documents received from outside Lebanon 
- Approval of a public agency or a private incoming from outside Lebanon 
Any transaction undertaken outside Lebanon should be legalized by the local 
authorities in the country and then released from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Lebanese embassy or consulate accredited in that country and then returns 
to Lebanon for legislation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants. 
The restoration of Lebanese nationality law is the latest and most important law if 
implemented correctly to attract migrants and expatriates to return to Lebanon or to 
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send more remittances and engage in more investments of developmental nature. 
This may also be enhanced by Lebanese migrants participation in parliamentary 
elections in order to increase relations between them and Lebanon through 
involving them in the decision making of their country. 
4.5 Financial and economic incentives offered to Lebanese expatriates (tax concessions, 
financial benefits, exemptions and investment privileges)   
The Lebanese government, mainly through the Ministry of Finance offers some 
incentives to Lebanese expatriates (tax concessions and investment privileges). The 
table in Arabic represents a comprehensive set of information which reflects the 
investment incentives and exemptions in Lebanon (since it has not been translated, it 
may be treated as an annex)226. 
 
4.6 Initiatives, projects and programs undertaken by Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the field of the Lebanese migration 
on direct and indirect fronts:  
 
4.6.1 Role of NGOs and CSOs in supporting migrants and sustaining development: 
In general NGOs have not traditionally had a role in providing social and welfare 
services; they have functioned instead as mediators of interests between citizens and 
the state or other interest groups, and have supported leisure or recreational 
activities for and through the population. However, more NGOs are trying to work 
in many vibrant fields including integration, migration and development. For the 
past decade, the Lebanese government has faced difficult times, and the public 
sector revealed insufficient support for Lebanese migrants and the Diaspora in 
general, due to many reasons. 
 
In addition, the commercially driven private sector is understandably selective when 
choosing who or what to support and when to act in the field of migration. As a 
result, a real need for the role of NGOs has appeared, this has pushed many 
elements of the civil society to act for the benefit of the Lebanese emigrants and get 
involved in migration strategies, Diaspora support and remittances programs. 
                                               
226 This report was presented by the Ministry of Finance to ESCWA’s National Committee for Remittances. 
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4.6.2 NGOs and CSOs involved directly or indirectly in Lebanese migration related 
initiatives (in Alphabetical Order): 
The performed research revealed a rather surprisingly large number of civil 
organisations working on the local, regional and international levels of which 
operations relate directly or indirectly to Lebanese migration. The following section 
represents a list of NGOs (listed by alphabetical order) working in the field of 
migration and development, along with the nature of the project which they are 
involved in. In addition, there are many NGOs which work partially on migration 
matters, since they are also engaged in other numerous other initiatives and 
programs related to Lebanese migration, mostly on bilateral bases (between 
Lebanon and the host country). 
A. Aspen Global Leadership Network (AGLN):227 
Its main mandate is to connect NGOs to the Lebanese Diaspora. 
Through creating a website to connect Lebanese expats with Lebanese NGOs, 
AGLN facilitates the transfer of information and funds between small and 
medium sized local NGOs and individual donors, focused on connecting 
Lebanese in the Diaspora with NGOs on the ground. There are many excellent 
NGOs in Lebanon who have a wealth of experience in the region but have 
limited access to funding and tend to be too small to benefit from bilateral and 
multilateral aid.  
As a result, this NGO addresses this matter and helps in the financing process.  
 
B. Africa & Middle-East Development Council (AMEDC):228 
AMEDC is a part of the community of Arab and African young leaders who are 
shaping the global agenda and implementing a better cooperation between Arab 
and African Countries in the framework of the new South-South Cooperation. 
Lebanese cluster maintains a big role in the volume of AMEDC’s operations.  
                                               
227 See Aspen Global Leadership Network. (2017). 
 Retrieved from aspeninstitute.org: https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/aspen-global-leadership-network/ 
 
228 See JCI Rwanda . (2012, February 9). JCI Africa and Middle East Development Council (AMDEC). Retrieved from 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.411840925531890.84115.405232476192735&type=3 
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C. Australian Lebanese Christian Federation (ALCF):229 
The Australian Lebanese Christian Federation was founded in 1986 by 
prominent members of the Australian community from Lebanese background. 
ALCF mission was to assist Lebanese and Arabic speaking individuals to settle 
harmoniously in the Australian community. Currently ALCF is helping the new 
Australians who originate from Arabic speaking countries to integrate fully and 
actively through a smooth and well oriented interaction within the broader 
Australian community. ALCF is also monitoring how the new Australians 
(including the senior citizens) are having an equitable and non-discriminatory 
access to mainstream services. 
 
D. African Continental Council (ACC):230 
ACC is affiliated to the World Lebanese Cultural University and has mandates 
related to the integration of Lebanese in their African host countries. 
 
E. Arab- American Museum in Michigan (AAMM):231 
The Arab American National Museum (AANM) is the first and only museum in 
the United States devoted to Arab American history and culture. Arab 
Americans, including Lebanese have enriched the economic, political and 
cultural landscape of American life. Since opening in 2005, the Museum has 
shed light on the shared experiences of immigrants and ethnic groups, paying 
tribute to the nation’s diversity. 
The AANM is accredited by the American Alliance of Museums and an 
Affiliate of the Smithsonian Institution; In addition it is a founding member of 
the Immigration and Civil Rights Network of the International Coalition of Sites 
of Conscience. 
                                               
229 See Welcome to Australian Lebanese Christian Federation. (n.d.). Retrieved from alcfed.org.au: 
http://www.alcfed.org.au/ 
 
230 See Continental African Leadership Council. (n.d.). Retrieved from Facebook: 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Continental-African-Leadership-Council/464290326951108 
 
231 See Arab American National Museum. (2017). Retrieved from arabamericanmuseum.org: 
http://www.arabamericanmuseum.org/ 
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F. Baladiyat:232 
The Baladiyat program recognizes the cultural and economic importance of the 
approximately 12.5 million persons which represent the Lebanese Diaspora 
throughout the world. Lebanese Diaspora remittances account for an estimated 
20 percent of Lebanon’s overall GDP. However, only a small percentage goes 
into job-creating investment in the retail and services sectors.  
 
G. Lebanese Diaspora Homeland Investment Database: 
Relief International has partnered with the Lebanese Emigration Research 
Centre (LERC) in order to identify likely Diaspora investors and link them with 
local investment opportunities. Through extensive surveying and research on 
the Diaspora, LERC began the development of a global database that can 
potentially connect the Lebanese Diaspora investors with economic 
opportunities tailored to their individual interests and home villages. 
 
H. Youth Camp 
In line with its commitment to youth empowerment, Baladiyat hosted a Youth 
Camp that brought together the Diaspora with the Lebanese youth and trained 
them to become informed / proactive citizens who have the skills to partner with 
local authorities in order to enhance economic and social development. The goal 
of the Camp was not only to empower youth, but to build positive, long-lasting 
connections between the Lebanese Diaspora and their homeland on many levels. 
 
I. Back to Roots:233 
Back to Roots is a group of North Americans of Lebanese origins that is based 
all over the United States of America and Canada. They connect alumni with 
volunteer and internship opportunities, both in Lebanon and in the US and 
Canada, to their continuous robust engagement with Lebanon. Participants have 
the opportunity to learn about Lebanon’s socioeconomic and political dynamics  
                                               
232 See Baladiyat. (n.d.). Retrieved from baladiyat.org: http://www.baladiyat.org/ 
 
233 See Back to the Roots. (n.d.). Retrieved from backtotheroots.com: https://backtotheroots.com/ 
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J. Brown Bag Talks (BBT):234 
The BBT that were held in 2011 were respectively entitled "There are no friends 
here", and "Exploring Diaspora Diplomacy through the Case of the U.S. Public 
Diplomacy in Lebanon". This initiative has organized in the past many events235 
that were valuable for enhancing Diaspora contribution in development. 
 
K. Centre for Lebanese Studies (CLS) 
CLS is a long term program of interest in Lebanese Emigration and brain drain 
issues which was launched in a three-day conference. The program was 
developed to include several publications and the Transfer of Know-how 
through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) project in collaboration with 
UNESCO and UNDP. The conference brought together an international group 
of scholars to discuss the history of Lebanese emigration as well as the present 
circumstances of the Lebanese. Members of the group had done academic 
studies in the field of Lebanese emigration from Australia, Canada, Europe, 
Latin America, Lebanon and the United States.  
 
L. Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Lebanon in Cote d'Ivoire: 
Today it is the official body that represents Lebanese economic interests and 
defends them in the face of the many challenges. It enjoys recognition of the 
Ivorian state and is part of the constituents of the Economic and Social council. 
Its president is a special economic advisor to the head of state. 
 
M. I am Lebanese: 
This is an initiative launched by Lebanese expats living in the United States of 
America that aims to encourage Lebanese-Americans to activate their Lebanese 
citizenship in order to deepen their ties to their mother country. This initiative is 
important in connecting the Diaspora with communities in Lebanon and 
providing them with citizenship rights by which they can preserve their roots.   
                                               
 
235 See Lebanese American University. (n.d). Retrieved from http://www.lau.edu.lb/institutes/ims/academic-activities.php 
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N. Development Association for Nurturing Arab Leadership & Innovation 
(DANALI):236 
DANALI is a regional independent non-governmental entity and one of the 
growing regional civil society organisations operating in the Arab world. 
DANALI aims at enhancing the wellbeing of Arab communities, primarily the 
youth, through nurturing leadership skills and innovation initiatives on various 
social, intellectual and academic levels. DANALI also works with individuals 
and groups in local communities to improve national policies and practices 
through providing the tools and mechanisms to fulfil the required change.  
   
O. Institute for Migration Studies (IMS):237 
The IMS is currently working to introduce a Master’s program in Migration 
Studies. The program will seek to provide an inter-disciplinary approach to 
understanding contemporary and future migration in Lebanon, the Arab region 
and the rest of the world. 
 
P. Little Push NGO:238 
Little Push is a nongovernmental organisation which offers creative modern 
tools of communication creating projects and initiatives that would fill the voids 
to achieve a specific social cause. Lebanese Migration and Diaspora connection 
is among such social ceases which fall under the interest of Little Push.  
Little Push has created in August 2014 the website (HelpForLeb.com) as the 
first project representing the first Lebanese crowd-funding website for sharing 
social awareness, offering volunteering services, funding social, environmental 
and humanitarian Lebanese causes, and for donating to Lebanese NGO’s. The 
vision of HelpForLeb.com is to gather and connect the Lebanese Diaspora, 
Lebanese locals, Lebanese NGO’s and Lebanese companies under one cause 
                                               
236 The author of this thesis (PhD candidate) is the Founder – President of DANALI / www.danali.org  
 
237 See Institute for Migration Studies. (2017). Retrieved from lau.edu.lb: http://sas.lau.edu.lb/institutes/ims/ 
 
238 See Little Push NGO- About us. (n.d.). Retrieved from helpforleb.com: https://www.helpforleb.com/campaigns/little-
push-ngo/ 
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Q. Lebanese Diaspora Energy (LDE):239 
LDE seeks to showcase the success stories of selected Lebanese residents and 
expatriates, and motivate them to stay connected, while celebrating the 
Lebanese heritage and promoting the positive image of Lebanon around the 
world. LDE represents a one-of-a-kind occasion for Lebanese emigrants to 
return to their roots and develop a valuable cultural and social connection with 
their homeland.  
 
R. Lebanese Expatriate Association (LEA): 
LEA is a specialized NGO for expatriates of which objectives include the 
following: 
1. Develop Lebanese expatriates’ affairs of cultural, social and economic 
aspects. 
2. Seek communication and intellectual, cultural and social exchange. 
3. Draw children of Lebanese expatriate communities worldwide, closer to 
Lebanon. 
4. Encourage cultural and social activities, tourism and economic exchanges 
and mutually beneficial cooperation between Lebanon and the host 
countries, and between the Lebanese and the descendants of Lebanese 
descent. 
5. Establish cultural clubs and public libraries and centres of intellectual and 
educational studies in all countries where there are Lebanese communities 
and hold regular meetings and seminars. 
6. Issue periodic educational, scientific and cultural materials which serve the 
objectives of the association. 
7. Cooperate with local and international institutions and with Lebanon's 
friends abroad for the success of efforts. 
 
 
                                               
239 See ABOUT LEBANESE DIASPORA ENERGY 2017. (2017). Retrieved from lde-leb: http://www.lde-leb.com/ 
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S. Lebanese Expatriate Series (Lebanese in the world), and its related 
website:240 
This provides comprehensive and detailed information about the Lebanese 
communities in the world, their economic, trade and industrial activities. It 
includes a database for the names and activities of companies and secures 
communication channels required to identify the activities in various sectors, 
which allows for the exchange of ideas and creates integrative investment 
opportunities for individuals and businesses. 
 
T. The Lebanese Expatriate Project - “Live Lebanon”:241 
The contribution of the Live Lebanon project to the overall development of 
Lebanon and to the eradication of regional disparities is based on the following 
strategy:  
1. Engage the private sector in development and strengthen the link between 
Lebanese abroad on one hand and the Lebanese government and local 
communities in the poorest areas on the other hand. 
2. Set up a mechanism for channelling financial support from expatriates to 
local development and community projects and hereby support the 
elimination of regional disparities. 
3.  Strengthen the local capacities and decision-making structures through the 
engagement of local UNDP working groups in the project development and 
management.  
 
U. The Lebanese Emigration Research Centre (LERC) :242 
LERC is an academic initiative of Notre Dame University (NDU). Established 
in April 2003, it is the first centre in Lebanon dedicated specifically to the study 
of migration. 
                                               
240  See Welcome to Lebanese around the World. (n.d.).  
Retrieved from http://loubnanioun.com/: http://loubnanioun.com/index.php 
 
241  See Pillars. (n.d.). Retrieved from livelebanon.org: http://www.livelebanon.org/ 
 
242 See NDU - About us . (n.d.). Retrieved from ndu.edu.lb: http://www.ndu.edu.lb/lerc/aboutus.htm 
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V. Lebanon Connect:243 
An initiative of an electronic platform for expatriates, which aims primarily to 
link them to the Lebanese residents and each other. 
 
W. Lebanese-Australian Chamber of Commerce (LACC):244 
LACC has several activities including the facilitation of housing loans for 
expatriates. Their website explains more about their services and programs.  
 
X. Lebanese- Dutch Businessmen Association (LDBA):245 
LDBA’s program aims at strengthening the national economy through 
cooperation to bring investments to Lebanon, opening the way for the 
employment of Lebanese investors and investment in the Netherlands. 
 
Y. Lebanese-Canadian Businessmen Association (LCBA):246 
LCBA was created over three decades ago; this association consists of about 
350 members and is working in coordination with the Canadian Embassy in 
Lebanon and commercial business bodies in order to enhance trade and 
economy between the two countries. 
 
Z. Lebanese Immigration Museum at the Notre Dame University:247 
Notre Dame University took a decision to allocate a plot of land within the 
university campus to build a museum that will be at the same time an 
educational monument open for schools and universities, and a space for the 
public and migrants to visit and explore. 
                                               
243 See Lebanese around the Globe. (n.d.).  
Retrieved from Lebanese Connect - Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/LebanonConnect 
 
244  See New Headline. (2014). 
 Retrieved from alcc.com.au: http://www.alcc.com.au/ 
 
245 See Lebanese Dutch Business Association . (2012).  
Retrieved from lebdutch.com: http://www.lebdutch.com/ 
 
246 See Lebanese Canadian Business Association . (2010).  
Retrieved from lcbaonline.com: http://www.lcbaonline.com/ 
 
247 See Museums. (n.d.).  Retrieved from ndu.edu.lb: http://www.ndu.edu.lb/lerc/museum.htm 
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Amongst the NGOs present worldwide are the bilateral business councils. These 
entities play an important role in doing business between the Lebanese expatriates 
and their host communities, as well as the development of business/ economic 
relationship between Lebanon and many countries. Although such entities are not 
exclusively involved in migration matters, it is evident that their mandates address 
issues such as developing the relationships of emigrants, enhancing developmental 
projects in Lebanon and enhancing remittances. The below list enumerates some of 
the Lebanese – foreign business councils worldwide248: 
 
a. Lebanese Cuban Business Council  
b. Lebanese Businessmen Council Czech 
c. Lebanese Egyptian Business Association 
d. Lebanese Iranian Business Council 
e. Lebanese Businessmen Council of Iraq 
f. Lebanese Friendship Association Kurdistan - Iraq 
g. Lebanese Moroccan Businessmen Council  
h. Lebanese - Russian Commission for commercial cooperation 
i. Lebanese Italian Businessmen Council. 
j. The Lebanese - Saudi businessmen  
k. Lebanese Sudan businessmen Council  
l. The Lebanese - Syrian businessmen 
m. Lebanese- Tunisian businessmen Council  
n. The Lebanese business Council - United Arab Emirates 
o. Lebanese Algerian Businessmen Council  
p. Qatari - Lebanese businessmen Council 
                                               
248 This is a non-exclusive list since other business councils in many countries exist, however the main ones are listed. 
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q. Maronite Foundation in the World 249 
The Maronite Academy is an initiative undertaken by the Maronite Foundation, 
aimed at introducing young Lebanese immigrants around the world to their 
country of origin, Lebanon. Selected candidates undergo online sessions (e-
learning sessions) to build their knowledge about Lebanon and the Maronite 
Heritage. After successfully completing their online courses, the selected 
candidates will benefit from an organized two-week trip to Lebanon covered by 
the Maronite Foundation. 
 
r. Maison du Liban in Paris:250 
This NGO is specialized in holding cultural events to gather Lebanese in 
France. 
 
s. World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU):251 
WLCU is an International Non-governmental Organisation (INGO) associated 
with the UNDPI (department of public information) and accredited with the 
ECOSOC (economic and social council) of the United Nations.  
The WLCU’s goal is to unite descendants of Lebanese origin and friends of 
Lebanon into one worldwide organisation and to promote and preserve 
Lebanese culture and heritage.  
 
t. World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU) – (1):252 
This is one of the three WLCUs; it has similar mandates but different 
management. 
                                               
249 See Maronite Foundation. (n.d.).  
Retrieved from maronitefoundation.org:http://www.maronitefoundation.org/ 
 
250 See Becoming a Resident. (n.d.).  
Retrieved from ciup.fr: http://www.ciup.fr/maison-du-liban/en/ 
 
251 See World Lebanese Cultural Union . (2017).  
Retrieved from wlcu.com: http://wlcu.com/ng/ 
 
252 See World Lebanese Cultural Union . (2017).  
Retrieved from wlcu.com: http://wlcu.com/ng/ 
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u. World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU) – (2) 253 
Is an international, secular, non-denominational, non-profit organisation 
sponsored by the Government of Lebanon but working independently in 
cooperation with Lebanese emigrants abroad, representing the Lebanese 
Diaspora in the world. WLCU/ULCM has offices in many major centres of 
Lebanese presence worldwide.  
 
It strives to unite descendants of Lebanese origin and friends of Lebanon into 
one worldwide organisation or union with the aim to promote and preserve 
Lebanese culture and heritage and to ensure its spirit for generations to come.  
 
The Lebanese Civil War, deep political and at times confessional differences 
and Lebanese official government interventions have resulted in resentment and 
formation of rival groups, although the official historical organisation claims it 
is the only one abiding by WLCU bylaws as amended in 1985 and duly 
recorded at the Interior Ministry in Beirut. 
 
v. World House of Lebanon/ House of Lebanon in the World 254: 
The World House of Lebanon (WHoL) is a non-profit, non-partisan, non-
governmental Foundation based in Lebanon. It was founded in 2009 by Betty 
Hindi. It aims to promote the spirit of cooperation and unity among resident and 
non-resident Lebanese citizens, including emigrants of Lebanese descent. 
 
On one hand, WHoL endeavours to encourage non-resident Lebanese citizens to 
take part in Lebanon’s political, economic, social, and cultural life; on the other 
hand, it encourages them to defend the Lebanese cause in their country of 
residence. 
 
                                               
253 See World Lebanese Cultural Union . (2017).  
Retrieved from wlcu.com: http://wlcu.com/ng/ 
 
254 See World House Of Lebanon. (2017).  
Retrieved from lecalebanon.org: http://lecalebanon.org/member/world-house-of-lebanon 
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w. Youth and Culture Centre:255 
YCC is a municipal centre that acts as an incubator for interaction and 
development, whereby the vision and mission evolve around the following 
actions: 
▪ Create a space for dialogue, which seeks to increase communication among all 
segments of society. 
▪ Promote a sense of participatory democracy and citizenship through meetings 
and exchanges. 
▪ Familiarize the public with new technologies by providing training and access 
to the Internet, social media and regular and open source software. 
▪ Promote culture and art as catalysts for universal communication. 
▪ Provide a space for reading and support active involvement in the learning 
process by encouraging the formation of research groups eager for knowledge 
and learning. 
▪ Empower and promote young artists and talents by building their capacity and 
offering them a venue to produce themselves and interact with the public. 
▪ Offer a free space of dialogue for civil society organisations. 
 
x. Youssef Bek Karam Foundation:256 
This NGO is a private, charitable and non-profit foundation which holds 
different congresses, seminars, conferences, projects, publications, expositions. 
In addition it undertakes educational, cultural and patrimonial activities and 
competitions related to the historical path of Youssef Bek Karam in Lebanon 
and abroad. These events facilitate the achievement of all the foundation’s 
goals. 
One of its main missions is to communicate with the Lebanese Diaspora and try 
to incorporate emigrants in the national, economic cultural Lebanese life. 
 
                                               
255 See Youth and Culture Center . (n.d.).  
Retrieved from ycczouk.wordpress.com: https://ycczouk.wordpress.com/ 
 
256 See Youssef Bey Karam Foundation. (2017).  
Retrieved from youssefbeykaram.org: https://www.youssefbeykaram.org/en/ 
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Section (5): General and Policy Recommendations 
According to the Joint ICMPD-IOM Project “Linking Emigrant Communities for More 
Development – Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices”, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Emigrants constitutes the leading national institution responsible for questions 
relating to Lebanese citizens residing abroad. With the presence of multiple national 
institutions involved in matters relating to migration and/or Lebanese emigrant 
communities, one obstacle faced in this view is, however, the absence of an institutional 
body or mechanism enacted with the responsibility to ensure inter-institutional 
coordination for migration affairs. 
 
Due to a deep lack of policies and regulations, Policy Recommendations are 
unquantifiable; however, it is crucial to list the main ones and keep in mind that this 
abundance of recommendations makes them even more challenging to implement:  
 
1. Introduce a "Lebanese Migration Law" and exert pressure for amendments of all related 
domestic laws by incorporating clauses that encourage investment and secure initiatives 
by Lebanese migrants. 
 
2. Create a specialized authority to coordinate among all national stakeholders and 
strengthen the bridge with the Lebanese migration power, in addition to becoming one 
of the main partners in the process of policy-making as well as of regulating 
improvements. 
 
3. Draft a "National Strategic Plan for Migration". 
 
4. Create a "National Investment Authority" and an "Investment Security Institution". 
 
5. Lebanese financial authorities must join efforts to form a National Committee to 
organize the inflows of remittances which shall be responsible to implement legal, 
financial and economic agendas related to the administration of the remittances’. 
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6. Address measures related to tax exemptions and applied to migrant investment 
initiatives. 
 
7. The Central Bank and other national institutions such as ministries responsible for data 
collection need to improve coordination in this area, with enhanced systematic data 
information exchange, better communication, and more effective division of labour to 
avoid duplication of efforts. 
 
8. Launch a campaign on migrant financial literacy in the countries with Lebanese 
presence, pointing toward amplifying the remittances to Lebanon, since the migrants of 
the second and third generations tend to lose direct connections with Lebanon, hence 
lack sufficient information about Lebanese banking and financial policies and products. 
 
9. Grant expats voting rights and encourage civil participation, thereby creating a stronger 
feeling of belonging and driving the Diaspora to truly believe that they are a part of the 
political process that directly influences the allocation of mechanism of remittances.  
 
10. Support activities such as monitoring cross-border remittance flows data at higher 
frequencies as well as revise data compilation methods. 
 
11. Formulate appropriate national policies and initiatives to address the high cost of 
remittance transfers and rebate policies that promote competition in the remittances 
market allowing for a reduction of transfer costs and an improved service quality. 
 
12. Banks must start offering increased financial products specifically tailored for expats, 
in addition to other investment products by stressing on the allocation of remittances. 
 
13. Create an Emigration Council to introduce a uniform policy for modern migration: This 
will aim to actively engage the majority of the country ministries and departments along 
the lines of what is happening in countries like Lebanon, including living conditions. 
 
14. Create a National Payment System which supervises all inflows. 
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15. Issue Diaspora Bonds which are designed to circumvent the country’s financial 
weaknesses and investment obstacles. The government would set the overall vision and 
create incentives for the private sector to lead this initiative.257.  
 
16. Review the "International Transactions Remittances Guide for Compilers and Users 
(2009)258" in order to facilitate the formulation of a Lebanese national guide. 
 
17. Establish a unit to coordinate among non-governmental bodies competent in migration 
affairs.259 
 
PART 4.C: Conclusion 
 
The main aim of chapter four is to provide comprehensive information supported with facts 
and figures on the state of remittance inflows to Lebanon to help understand how the matter 
of remittances is handled on different governmental and private levels, namely by 
addressing the regulatory and legislative aspects. The key element was also to propose 
policies and programs in the form of policy recommendations, in order to enhance the 
impact of migration and remittances on financing sustainable economic development in the 
country which would be applicable to other Arab countries.  
Therefore, this would also be utilised to formulate a successful study case which may be 
duplicated in the rest of the Arab countries in terms of providing robust tools for the road to 
establish an Arab Economic Union from the positive, yet sensitive, topic which is the 
migration and remittances and their developmental impact on the national and regional 
economies. 
                                               
257 According to (Sassine, 2013), the success or failure of diaspora bonds can is based on three key drivers. First: Profile 
of the country’s diaspora network, its size and wealth, how well organized it is and how easily it can be tapped into. 
Second: Relationship between the diaspora and its home government. Third: Patriotism - emotional tie to homeland and 
national identity.  
See Sassine, G. P. (2013). How Lebanon could raise $1 billion per year. Executive Magazine. 
 
258 See IMF. (2009). International Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users. INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND. 
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Throughout thematic analysis, it was noticed that there is an ultimate need for a national 
strategy based on an economic and regulatory plan to create a proper framework for 
migration. This would be represented in the first place in the formulation of a National 
Strategy for Migration and Remittances for Development, in order to secure sound 
allocation of such fiscal resources in sustainable economic sectors, while spurring the 
economic cycle and leading to economic growth on the national levels. This would 
eventually materialize on the regional level and actively play a main role in the progression 
of the Arab Economic Union.    
 
Part (2) of this chapter which represented the factual report about remittances and its 
stakeholders in Lebanon, was based on the conviction which applies to all Arab countries 
(but in our case Lebanon) that recipient countries suffered from the lack proper 
infrastructure for migration, including the remittances factor of course. It has uncovered the 
lack of a unified national strategic plan for migration in Lebanon, and the lack of economic 
and regulatory structures to cater for migrants and their remittances. Unfortunately, the 
absence of the sound migration strategies applies to most Arab states with few exceptions.  
 
As a result, Part (2) introduces the National Factual Report for Lebanon which elaborates 
the current situation by revealing what currently exists on ground in addition to what needs 
enhancement and what is profoundly lacking. This was orchestrated by compiling several 
thematic institution-specific factual reports, to come up with a national factual report that 
would help draw the roadmap for relevant action, towards constructing the National 
Strategy for Migration and Development, in support of dealing with the flow of remittances 
and its proper channelling, as a main pillar in the construction of an Arab Economic Union. 
 
Due to the fact that this chapter is of a factual nature since it provides a comprehensive 
outlook on the regulatory, organisational, economic, administrative and social status of 
Lebanese migration with a window on the remittances sector, the need for an analytical 
conclusion does not rise. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the research 
conducted and conveyed in this chapter, and in spite of being inclusive of most involved 
sectors and entities, a necessity arises to obtain further opinions and positions and explore 
the activities of additional entities involved in other Arab countries in the migration field. 
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CHAPTER (5): CREATING AN ARAB FINANCIAL / MONETARY 
UNION - THE NEW ARAB MODEL for a NEW ARAB WORLD 
     
Section (1): Arab readiness for the creation of trading blocs (all stages): 
 
1.1 Historical attempts and reasons for failure: 
 
1.1.1. Historical attempts: 
The idea of trade integration in the Arab world is an old story and has become 
closer to a myth. While it all started with the creation of the Arab League of States 
in 1945, several attempts occurred to promote regional political and economic 
integration. While there were several less significant attempts, the main ones can be 
summarised by the following:  
i. The 1950 Treaty for Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation; 
ii. The 1953 Convention for Facilitating and Regulating Transit Trade; 
iii. The 1957 Arab Economic Unity Agreement; 
iv. The 1964 Arab Common Market; 
v. The 1981 Gulf Cooperation Council 
vi. The 1989 Arab Cooperation Council. 
vii. The 1989 Arab Maghreb Union; 
 
Nevertheless, such agreements and initiatives have either partially seen the light or 
were never implemented in the first place. As a result of such lack of perseverance 
and implementation, and with the exception of the GCC and some bilateral minor 
trade agreements, trade barriers have remained high within the Arab region. 
 
Things took a twist in the 1990s, whereby most Arab countries took the step to 
actually implement an acceptable level of the trade liberalization process, by 
becoming signatories to the GAFTA260 which was signed in February 1997 and 
                                               
260 The League decided to create an Arab Free Trade Area, also known as the GREATER ARAB FREE TRADE AREA 
or the PAN-ARAB FREE TRADE AREA, by 2008. 
See Bilaterals. (2012, May). GAFTA. Retrieved from bilaterals.org: http://www.bilaterals.org/?-GAFTA- 
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came into force in January 1998, whereas the Agadir Agreement was signed 
between Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia in 2004. Eighteen of the 22 Arab 
League countries signed on to the GAFTA, 14 of which are effective members of 
the free-trade area, complying with total or partial procedures of adhesion261. These 
are Kingdom of Bahrain, Arab Republic of Egypt, Republic of Iraq, Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, State of Kuwait, Republic of Lebanon, the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya (at the time) now known as Republic of Libya, Kingdom of Morocco, 
Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Republic of Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.  
 
The importance and impact of the GAFTA lays not only in its coverage to all 
countries in the Arab region, but also due to its reliance on political institutions, 
such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States. Moreover, the 
contents of the agreement are also far reaching, firstly since it did not cater for the 
standard hierarchy in reaching common monetary policy through mere removal of 
tariffs, but crossed that standard towards catering for monetary, administrative and 
quantitative NTBs quotas (Non-Tariff Barriers to trade). It also provided for the 
trade liberalization in agriculture (despite a transition period) as well as a precise set 
out of rules of origins. 262 There is no doubt that there are a number of anticipated 
long term benefits for GAFTA signatory states, since several gains could be derived 
from the trade agreement.  
 
First and foremost, the GAFTA may very well facilitate a smooth and gradual 
integration into a liberalized global trading system, namely since the economic 
cooperation among GAFTA states also creates a collective approach to negotiations 
with the World Trade Organisation (WTO)263 and other regional blocs.  
                                                                                                                                               
 
261 See Jovanović, M. N. (2011). International Handbook on the Economics of Integration: General issues, Volume 1. 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
262 See Taehak, S. (2008). Journal of Economic Integration. Bloomington: Indiana University. 
 
263 World Trade Organisation Director-General Mr. Mike Moore and Arab Monetary Fund Director-General Dr. Jassim 
Al-Mannai today (3 May 2002) signed a memorandum of understanding to establish cooperation between the two 
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In addition and upon proper implementation, GAFTA could increase the volume of 
intra-Arab trade and promote industrial development, especially in those industries 
that are likely to face challenges abroad under other the WTO Agreements. GAFTA 
also generates confidence among domestic and foreign investors and should attract 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the transfer of technology. The process of 
economic integration is a long one and very time consuming and requires caution 
and prudence; it is divided in five stages or taxonomies which include; Free Trade 
Area/Zone, Custom Union, Common Market, Economic Union and Political Union.  
 
As explained in Chapter (1), the Free Trade Zone is the first stage of economic 
integration;  
 
This first stage allows unhindered trade and free movement of goods and services 
among member states by removing trade barriers like taxes and levies.  
 
The second stage, which is the Custom Union, allows free trade among members 
and maintains a common external tariff and other trade measures with non-member 
states outside the union.  
 
The third stage, which is the Common Market, require all member states to allow 
ease of movement of capital and human resource inflows as well as other inputs, 
while each member country retains power over their monetary and fiscal policies.  
 
The fourth stage, which is the Economic Union, entails embedment of a common 
monetary policy, single currency, budgetary and fiscal policies as well as socio-
cultural policies required for smooth integration process.  
 
The fifth stage, which is the Political Union, which demands total unification of 
member nations’ political institutions, governmental organs and apparatuses under a 
common central body, providing direction to all member nations on all matters. 
                                                                                                                                               
institutions. The aim of the MOU is to provide technical assistance and capacity building to enhance the participation of 
Arab countries in the multilateral trading system and the trade negotiations. 
See WTO. (2002, May 3). WTO (ARAB AND MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES). Retrieved from medea.be: 
http://www.medea.be/en/themes/international-organisations-and-diplomacy/wto-arab-and-mediterranean%20countries-
and-the/ 
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1.1.2. Barriers impeding Arab economic integration and reasons of failure:264 
In their paper “Economic and Financial Integration of Arab Countries: Presence and 
Perspective” published by the European Journal of Business and Social Sciences in 
April 2014, Prof. Harbi Arikat of Petra University – Jordan, and Dr. Adbul Aziz 
Saymeh of the Middle East University – Jordan, clearly state and elaborate the barriers 
that stand in the path of developing Arab economic integration. They explain that 
evidence on financial and economic growth of Arab states suggests that growth tends 
to be below the efficiency level and globalization is low, all of which is due to several 
reasons, amongst which are the following: 
 
a. Political motives:  
There are tens of examples over the past 70 years, whereby political principles and 
reasons have decreased the volume of trade and the shrunk size of bilateral trade due 
to sanctions or trade embargos. The latest example is within the GCC itself, well 
known as the Qatar crisis, in addition to the trade embargos on Syria due to the 
political position of some Arab countries against the Syrian government and regime. 
 
b. Doing of business cost disparities between Arab countries: 
The cost of doing business differs from one Arab country to another whereby the 
disparities are quite large in numbers in terms of timing and cost. For instance, the 
GCC countries have a lower cost of doing business than the other Arab countries, 
especially Arab countries which are considered underdeveloped. This creates an 
additional barrier since the matter of cost of doing business in addition to the 
availability of a much more developed logistics structure have a direct impact on the 
trade competitiveness amongst Arab countries. In other words, the cheaper the cost of 
doing business and the better the logistics and the easier the establishment of new 
entities and the existence of the rule of law which breaks down corruption, will lead to 
the creation of a solid ground for investment within the countries which are blessed 
with such criteria, compared to a much less fertile ground in other countries which 
suffer from inadequate and inefficient infrastructure and services, well as corruption. 
                                               
264 See Arikat, H. (2014). Economic and Financial Integration of Arab Countries: Presence and Prospective. European 
Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 118-136.  
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c. The volume and size of Arab countries: 
Compared to many other countries, the Arab countries are smaller in size comprising 
quasi-primitive markets which lack the diversification commodity that is usually 
desired on a global level; especially since their portfolio is quite limited and non-
diversified as it consists of natural raw materials and primitive production factors.  
 
d. The remaining impact of Economic Colonialism in Arab countries265:  
Long periods of colonisation have played a remarkable role in impeding Arab 
financial and economic growth. The colonization powers, primarily the Ottomans 
which ruled for almost half a century and secondarily the French, British and Italian 
colonization which ruled for over 50 years, have all left deep marks in the public Arab  
governmental structures, and caused vivid weaknesses in the Arab development on the 
social, economical, and financial sectors, and impeded unity initiatives. 
 
e.  Expansion of  Arab Governments and Nationalization Policies: 
Nationalization is a phenomenon that occurred in many Arab countries following the 
independence of these countries. Governments usually claim, aka nationalize, the 
resources and all means of production as belongings to the public. The majority of 
Arab countries have resorted to reach economic development through nonmarket 
strategies based on principles of socialism. In other words, the process of swapping 
commodities of one country with commodities or services of other countries (both of 
which adopt the socialist system), could impede economic development and progress. 
 
f. The negative tradition of old Arab states to guard their trade policies, which has been 
implemented by their outdated regimes for a long while: 
The conventional Arab regimes have favoured interior-oriented policies during the 
third quarter of 20th century, which drove them in a different direction from free trade 
policies. Even on the GCC level, there were sustaining efforts of the regulated and 
deregulated policies, which raised voices calling for free trade policies during the past 
two decades.  
                                               
265 See RITLI, E. (2011, February). Colonialism, Lebanon and the Middle East. Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia  
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g. Small volume of the Arab economies:266 
The small volume of Arab economies, compared to economies worldwide, has 
impeded product diversification / proliferation through confining economies of scale. 
 
h. The blessing / curse effect of natural resources:  
Arab countries’ blessings are their curse when it comes to natural resources. The 
prime existence of oil, gas and minerals has made the Arab Region a target for 
western domination through military colonization followed by economic domination 
resulting from the former military colonisation effects, even post independence. 
 
The dual blessing – curse effect of natural resources has landed on the Arab countries, 
namely the oil dependant ones. While such countries, and due to the international high 
demand for natural resources such as oil and gas, have enjoyed higher GDP and Per 
Capita resulting in the formation of rich nations, these countries have regretfully 
solely relied on this natural wealth based on raw oil and petrochemical industries and 
have failed to originate a robust economic plan to secure economic development based 
on market diversification in production. In addition, they neglected the sound 
development of the adequate economic or financial reforms which are necessary to 
support the economy and protect it from recession.  
 
One of the main fallbacks was the inability of most of such countries to harmonise the 
pricing and standards of public services which include but not limited to water 
transportation, telecommunication and other infrastructure projects. This has created a 
habitual anomaly represented in the dependency of citizens of countries, rich in 
natural resources, on income generated from exploitation of their natural resources.  
 
As previously elaborated, this has caused the loss of incentives to seek the real 
economic diversification, and has resulted in a high degree of concentration in the 
structure of production and exports, all of which are vulnerable to fluctuations in 
accordance to the price fluctuations in energy prices.  
                                               
266 See USEK UNIVESRITY. (2016). Arab Economic and Business Journal . Science Direct , 93-172. 
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N. Saidi267 has elaborated in his report on Arab Economic Progress in 2004, that some 
Gulf countries with low petroleum resources, namely the Kingdom of Bahrain and the 
Emirate of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, in addition to a non producing oil 
country namely the Republic of Yemen have risen as pioneers in formulating 
innovative economic strategies based on economic diversification which include the 
multi-division service industry and the diversified non-oil sectors.  
 
The liberal policies adopted by some capital exporting countries have created large 
labour migration waves in Arab countries, as well explained in Chapter (4)268, these 
include Egypt and Lebanon towards the GCC countries which are rich in the natural 
resources but they lack the national man power.  
 
These migration waves from one end and income production on the other end have 
caused the labour exporting countries to become income importing countries, since a 
large portion of their GDP have become reliant on their workers' remittances.  
 
On the other hand, and as stated by (Saidi, Nasser. 2004) “the Arab labour-exporting 
countries have become hostages to Arab oil-producing countries as they rely on their 
exported work force remittances, and thus have not taken the adequate measures to 
conduct the reforms necessary to meet the changing economic conditions that require 
a change in the economic policies and strategies”. (End of quote).  
 
 
                                               
267 Dr. Nasser Saidi who has a wide range of research in Arab economic integration attempts, is Founder and President of 
Nasser Saidi & Associates and Former Chief Economist and Head of External Relations at the DIFC Authority 
and Executive Director of Hawkamah, The Institute for Corporate Governance and Mudara Institute of Directors. As 
founder and Executive Director of Hawkamah Institute for Corporate Governance, he developed the regional. Dr. Saidi is 
a member of the IMF’s Regional Advisory Group for MENA and Co-Chair of the (OECD) MENA Corporate Governance 
Working Group. In 2013, he was named among the 50 most Influential Arabs in the World by The Middle East magazine, 
for the fourth consecutive year and named among the 500 Most Powerful Arabs in the world by Arabian Business for the 
2nd consecutive year. Dr. Saidi was Minister of Economy & Trade and Minister of Industry of Lebanon between 1998 and 
2000. He was first Vice-Governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon for two successive mandates, 1993-1998 & 1998-2003.  
See Nasser Saidi. (2012). About Nasser Saidi. Retrieved from nassersaidi.com/: http://nassersaidi.com/who-we-are/ 
 
268 See Yaseen, H. S. (n.d.). Institutional and Regulatory Framework Analysis. In Role of Arab Workers’ Remittances to 
enhance the Development of an Arab Economic Union “A Lesson from Lebanon (pp. 173-175). 
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i. Arab Uprising: 269 
A series of protests and uprisings in the Middle East which began with unrest in 
Tunisia in late 2010 and continued in Arab Republic of Egypt, Republic of Libya, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Kingdom of Bahrain, and Republic of Yemen and has brought 
down regimes in some Arab countries and sparked mass violence in others.  
 
1.2 Challenges facing the Arab economic unity attempts under current security situations: 
Numerous challenges face the attempts for economic integration in general, and 
specifically Arab economic unity, many of which were summarised in the previous 
sub-section which discussed and addressed main barriers to regional Arab economic 
integration.  
 
The global changes and developments will undoubtedly bring further negative impacts 
on individual economies of Arab countries since these economies are confronting 
mega economic blocs, including but not limited to the E.U, the NAFTA, the APEC270 
and many more.  These self reliance blocs have maintained several positive impacts in 
terms of decision making in various fields on local, regional and international levels.  
 
Having said the above, it appears that complex conditions and developments are most 
likely to bring immense repercussions on Arab individual economies when competing 
with these giant blocs. Economic integration and self dependence among Arab 
Countries would decrease the gap between the predetermined Arab Economic Union 
and the rest of the global economic blocs, which will result in the Arabs increased 
ability to confront the negative influences of globalization and other challenges.271 
                                               
269 The Arab Spring has been explained in details in previous chapters. 
See Tristam, P. (2017, May 23). What is the middle east . Retrieved from thoughtco.com: 
https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-the-middle-east-2353342 
 
270 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation: APEC has 21 members. The word 'economies' is used to describe APEC 
members because the APEC cooperative process is predominantly concerned with trade and economic issues, with 
members engaging with one another as economic entities. 
See APEC. (2017). Member Economies. Retrieved from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: 
https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies 
 
271 See EAJ. (n.d.). Economic and Financial Integration of Arab Countries: Presence and prospective.European-American 
Journals. 
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Also in the same paper previously mentioned “Economic and Financial Integration 
of Arab Countries: Presence and Perspective” published by the European Journal of 
Business and Social Sciences in April 2014, by Prof. Harbi Arikat of Petra University 
in Jordan, and Dr. Adbul Aziz Saymeh of the Middle East University – Jordan, the 
authors introduced the topic by stating that “The emergence of regional economic and 
financial groupings in various countries of the world began in the first half of the 20th  
century and named the era of economic and financial blocs, where these 
Communities formed 80% of the world's population and controlled 90% of the global 
trade and arrived in GDP for three big gathering (EU, NAFTA and ASEAN ) to 81% 
of global output, indicating that 19% of the economic process are outside those 
communities that are increasingly important having central role in the economy”.272 
 
The integration between the Arab countries, if ever achieved will eventually lead to 
the reduction of the gap with international economic blocs and would assist Arab 
countries in facing the negative effects of the phenomenon of globalization and other 
challenges. There is no doubt that the establishment of an Arab Economic Union, if 
achieved will have many short and long term benefits that will be accrued by the Arab 
countries in the future.  
 
The terrorist attacks273 which occurred and shook the world on September 11th 2001, 
followed by the war on Afghanistan and the continuing war on Iraq which was 
followed by the Arab Uprisings, pose serious challenges and difficulties for the Arab 
Region for years to come, if the Arabs remained hesitant to consider their integration.  
 
The declared ‘war on terror’ has led in many occasions to clear discrimination against 
Arab and Islamic countries which created greater impediments and barriers to 
business and to the free flow of factors of production; capital, labour and people. 
                                               
272 See Arikat, H. (2014). Economic and Financial Integration of Arab Countries: Presence and Prospective. European 
Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 118-136. 
 
273 NEW YORK (CNN) -- In an apparently coordinated terrorist attack against the United States, four commercial 
passenger jets crashed on Tuesday, three of them into significant landmarks. 
See CNN. (2011, September 11). Terror attacks hit U.S. Retrieved from edition.cnn.com: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/worldtrade.crash/ 
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However, it is believed by many, and as previously elaborated, that such challenges 
and discrimination provide a historical opportunity for Arab economic integration, 
whereby the times of commotion and external challenges are frequently considered as 
opportunities for internal unification, which is elaborated what Chapter (1) earlier274. 
 
One prime example would be the war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
Republic of Iraq war275, which encouraged the GCC to take the initial steps towards 
unification. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the post-colonial confrontations led to the 
abandoning of unification attempts between Egypt other of Arab countries.  
 
There is no doubt that the establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945 was 
also an attempt to develop a common “voice” for the Arab world, with plans to 
develop the LAS into an Arab Common Market with hope to eventually lead to 
economic integration.  
 
More recently, the emergence of large trading blocs and regional trade and integration 
agreements have encouraged the Arab countries to move towards a Greater Arab Free 
Trade Area (GATCA), which was explained in details in previous sections.  
 
While it sounds promising, none of these initiatives has resulted in greater integration, 
and up to the date of the submission of this research, no serious attempts have 
materialised, especially during the continued turbulent times. 
 
 
                                               
274 Chapter one of the current thesis discussed the golden opportunity of Arab economic unity at the times of 
commotion and turbulence, whereby such challenging times open the gate for drastic and real change. 
 
275 Global Security: The Iran – Iraq War (1980 – 1988) 
The Iran-Iraq War permanently altered the course of Iraqi history. It strained Iraqi political and social life, and led to 
severe economic dislocations. Viewed from a historical perspective, the outbreak of hostilities in 1980 was, in part, 
just another phase of the ancient Persian-Arab conflict that had been fuelled by twentieth-century border disputes. 
Many observers, however, believe that Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran was a personal miscalculation based 
on ambition and a sense of vulnerability. Saddam Hussein, despite having made significant strides in forging an Iraqi 
nation-state, feared that Iran's new revolutionary leadership would threaten Iraq's delicate Sunni-Shiite balance and 
would exploit Iraq's geostrategic vulnerabilities--Iraq's minimal access to the Persian Gulf, for example. 
See Global Secuirity . (2011, July 11). Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Retrieved from globalsecurity.org: 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm 
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Section (2): Emphasis on monetary integration towards a single currency 
 
2.1 Effect of monetary integration on Arab countries in light of different volumes of 
economies for Arab states: 
 
The economic development in the League of Arab States revealed a clear diversity 
between Arab countries rich in oil with strong economies, on one hand, and other 
Arab states rich in non-oil natural resources with weak economies, on the other 
hand; this of course has lead to the existence of a significant difference between 
these two categories of countries. To elaborate this in numbers, the richest Arab 
country in the League has a GDP per capita276 seventy three (73) times higher than 
that of the poorest Arab country. Such gap is considered widely significant. 
 
Arab organisations and institutions seem to have strong names, but the question 
remains to what extent are they achieving their objectives. In general, and 
regardless of the efforts mentioned, the degree of Arab markets integration remains 
low and limited. It is important to note that efficiently implementing the goals of the 
current institutions would be a favoured way towards integrated Arab financial 
markets. Serious and firm actions and steps must be taken by the Arab leaders, 
starting with supervising these organisations and watching their performance 
closely before setting up any new ones. Greater financial and monetary integration 
will enhance the trade integration in the region and will be an additive to financial 
institutions and achieve markets developments and increase competition.  
 
However, there remains significant heterogeneity across countries in the Arab 
world, especially between the oil-exporting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries, the developing oil exporters, and the emerging non-oil exporting 
economies. In addition, financial developments in many Arab countries remain at 
an early stage. According to Bernard Hoekman277 and Khaled Sekkat278 in their 
                                               
276 See Tasch, B. (2017, March 6). RANKED: The 30 richest countries in the world. Retrieved from uk.businessinsider: 
http://uk.businessinsider.com/the-richest-countries-in-the-world-2017-3 
 
277 Bernard Hoekman is with the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute  
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paper “Arab Economic Integration: Missing Links”279, they state that Integration in 
between Arab countries has been explored for decades. Efforts of Arab regional 
integrations have started by late 1950s, earlier than most of any developing country 
in the region280. All Arab states have at some point signed several agreements to 
reduce trade barriers and tariffs on a preferential basis. Most of the analysis on the 
causes of intra-Arab integration failures focused on the level of intra-regional trade 
in goods.  
 
The same paper “Arab Economic Integration: Missing Links”, explains that the 
economic debate on intra-Arab integration is divided into two perspectives: The 
first relates to its concentration on the products market only, while he second 
related to the political conditions that have a role in both driving and constraining 
regional integration.  
 
As a result and in order to measure the impact of economic or financial integration, 
generally, every country needs a general equilibrium formula to assess the effect of 
the integration process. To test whether Arab economic integration which leads to 
the desired Arab Economic Union is beneficial; and notwithstanding the suggested 
institutional structure of the Arab Economic Union introduced in Chapter (2) of this 
research, the relevant changes to be introduced by the integration must be examined 
to determine the expected impact for any individual, country and for the Arab 
Region as a whole.  
                                                                                                                                               
See  Hoekman, B., & Sekkat, K. (2010). Arab Economic Integration: Missing Links. Bruxelles: CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. DP7807. 
 
278 Khaled Sekkat is a Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) 
See  Hoekman, B., & Sekkat, K. (2010). Arab Economic Integration: Missing Links. Bruxelles: CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. DP7807. 
 
279 This paper surveys the recent literature on Arab economic integration, discusses the goals and progress that has been 
made to date and some of the key policy, regulatory and political factors that underpin the segmentation of Arab markets. 
It argues that there has been an excessive focus by both analysts and policymakers on trade in goods and that the 
prospects for and returns to efforts to deepen integration of other markets (services, labor and capital) are likely to be 
higher.  
See  Hoekman, B., & Sekkat, K. (2010). Arab Economic Integration: Missing Links. Bruxelles: CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. DP7807. 
 
280 See  Hoekman, B., & Sekkat, K. (2010). Arab Economic Integration: Missing Links. Bruxelles: CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. DP7807. 
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Nonetheless, and to date, a real assessment and evaluation of the impact of 
integration on all Arab countries is not available. Reorganizing the service sector 
influences all forms of economy, not just the external sector, it includes the removal 
of high obstacles of entrance for all the domestic and abroad firms; and also it 
removes all policies that cause extra costs transactions. This differs from 
merchandize trade liberalization, which gives rise to efficiency gains only. Trade 
liberalization equalises between domestic and international prices, it is also the 
reason to reducing the cost of reconciliation adjustment.  
 
To sum up, the Arab Economic Union has a positive economic and financial 
impact. Profits can be much higher with the AEU actions as it increases the service 
sector efficiency and it removes all trade barriers. 
 
2.2 The road towards the Euro-like single currency / the “Arab single currency” in light 
of different values of Arab currencies: 
 
The incorporation of financial integration on the international and local levels began 
prior to the establishment of economic and monetary unions. At the European level 
efforts were exerted to integrate the European Community on January 1st of the year 
1999, whereby the European states which gained memberships in the Euro Zone 
began to implement a common monetary policy, and the Euro was introduced as the 
legal currency unit for all European Union member states. International currency 
union countries were having higher trade volumes, lower exchange rate risks, and 
more synchronized business cycles than countries of own currencies. 
 
Since the 1950s, the Arabs failed to achieve the desired economic progress due to 
inactive economic cooperation, thus leading to accumulation of many ineffective 
decisions and recommendations, which were later placed on the shelves and cabinets 
of the Arabic League’s offices. Lately, the Arab League, however, decided to study 
the possibility of setting up an Arab single currency, based on a proposal submitted 
by the Arab Importers and Exporters Union. This never saw the light, at least not yet. 
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The Arab joint action, including the economic sphere, was characterized by the 
dominance of emotional aspects far away from reality. As a result of such a 
sentimental attitude, the decisions were put aside and forgotten, simply because they 
appeared to be inapplicable as they lack the availability of conditions necessary for 
their implementation. As for the common Arab market, which is less complex than 
the single currency, the Arabs have yet to implement a single term of its agreement 
which was approved over 50 years ago (1964). 
 
Several preparatory measures and procedures are necessary to be discussed and 
implemented before the single currency can be set up by any economic group. First, 
these preparations include implementation of common agreements, such as the free 
trade area, customs union, common market and unification of regulations and 
financial legislation. Second, the single currency requires a convergence of fiscal and 
monetary conditions, particularly the strength of government budgets as well as 
deficit and public debt ratios, and convergence of exchange rates for national 
currencies, credit policies, interest rates and inflation rates. 
 
An Optimum Currency Area (OCA)281 is a geographical region where a single 
currency between the countries within that region would maximize economic 
efficiency. The theory of optimum currency area provides criteria and facilitates 
assessment of an area that would be considered a successful currency area, as well as 
an analysis of the costs and benefits of such a currency area.  
 
Studies on whether the Arab world forms an OCA are infrequent and tend to mostly 
focus on specific regions of the Arab world, such as the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) and the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council countries. 
 
There are two main elements that are influential in the formation of a currency union: 
                                               
281 In economics, the theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA), also known as an Optimal Currency Region (OCR), 
is a geographical region in which it would maximize economic efficiency to have the entire region share a single 
currency. ... The theory of the optimal currency area was pioneered by economist Robert Mundell. 
See Ricci, L. A. (1997, June). A Model of an Optimum Currency Area . Retrieved from Imf.org: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9776.pdf 
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2.2.1 Political factors: 
The most critical factor in forming a currency union is the political one. 
Politicians do not always pay attention to economists, and political considerations 
usually supersede economic ones. Therefore it is necessary to examine the current 
political situation in the Arab world. 
 
2.2.2 The openness and size of the economy:  
In his article for the Gulf News Analysis, titled “How to form an Arab Single 
Currency”282, Mohamed Al Asoomi explains that it is crucial here to refer to the 
hefty gaps between Arab countries’ GDP per capita, especially that the highest in 
the GCC, with the average per capita surpassing $40,000, while it is only $2,000 
in Yemen, and less than $1000 in Somalia, in addition to numerous other 
inequalities. 
 
 Over and above, Al Asoomi believes that while the budgets of Gulf countries 
reach large surpluses, most of the remaining budgets of Arab countries are 
increasingly suffering from chronic deficits, which causes them to rely on 
workers’ remittances and foreign subsidies.  
 
The Author adds that the GCC experience is the best example of collective 
cooperation in the region, nevertheless the formation of a single currency still 
requires additional intensified efforts. However, one cannot deny the progress 
reached in the economic sphere, namely upon the foundation of a free trade area 
and the Unified Customs Union and Common Market currently in place in the 
GCC but still needs to be rolled out through the rest of the Arab world. 
 
In this context, and although the GCC countries appear to in remarkable harmony, 
with the exception of the most recent Qatar crisis, the setting up of the GCC 
                                               
282 See Mohamed Al Asoomi. (2012, October 3). How to form an Arab single currency? More co-operation an political 
will required for Arab common currency. Retrieved from Gulf news analysis: http://gulfnews.com/business/analysis/how-
to-form-an-arab-single-currency-1.1084514 
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single currency is progressing on “turtle-like” steps in spite of the fact that the 
Gulf Cooperation Council was found over three decades ago. 
 
Upon comparing Arab countries with a normal sized country, namely the 
Netherlands in this case, in terms of GDP, it is noticed that the largest Arab 
economy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, does not exceed in volume 50% of the 
Netherlands economy. Over and above, numbers show that the combined GDP of 
the Arab countries is only twice that of the Netherlands.  
 
There are huge structural differences in countries like Syria and Sudan, where the 
agricultural sector varies in size to large extents, or in countries such as Jordan 
and Lebanon where services industry exceeds 70% of the economy. Nonetheless, 
these differences are limited to a few countries and expected to decrease in case a 
single currency was adopted in a monetary union. Hence, the goods market 
integration criterion is considered to be satisfactory. 
 
The Arab countries satisfy most of the relevant OCA criteria. However, the most 
important criteria, namely the political factors, remains unanswered and the 
creation of an Arab currency union effectively hinges on it fulfilment. Hence, 
while the economic factors mostly indicate a currency union would be optimal, it 
is unlikely to be achieved unless democracy prevails in the Arab world and the 
will of the people is fulfilled. 
 
In principle, the same article suggests there are prospects for Arab economic 
cooperation, which may only be based on objective and scientific grounds which 
give full considerations for the surrounding circumstances, inequalities and 
economic abilities of Arab countries. It further explains that this type of 
cooperation must commence with the formulation of a free trade area under which 
local products shall be exempted from customs duties, prior to shifting into a 
more advanced stage. 
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Section (3): Reviewing some main applicable articles from Maastricht treaty283 (100 
– 115), to the Arab economic unification initiative 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
The Maastricht Treaty is officially known as "the Treaty of the European Union" 
which created the EU for the first time and led it to be the largest economic bloc in 
existence. The Treaty was signed in Maastricht, Netherlands on February 7, 1992, by 
the leaders of 12 member nations which are, (1) Belgium, (2) Denmark, (3) France, 
(4) Germany, (5) Greece, (6) Ireland, (7) Italy, (8) Luxembourg, (9) Netherlands, (10) 
Portugal, (11) Spain and (12) the United Kingdom, and it reflected the serious 
intentions of all countries to create a common economic and monetary union.  
It represented a new stage in European integration since it was considered the last 
step before full political integration and a very fertile soil for such unification. The 
Treaty’s task was the organisation, in a manner demonstrating consistency and 
solidarity of relations between the member states and their citizens, while creating an 
ever closer unified culture among the citizens of Europe.  
The main objectives of the Maastricht Treaty may be summarised with the following:  
a. An economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable by means of 
an area without internal frontiers, a social cohesion and a monetary union.  
b. A union identity on international scene with common foreign and security policies. 
c. A citizenship of the union with full rights protection policy. 
d. A cooperation mechanism on the issues of justice and home affairs. 
The Treaty was based on three pillars284, the community pillar, with a supranational 
character and the second and third pillars, which are of intergovernmental character. 
 
3.1.1 First Pillar (Community Pillar):  
The First Pillar was based on the creation of the European Community that had 
the capacity to interfere in Europe’s fundamental factors of production (freedoms) 
                                               
283 The Maastricht Treaty (formally the Treaty on European Union or TEU) undertaken to integrate Europe was signed 
on 7 February 1992 by the members of the European Community in Maastricht, Netherlands. On 9–10 December 1991, 
the same city hosted the European Council which drafted the treaty. 
See European Communities Council . (1992). Treaty on European Union. Retrieved from europa.eu: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf 
 
284 See European Union. (1992, February 7). The three pillars of the European Union. Retrieved from cvce.eu: 
https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_three_pillars_of_the_european_union_maastricht_7_february_1992-en-37b4b8c8-0f00-
4c1c-bec8-bcdf4b26807d.html 
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It also included the creation of other communities that interfere in common 
policies which include agriculture, transport, trade, competition, economic and 
monetary policy, social policy, employment, culture, public health, consumer 
protection, trans-European networks, industry, economic and social cohesion, 
research and development, environment, cooperation and other factors.  
 
3.1.2  Second and Third Pillars:  
The Second and Third Pillars define intergovernmental cooperation methods on 
subjects such as common foreign security policy, common defence policy, and 
other matters of common interest such as immigration, crossing of external 
borders, fraud and international crime, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
matters, customs and police cooperation (Europol), and other related fields. 
 
3.1.3 EU Evolution Timeline285:  
 
                                               
285 See BBC. (2007, March 12). A Timeline of the EU. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3583801.stm 
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3.2 The Maastricht Treaty as a dynamo of economic integration 
According to (BBC, 2001), the Maastricht was the blueprint for what was to be 
Europe's biggest project for the next decade which is “economic and monetary union”. 
The article elaborates that the Maastricht defined the three stages of EMU which 
eventually led to the single currency, and set out the convergence criteria or economic 
tests that member states have to pass286. The Treaty of Maastricht marks a crucial 
milestone in the process of European development and integration most importantly 
because it established the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU)287 which led to the construction of the main pillars of the 
European Union and the introduction of the single currency. 
 
The Maastricht treaty defined the three major phases of economic integration and 
offered an outline for EMU. It also discussed the convergence criteria that every 
country must undertake in order to achieve monetary unification and proposed the 
establishment of a European Central Bank. In accordance to Andre Rogobete, in his 
article “Why is the Maastricht Treaty considered to be so significant?” 288, Published in 
February 2011, he describes that the three main phases of the Maastricht Treaty in 
broad terms can be summed up as follows:  
▪ First Phase includes free movement of capital between member states, closer 
coordination of economic policies and cooperation amongst the national central 
banks.  
▪ Second Phase ensures the convergence of monetary and economic policies. 
▪ Third Phase introduces the single currency and establishes the European Central 
Bank.  
 
                                               
286 See BBC. (2001, April 30). In Depth: Euro-glossary : Maastricht Treaty. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216944.stm 
 
287 The Treaties of the European Union are a set of international treaties between the European Union member states 
which sets out the EU's constitutional basis. 
See European Union . (2012, October 26). Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. Retrieved from eur-lex.europa.eu: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:12012M/TXT 
 
288 See  ROGOBETE, A. (2011, February 26). Why is the Maastricht Treaty considered to be so significant? London.  
 
236 | P a g e  
 
The article adds that any given state wishing to join the EMU is required in the first 
place to pass the requirements of the ‘convergence criteria’ that specified the conditions 
for the member to qualify for participation in the common currency. To this extent, 
countries had to maintain an annual budget deficit less than three percent (3%) of the 
(GDP), in addition to maintaining a public debt which is sixty percent (60%) of GDP, 
and inflation rates within the range of one and a half percent (1.5%) of the three lowest 
inflation rates in the EU, in addition to required exchange-rate stability. These criteria 
were referred to in previous chapters as being a “fit to follow” example in the 
establishment of an Arab monetary bloc. However, numbers and percentages may vary 
depending on economic facts. Under this process, the qualifying members may decide 
whether to proceed to the final stage represented in the adoption of a single currency. 
Such major decision required the establishment of permanent exchange rates followed 
by replacing the national currencies with the common currency, known as the EURO.  
 
The Maastricht Treaty may be considered as a dynamo for economic integration since it 
created an entirely new interstate economy, opened up new opportunities for economic 
development and therefore represented a major step forward for the European 
integration. Moreover, it created the premises for introducing the singular currency with 
all it benefits it brings for the union and for the countries. 
 
3.3 Importing main articles of Maastricht Treaty applicable to Arab States towards AEU 
Here under the Maastricht Treaty articles that might be applicable on the Arab states in 
their attempt to establish the Arab Economic Union:289 
 
Article 102a:  
Member States shall conduct their economic policies with a view to contributing to 
the achievement of the objectives of the community. The Member States and the 
Community shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy 
with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources.  
“Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common 
concern and shall coordinate them within the A Union Council”. 
                                               
289 The Articles have been incorporated in their original form as extracted from the Maastricht Agreement. 
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Article 103a: 
“Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe 
difficulties caused by exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Union Council 
may; acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, grant, under certain 
conditions, Community financial assistance to the Member State concerned. 
Where the severe difficulties are caused by natural disasters, the Council shall act 
by qualified majority. The president of the Council shall inform the European 
Parliament of the decision taken” 
 
Article104c:  
Commonly known as the "excessive deficit reduction provision," this article sets 
controls and provides the Union Council with power to issue recommendations and 
sanctions to Member States who do not meet the criteria of the Treaty’s protocol: 
▪ Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. 
▪ The Union Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary 
situation and of the stock of government debt in the Member States with a view 
to identifying gross errors. 
 
Article 105:  
a. The Union Central Bank (UCB) task will be to maintain price stability. “Without 
prejudice to the objective of price stability, the Central bank shall support the 
general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Community. The central bank shall act in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition 
favouring an efficient allocation of resources and in compliance with the 
principles set by the commission”.   
b. The Union Central Bank shall carry the following tasks:  
▪ Define and implement the monetary policy of the Community 
▪ Conduct foreign-exchange operations 
▪ Hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States 
▪ Promote the smooth operation of payment systems. 
c. Member states shall consult UCB on any matter related to its competencies’ field.  
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 Article 106:  
The Union system central bank shall be composed of the Union Central Bank and of 
the national central banks. 
The Union Central Bank shall have legal personality. 
The Union System Central Bank shall be governed by the decision-making bodies of 
the UCB which shall be the Governing Council and the Executive Board. 
 
Article 107:  
The member states shall respect the treaty principles and not seek to influence the 
members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks 
in the performance of their tasks. 
 
Article 108:  
▪ Member states shall ensure at the latest at the date of the establishment of the 
Union System Central Bank, that its national legislation including the statutes of 
its national central bank is compatible with the treaty and the statutes of the 
Union System Central Bank.  
▪ Member states shall respect all obligations and regulations set by the Union 
Central Bank, if not the UCB shall be entitled to impose fines or periodic penalty 
payments on undertakings for failure to comply with obligations under its 
regulations and decisions. 
 
Article 109c:  
A monetary committee with advisory status shall be set up in order to promote 
coordination of the policies of member states to the full extent needed for the 
functioning of the internal market, the committee should interfere along all stages 
of achieving economic and monetary union.  
The committee tasks will be:  
▪ Keep under review the monetary and financial situation of the Member States 
and of the Community and the general payments system of the Member States 
and to report regularly thereon to the Council and to the union commission;  
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▪ Deliver opinions at the request of the Council or of the Commission, or on its 
own initiative for submission to those institutions; 
▪ Contribute to the preparation of the work of the Council referred 
▪ Examine, at least once a year, the situation regarding the movement of capital 
and the freedom of payments, as they result from the application of this Treaty 
and of measures adopted by the Council; the examination shall cover all 
measures relating to capital movements and payments; The committee shall 
report to the Commission and to the Council on the outcome of this examination. 
 
Article 109e:  
A limit date should be set for the different stages of achieving the monetary union, 
before the start of each stage the states members should ensure that all appropriate 
measures to meet the union requirements were set, the union committee should 
issue reports on each member statue and progress.  
 
Article 109j:  
Establishing a Monetary institute to:  
▪ Strengthen the cooperation between the national central banks; 
▪ Strengthen the coordination of the monetary policies of the Member States, with 
the aim of ensuring price stability; 
▪  Monitor the functioning of the European Monetary System; 
▪ Hold consultations concerning issues falling within the competence of the 
national central banks and affecting the stability of financial institutions and 
markets; 
 
Article 113:  
Common Commercial Policy:  
Creation of a common commercial policy that shall be bases on uniform principles; 
particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade 
agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export 
policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of 
dumping or subsidies. 
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Section (4): Enhancement of domestic laws (to promote implementation): 
 
4.1 Introduction:  
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the post-colonial confrontations led to the abandoning of 
unification attempts between Egypt290, being an Arab pronounced leading country under 
Jamal Abdul Nasser and other of Arab countries, mainly Syria.  There is no doubt that the 
establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945 was also an attempt to develop a 
common “voice” for the Arab world, with plans for an Arab Common Market. The 
emergence of trading blocs and regional trade and integration agreements worldwide 
encouraged the Arab countries to move towards a Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA).  
 
In his paper titled “Arab Economic Integration: An Awakening to Remove Barriers to 
Prosperity” 291, the author Dr. Nasser Saidi explained that given the modest size of Arab 
economic, differences in legislation, legal systems, regulations, norms and standards lead to 
high costs of transactions that reduce intraregional trade, capital flows, and labour 
movements. As a result, Arab countries must launch the integration process by formulating 
a vivid unification strategy through drawing a clear integration road map; this would best 
be initiated with the legislative amendments and drafting, in order to cohere with the 
unification of laws and legislative requirements, similarly to the European Union scenario. 
 
4.2 Readiness of current Arab legal systems for integration: 
In the same paper “Arab Economic Integration: An Awakening to Remove Barriers to 
Prosperity” 292, Dr. Nasser Saidi explored a number of steps as suitable means and 
requirements to achieve regional integration on the Arab level. These include but are not 
necessarily limited to the following steps:  
 
                                               
290 See Yafai, F. A. (2012, November 3). The death of Arab secularism. Retrieved from thenational.ae: 
https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/the-death-of-arab-secularism-1.589937 
 
291 See Saidi, N. (2005). Arab Economic Integration: An Awakening to Remove Barriers to Prosperity . Dubai: AMF-IMF 
High Level Seminar . 
 
 
292 See Saidi, N. (2005). Arab Economic Integration: An Awakening to Remove Barriers to Prosperity . Dubai: AMF-IMF 
High Level Seminar . 
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A. Arab governments are under the obligation to join efforts with, and provide support 
to, the private sector to plat the partner’s role in terms of promotion of economic 
integration, causing them to be a main force for unification. Therefore, the idea of 
building on the existing vision to set up and execute an Arab economic integration 
treaty is deemed to be very reasonable to reach an Arab Economic Union. 
 
B. In order to secure the success and efficiency of regional economic integration, 
compensation mechanisms to surmount resistance to economic openness and 
integration should be established.  
 
C. Arab countries should exert efforts and work diligently towards creating social 
cohesion and structural funds, and secure institutional financing for regional 
investment and development as mechanisms during the period of transition. 
C. Investment in physical infrastructure is required for integration in order to break 
down physical barriers and reduce costs for transport, communication and logistics. 
 
D. Arab countries should avoid shallow integration, which is symbolised by free trade  
in goods (as represented by the Greater Arab Free Trade Area - GAFTA). Instead, 
they must adopt real core integration through creating harmonisation of legislations, 
institutions, laws, and regulations to facilitate comprehensive economic integration. 
 
E. The process of Arab economic Integration should also be based on a Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) program targeted to realise consensus. The private sector must be 
kept informed of the process for efficiency of the transition. Economic integration 
based on openness and will, dictate sizeable investments to commence structural 
change and transition towards solid and diversified market economies. Moreover, 
the provision of adequate information to the private sector regarding policies and 
strategies will reduce adjustment costs during transition and beyond into the future. 
 
Based on historical trends, it is believed that in order to achieve the desired and strong 
successful integration, all Arab countries should set up their internal structures for the 
transformation and must be engaged to implement the developed regulations, and observe 
and realise the positive role in the development of international trade through integration. 
242 | P a g e  
 
There exists a huge volume of literature on the importance of trading blocs, and the current 
existing examples throughout the last 50 years from around the world have proven that 
economic blocs are catalysts for economic development and international trade and the 
guardian to prevent financial crisis. In his article “The Role and Importance of Trading 
Blocs”293, Dr. Bharat Kumar294, enumerates 8 elements to summarize the trading blocs role:  
 
4.2.1 Economic integration: 
Trading blocs are commonly followed by the unification of different independent 
economies in an aim to reach economic integration. While trading blocs tie nations 
together harmoniously, they establish a certain level of collaboration on the regional 
level and assist in the creation of economic cooperation among group members. 
4.2.2 Free transfer of factors of production and resources:  
Trading blocs have an important role in the removal of trade barriers in order to rotate 
resources within the trading bloc without any specific imitations. This enhances the 
comparative advantage295 which basically allows each country to produce what it 
produces best in terms of time, cost and quality and exchange it with commodities 
from another country which produced different commodities in same manner as well. 
E.g., Lebanon has an excellent quality of tobacco production and should export to 
Iraq, while Iraq, being a large date producer, should export dates to Lebanon in 
return. Such a trade represents the principles of comparative advantage practiced. 
                                               
293 See KUMAR, B. (2017). The Role and Importance of Trading Blocs (8 Points) | Business. Retrieved from 
preservearticles.com: http://www.preservearticles.com/2013082933394/the-role-and-importance-of-trading-blocs-8-
points-business.html 
 
294 Dr. Bharatkumar Raut is a former Member of Parliament in the upper house of the Indian Parliament. He practiced 
journalism for over four decades. He worked in English and Marathi newspapers, Government and private television 
channels in India and abroad. He was the Editor of Maharashtra Times, consultant Times of India Group and the Editorial 
Director of Lokmat Media Group. 
See Bharatkumar Raut. (2017). Retrieved from revolvy.com: 
 https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Bharatkumar%20Raut 
 
295 It can be argued that world output would increase when the principle of comparative advantage is applied by countries 
to determine what goods and services they should specialise in producing. Comparative advantage is a term associated 
with 19th Century English economist David Ricardo. Ricardo considered what goods and services countries should 
produce, and suggested that they should specialise by allocating their scarce resources to produce goods and services for 
which they have a comparative cost advantage. There are two types of cost advantage – absolute, and comparative.  
Absolute advantage means being more productive or cost-efficient than another country whereas comparative advantage 
relates to how much productive or cost efficient one country is than another. 
See Economics Online. (2017). Comparative advantage. Retrieved from economicsonline.co.uk: 
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Global_economics/Comparative_advantage.html 
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4.2.3 Cooperative spirit: 
Trading blocs enhance the unification spirit based on cooperation and conviction of 
integration, especially that they have increased volume of trade on several occasions. 
4.2.4 Increase in trade: 
Increased productivity is usually correlated with free movement of resources of 
production between the member states in an economic bloc. By removing all tariffs, 
trade becomes easier and productivity increases. Over and above it is important to 
note that trading blocs have a key role in achieving sustainable economic growth. 
4.2.5 Employment opportunities: 
Employment opportunities tend to witness increase upon the expansion of production. 
This has a direct impact on the citizens’ income, and results into an increase in the 
level of income for citizens. This enhances living standards and boots the economy. 
4.2.6 Consumer Benefits: 
Trading blocs facilitate the knowhow and technology transfer, since it moves freely 
with no limitations under the bloc’s structure. This results in mutual capacity building 
for involved professionals, human resource development and enhanced production. 
4.2.7 Competition: 
Trading blocs increase competition amongst firms within the same bloc. Competition 
is the prime reason for creating Market Pluralism, which insures that firms compete to 
produce commodities with higher quality and lower prices. In addition, competition 
supports the survival and progress of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) by 
preventing large firms including Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) also known as 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) form digesting SMEs by replacing their business.  
4.2.8 Regional Development: 
Trade blocs contribute in regional industrialization and economic growth, through 
identifying efficient mechanisms to achieve economic sustainability and progress. 
 
4.3 Necessity of legal and legislative amendment to adapt to integration: 
Even if the twenty two Arab states have only one language, they still have different 
legal systems. Thus an integral pillar to achieve an Arab Economic Union through 
integration is the creation of a unified solid legal structure which can be implemented 
through the required legal texts’ unification by legal and legislative amendments. 
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4.4 The twenty two (22) Arab states and their old/new dream 
 
The Arab Uprising, referred to as the Arab Spring, was considered by many as an 
unprecedented platform to drive the crucial reforms, with the collapse of much of the 
dictatorial regimes. Unfortunately, it went not only into another missed opportunity but 
also a violent scene of wars. Historically, and since the independence of most Arab 
countries during the 40s and 50s, attempts to achieve Arab regional economic integration 
were numerous and broadly unsuccessful. Below are the most historic distinct attempts: 
 
4.4.1 The Multilateral Trade Agreement in 1953, under the umbrella of League of 
Arab States, was one of the first strives; it included exempting tariffs on 
agricultural goods and some industrials14. 
 
4.4.2 The 1956 Arab Economic Unity Agreement; a full economic merger between 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Kuwait. 
 
4.4.3 The Arab Common Market in 1964, between aforementioned countries, with a 
plan at the time to gradually remove tariff and non-tariff barriers over a period 
of ten (10) years. In addition, there were many others e.g. the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU), Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), Arab Trade Financial Program 
(ATFP), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 11. 
 
Unfortunately, the Arab world, together with the Arab League, was misled by political and 
military cooperation and failed to recognize the importance of economic alliances in 
achieving political goals and in creating a balanced participation. 
 
The Arab League also failed, in every single way, in providing any significant tangible 
contribution to the many crises facing the Arab world since its establishment. Quarrels, 
invasions, foreign occupation, economic crisis, refugees, foreign exploitation of resources, 
the ongoing political risk and more destructive factors; 
 
LAS is considered by many experts as a dysfunctional organisation, reduced to a debate 
platform between disputing nations attending its meetings which usually wraps up with the 
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one and only mutual agreement to boycott Israel; one that is actually non-binding to all, 
with no derived outcome planning or policies. All of this questioned the relevance of this 
institution. Will it ever become a decision-making League296? 
 
Most notably, the organisation could not come up with meaningful contributions towards 
many conflicts e.g. the 1948 Israeli occupation to Palestine, the 1975 Lebanese civil war, 
the 1990 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the 1900-1991 Gulf War, the 2003 US invasion to 
Iraq, the Arab Uprisings, the Syrian civil war, the Saudi led Arab coalition war on Yemen 
and many more conflicts going in the region for years. 
The Arab League of States must position itself as an important and major player in the 
Arab world to deal with imposed risks continually exposing its limited solidarity.  
 
It is worthy to mention that, only in 2004; the League recognized the importance of 
cooperation with civil society bodies and appointed a Commissioner General for Civil 
Society (CGCC). It also established for this purpose two departments; the Department of 
Human Rights conveyed the mission of forming an Arab Human Rights System (AHRS), 
and the Department of Civil Society Observation and Vocational Unions (CSOVU), 
building channels of communication and dialogue with Non-Governmental Organisations 
and Civil Society Organisations present and operating in the Arab World.  
 
Another distinguishable event was the LAS appointing in 2011, for the first time in its 
history, a team of observers to control the implementation of its plan in regards to the 
Syrian conflict. These two measures, though late and way behind in time and considerably 
apart, could be considered as a first step in a thousand miles road.  
 
Last but least, it is of vital importance for the LAS to abide by its Charter and preserve its 
biased nature. Similar to many international organisations, the League has fallen into the 
misdemeanour of partiality through taking a nepotistic approach in favour of certain Arab 
States against others. 
                                               
296 See Arvanitakis, I. M. (2015). Israel and the BDS debate: two academics respectfully agree to differ. The 
Conversation. 
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Section (5): Proposing the "SHAMGATE Treaty" (SCHENGEN - like Agreement) 
 
5.1 The Schengen Agreement as a main vehicle for economic integration 
5.1.1 Introduction 
As defined by the European Commission, “the free movement of persons is a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the EU to its citizens. It entitles every EU citizen to 
travel, work and live in any EU country without special formalities. Schengen 
cooperation enhances this freedom by enabling citizens to cross internal borders 
without being subjected to border checks. The border-free Schengen Area guarantees 
free movement to more than 400 million EU citizens, as well as many non-EU 
nationals, businessmen, tourists or other persons legally present on the EU territory.297" 
 
The Schengen Agreement has marked a major transformation in the history and pattern 
of regional economic integration. While any group of countries, such as Arab countries, 
must undertake several gradual steps prior to reaching full economic integration, the 
fact remains that a Schengen-like agreement could be the ideal “fit to follow” example. 
Some Arab countries have existed for a much longer period and hold larger historical 
and cultural reserves than other Arab countries; to be specific the Arab Levant region 
comprises the countries with over seven thousand years of rich history and culture in 
addition to being the incubator for the three religions; Judaism, Christianity and Islam.  
The Levant is referred to as the “Natural or Greater Syria” also known as “Bilad Al 
Sham” or Sham Land298, and mainly consists of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestine. 
 
One remarkable name-related coincidence appears when a suggested name for the Arab 
integration treaty could be the SHAM-GATE Treaty in a clear reference and indication 
to the Schengen Agreement, due to the visible name resemblance. The first syllabus of 
the word refers to the oldest and culturally and historically and politically the richest 
                                               
297 See Euro-Mediterranean partnership. (2017, February 22). Retrieved from European Commission: ec.europa.eu:
 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-partnership/index_en.htm 
 
298 “[Syria] has distinct natural boundaries and extends from the Taurus range in the northwest and the Zagros mountains 
in the northeast to the Suez canal and the Red Sea in the south and includes the Sinai peninsula and the gulf of Aqaba, and 
from the Syrian sea in the west, including the island of Cyprus, to the arch of the Arabian desert and the Persian gulf in  
See Lewis, M. W. (2011, April 2). Greater Syria and the Challenge to Syrian Nationalism. Retrieved from 
geocurrents.info: http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/greater-syria-and-the-challenge-to-syrian-
nationalism#ixzz4tKhDls41 
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countries in the Arab World “SHAM”, whereby primarily these countries may be 
considered as the core of the unification process, which conforms with their role prior 
to the Sykes-Pico Accord, which dissected the Arab world and drew the map in 
accordance to their colonial benefits and interests. In addition, other Arab countries, 
namely Gulf States, have already taken major steps towards economic integration by 
creating a common market through the GCC, explained in details in previous chapters. 
 
Prior to exploring the probability and opportunity to establish the suggested Schengen-
like Treaty, referred to as the SHAMGATE Treaty, it is important to explore the 
necessary steps considered pre-requisites to establish a monetary union and substantial 
economic integration accompanied with monetary and fiscal harmony, similarly to EU. 
 
According to Steven M. Suranovic in his article “International Trade Theory and 
Policy” 299, he argues that nations should coordinate their economic policies, which will 
cause confirmed benefits. He adds that the removal of tariffs is one of the merits of 
cooperation; however benefits will include capital movements across borders, 
coordination of fiscal policies and proper allocation of resources (including agriculture) 
and coordination of monetary policies. As a result and prior to exploring the best 
formula of economic integration and unification on the Arab level, the hierarchy or 
gradual steps towards integration should be explored once again and from a slightly 
different angle than the one which was presented at the beginning of this thesis. 
 
5.1.2  Different types of integration 
Although reference has been made extensively throughout this thesis to the commonly 
known stages of integration, commencing with a Free Trade Area to eventually reach 
the final stage of political integration, according to Suranovic, there are many different 
degrees of integration, most of which intersect with the previously explained stages: 
 
5.1.2.a. Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA)300 
                                               
299 See Suranovic, S. M. (1998, January 4). International Trade Theory and Policy . Retrieved from 
nternationalecon.com: http://internationalecon.com/Trade/Tch110/T110-2.php 
 
300 A preferential trade area (also preferential trade agreement, PTA) is a trading bloc that gives preferential access to 
certain products from the participating countries. This is done by reducing tariffs but not by abolishing them completely. 
A PTA can be established through a trade pact.   
See WTO. (2017). Preferential Trade Arrangements . Retrieved from ptadb.wto.org/: http://ptadb.wto.org/ 
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It is the most primitive form of economic integration whereby tariff reductions are 
offered, to a group of partner countries, but only in some product categories. The 
World Trade Organisation does not allow PTAs since WTO members must grant 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN)301 status to all other WTO members, whereby such 
members may not discriminate against other WTO members. 
 
5.1.2.b. Free Trade Area (FTA) 
As previously elaborated in Chapter Two, a Free Trade Area occurs when a group 
of countries eliminate tariffs amongst themselves, but maintain their own external 
tariff on imports from the rest of the world. Several countries have signed 
a European Union Association Agreement (AA)302 with FTA provisions. These 
mainly include Mediterranean countries (Algeria in 2005, Egypt in 2004, Jordan in 
2002, Lebanon in 2006, Morocco in 2000, Palestinian National Authority in 1997, 
and Tunisia in 1998), in addition to other countries from other parts of the world. 
 
5.1.2.c. Custom Union 
This takes place when a group of countries eliminates tariffs between themselves 
and set a common external tariff on imports from all other countries. The European 
Union established this type of arrangement during its progress and took it further.  
 
5.1.2.d. Common Market 
A common market establishes free trade in goods and services and sets common 
external tariffs among members and also allows for the free mobility of capital and 
labour across countries. On the Arab level, the Gulf Cooperation Council has gone 
far in the creation on a common market, and which may be the existing cornerstone 
to start building an economically integrated Arab world, on solid grounds this time.  
                                               
301 Most-favoured-nation (MFN): treating other people equally Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally 
discriminate between their trading partners. Grant someone a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of 
their products) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members. 
See WTO. (2017). Principles of the trading system. Retrieved from wto.org: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
 
302 An association agreement is a bilateral agreement between the EU and a third country. In the context of accession to 
the EU, it serves as the basis for implementation of the accession process. Turkey currently has an association agreement. 
Association agreements between the Western Balkan countries and the EU and its Member States are called 'stabilisation 
and association agreements'. 
See European Commission . (2016, December 06). Association agreement. Retrieved from ec.europa.eu: 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/association-agreement_en 
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5.1.2.e. Economic Union 
An economic union, being the main topic for this research, most importantly allows 
the free mobility of all factors of production which mainly include goods, services, 
capital and people among other factors, in addition to the qualities of a common 
market. The GCC has succeeded to a certain extent to establish what is the closest 
to an economic union, however the most recent Qatar crises has left unprecedented 
doubts and major question marks on the level of strength of the GCC. While the 
European Union's Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) is an example of a type of 
fiscal coordination, the League of Arab States has taken important steps towards 
similar agreements, however the implementation was inadequate and still at vague. 
 
5.1.2.f. Monetary Union  
The monetary union establishes the criteria of a common market and an economic 
union in addition to realization of a common currency among a group of countries, 
which is the exact case for the European Union. The creation of a common currency 
requires the establishment of a regional central bank, which is the European Central 
Bank (ECB) in the EU case. The Maastricht treaty, explained in details above, and 
which was executed by EU members in 1991 proposed the implementation of a 
single European currency (the Euro) by 1999. Physical coins and banknotes were 
introduced on 1 January 2002. As a result, this stage is considered the last one prior 
to reaching the pinnacle of progression through achieving full political integration.  
 
For the purpose of this research, and in order to achieve the SHAMGATE Treaty or what 
resembles it, the Arab world should consider and respect the hierarchy of integration to 
reach the desired monetary and economic union, and ideally a political union (Arab 
Nation). The importance of respecting the hierarchy is to avoid a similar scenario of the 
United Arab Republic (1959 till 1961) and which had a blasting fall due to the fact that 
unification was approached from top to bottom rather from bottom to top. Back then, 
Egypt and Syria believed that they can count on the Arab Nasserism (followers of 
Egyptian President and Arab leader at the time Jamal Abdul Nasser) and socialist 
movement to establish a political union. Nevertheless, the attempt proved fragility and 
inadequacy since the legal and eco-social platforms were not appropriately set up.  
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5.2 The Proposal of ShamGate, as an Arab tailored agreement: 
A rich literature is available on Arab economic integration, especially that the Arab 
region better referred to as the MENA region is a perfect candidate for unification since 
all Arab countries share the same language, similar culture and same religion (with the 
exception of small minorities), as previously mentioned. However all attempts have 
failed due to many internal and external factors, most of which are political by nature. 
 
In order to succeed in presenting the ShamGate Treaty, on one hand, the League of Arab 
States may be the starting point since it consists of all the Arab countries and is the 
umbrella for all regional bodies. On the other hand, the mechanisms and functions 
adopted and used by the GCC could be used as the technical factor and a good example 
to import and adopt. Prior to the ShamGate, the five different regions in the Arab 
world303, with the exception of the GCC, should consider setting up their own custom 
union to get them prepared for a more integrated and developed bloc. The suggestion 
does not include the GCC because the Arab Gulf States have already established a 
common market and may easily blend into a larger union, if the political will allows it.  
 
Following the set up and operation of five different trading blocs depending on the sub-
region, and upon consensus of the 22 Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros Islands, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, 
Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and 
Yemen), all of which consist of about 400 million citizens and cover the area of about 14 
million square meters, the ShamGate may be introduced, to be negotiated and executed 
while considering the specificities and administrative factors and structural changes 
required by such formation, and which Chapter (3) has explored and explained in details. 
Once ready and finalised, it shall come into force as the official document for the AEU. 
                                               
1. 
303 The Levant “Al - Mashriq” which includes the Republic of Lebanon, the State of Palestine, the Syrian Arab 
Republic, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
2. The “Persian Gulf” which includes the oil rich states of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, 
State of Qatar, Sultanate of Oman, Kingdom of Bahrain and the State of Kuwait. 
3. The “Maghreb” which includes the Kingdom of Morocco, the Republic of Algeria, the Republic of Tunisia, 
Republic of Libya and the Republic of Mauritania. 
4. The Bab-el-Mandeb which includes the Republic of Yemen, Republic of Somalia and Djibouti, and the Indian 
Ocean that includes the Comoros. 
5. The Nile Valley which includes the Fertile lands of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Republic of Sudan, and the 
Republic of Iraq. 
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5.2.1 Objectives of the ShamGate Treaty: 
While the list of objectives is quite comprehensive, the general and bold objectives 
of the ShamGate Treaty towards establishing an Arab Economic Union may include 
but not limited to the following objectives: 
 
a. Establishing coordination, integration and interconnection, among member 
states in all fields, in order to achieve the desired sound economic unity. 
b. Strengthening relations, links and areas of cooperation, prevailing among 
Arab citizens in various fields. 
c. Stimulating scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, 
mining, agriculture, water and animal resources, to establish scientific 
research, in order to facilitate creating joint ventures and encouraging 
cooperation by the private sector through PPPs for the public benefit. 
d. Formulating unified regulations in various fields including: 
▪ Legislative and regulatory texts and affairs;  
▪ Economic, Monetary, Fiscal and financial affairs; 
▪ Commercial (including e-commerce regulations) and corporate affairs; 
▪ Communications, Telecom, internet and other technological affairs; 
▪ Logistics and customs and all related affairs. 
▪ Education and culture affairs; 
▪ Sports and factors related to it; 
▪ Social and health affairs; 
▪ Information and tourism affairs; 
▪ General administration affairs; 
 
5.2.2 Arab Infrastructure Integration 
The Cooperation Council to be created following the execution of the ShamGate 
Treaty will aim to launch common economic projects to promote and facilitate the 
desired Arab Economic Union. The member states will actively cooperate in order 
to connect their power grids. Common infrastructure projects including irrigation, 
electricity, oil pipes, trains, highways and many more will be designed to enhance 
the links and stimulate the cooperation and deepen the integration on all levels.  
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Section (6): Residual Arab Political and Social Challenge  
 
6.1 Fundamental Theme: Underlying the Arab economic, political and social challenges 
 
Currently a large number of existing challenges and obstacles hinder the formation of the 
Arab Economic Union. While political conflicts remain the prime cause for failure, 
economic discrepancies comprise the roots of other social conflicts and financial deficits. 
Such anomalies currently causing digression of the Arab world represent core and serious 
challenges for Arab economic regeneration, and hindrance for apt economic integration. 
 
First and foremost, and in spite of the existence of large reserves of natural resources in 
the Arab countries, millions of Arab citizens are living today under the line of poverty. In 
addition many countries are suffering from enormous foreign debts, budget deficits and 
monetary failures, driving them into a vicious cycle leading to their economic and 
financial dependence to the western globalizing powers which usually maintain agendas 
of their own, not necessarily serving the interests of the Arab countries. On the contrary, 
some western agendas and practices tend to play a destructive role towards the countries 
in need (borrowing countries) which includes imposing conditions304 that defy the 
principal of sovereignty in exchange for financial support in form of loans and grants.  
 
On the other hand, a few Arab countries were blessed with the wealth of oil, but are not 
willing to share their resources with their less fortunate fellow Arabs. Surprisingly, Arab 
countries and specifically Arab Gulf countries are not allowing any Arab citizens 
escaping wars in their countries (Syria, Iraq and Yemen) to access the Gulf area as war 
migrants. This has created a huge gap and variation in living standards and led to severe 
imbalance in economic regulations and degrees of freedom of trade. Surprisingly, and 
contrary to the rich GCC Arab countries, Europe and many other countries around the 
world remain open to the war escaping migrants whom are provided with shelter and aid.  
This adds further oddness especially that 100 years ago Arab borders did not exist at all. 
                                               
304 One vivid example on imposing conditions that defy the principal of sovereignty in exchange for financial support in 
form of loans and grants is the IMF’s conditionality. The IMF, and specifically in the 1980s, has adopted an extreme 
policy based on imposing a very exhaustive and long list of conditions on borrowing countries, most of which do not 
relate or have a direct impact on the economic or social wellbeing on the borrowing country. Instead, such conditions 
were more oriented towards preserving the political agendas of the dominating western powers aiming to achieve their 
interests through the IMF and its conditions. 
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As a result, and while it is well known to all countries that economic integration is 
beneficial on all levels, the existing structural, legal, social and economic imbalances are 
considered discouraging factors for resource rich capital exporting countries to engage in 
deeper regional integration, especially that states such as Morocco, Lebanon and Tunisia 
have been benefiting from regional trade agreements, while other rich countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates still suffer from them.  
 
To be more specific, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is prudent not to reiterate the 
European scenario experienced by the strong economic European countries integrating 
with less economically fortunate countries, thus ending up having to provide continuous 
financial support in form of bails, from their national private budgets in addition to the 
large portions that they pay to the EU to maintain their presence and power. They had to 
substitute cheaper and higher quality imports from the rest of the world and give 
preference to less efficient goods produced by other weak European countries in the EU.  
Over and above, the current security situation represented in ongoing wars and 
commotions have hindered the economic coordination among Arab countries and caused 
more difficult and challenging circumstances in the absence of competition and the non 
existence of market pluralism, mainly caused by the continuous emergence and growth of 
corruption on the highest governmental levels as well as the private sector. Hence, Arab 
cooperation is almost strictly demonstrated through regional trade blocs with similar 
resources and production capabilities which make it difficult to increase intra-trade flows.  
 
To sum up the economic perspective, the Arab world still lacks a strong incentive to 
achieve Arab Integration represented in the formation of an economic union based on full 
economic, fiscal and monetary integration. Nevertheless, historical patterns have revealed 
that the best times for change and progress are the times of commotion, challenges and 
upheavals, which is exactly being currently witnessed and experienced in the Arab region 
 
On the political front, the Arab world demonstrates weakness and lack of administration, 
since many countries are committed to foreign concealed agendas, and the rule of law in 
its essence rarely exists with the wide spread of corruption. In addition, politics creates a 
barrier to achieve Arab economic integration driven by concerns and questions on which 
nations would benefit most, and the impact integration will bring on regional leadership.  
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On the Geographical front, and in spite of the prime geographical position of the Arab 
world from a strategic perspective, the border conflicts, internal upheavals and wars are 
peaking in some countries and still not fully resolved in others, in addition to military 
conflicts with non-Arab states, all of which pose serious challenges that require profound 
dialogue and discussion in order to address such challenges and reach a solution of 
mutual benefits and reciprocal advantages. In addition, the recent wave of uprising which 
took the Arab world by storm with wars still ongoing and people repelling more and 
more, are sourcing more troubles, thus requiring serious efforts to tackle alarming issues.  
 
On the religious level, sectarian conflicts have been invading countries, with extremism 
and terrorism being the most malignant phenomena spreading in the Arab world. On the 
other hand, the ethnic minorities such as Armenians, Kurds, Aizidis and other religious 
minorities (mostly Christians, including Coptics in specific) are increasingly being 
cautious with concerns and fears of their identity dilution under the current Arab 
upheavals, and which some fear could occur in case of random formation of the AEU. 
 
For the mentioned reasons and others, there remain massive impediments to achieve the 
AEU, none of which are impossible to solve if the political will is present among Arab 
countries, paralleled with the support of influencing regional countries (e.g. Turkey and 
Iran) and non-Arab western powerful countries (e.g. Russia, US, UK, France) and global 
international organisations (e.g. IMF, WB, WTO, OECD). Moreover, and as explained in 
previous sections, building aligning policies and objectives is crucial for the success of 
Arab economic integration, which raises the challenge of social and cultural divergence.  
 
In the same context, and to better elaborate, Professor Michel Nehme, in his article titled 
(Upheavals and Minority Fears in the Arab world), states that “The identity and behaviour 
of individuals with regard to social values are primarily and spontaneously a function of 
their identification with a group. Different habits, historical experiences and preferences 
in the Arab world have created a system of sectarian groups commonly known as a 
prescriptive system, characterized by the comprehensiveness and specificity of value 
commitments and consequently lack of flexibility”305 - (End of quote).  
                                               
305
 See: Nehme, M. (2013). “Upheavals and Minority Fears in the Arab world”. Beirut: Lebanese National Defence. 
https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/upheavals-and-minority-fears-arab-world 
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The fact remains that in many Arab countries, religion continues to interfere with social 
norms and cultural aspects, which unfortunately leads to form rigid and ineffectual 
communication. While it is explicable for the religious identity to shape society and 
culture to a certain extent, nevertheless once religious control overcomes and hinders the 
attempts of progress and evolution, it becomes highly questionable and real threat to the 
very core of existence and wellbeing of economic integration and its prerequisites. 
 
Challenges may be well transformed into opportunities, and the Arab world has a real 
chance to implement the transformation at such turbulent times, mainly through kicking 
off the roadmap towards economic integration in order to expand their position and 
reserve a spot on the global financial arena and avoid being swept by overwhelming 
speed of developments and emergence of new economic blocs on the international level. 
 
6.2 Functional Integration: Finding common grounds and building cooperation to come 
up with a regional solution based on “Existing Common Interest”,  as a starting point:  
 
In the midst of the current serious Arab internal conflicts, some of which have regretfully 
developed into noxious military conflicts, the only resort is to identify a common interest 
between all countries in order to achieve limited integration. This will develop slowly and 
convert into economic integration in an attempt to reach the ideal political Arab 
integration which will, upon its readiness, take the form of a political union. The GCC, as 
a common market, along with the LAS as the exclusive pan Arab regional body, may 
well be the pillar to kick off further economic integration leading to desired unification. 
Nonetheless, and due to many reasons specified above, such choice remains challenging.  
 
One innovative idea to tackle such complex challenges would be obtaining the consensus 
and support of all Arab countries to design a comprehensive regional policy reform 
package. This package will aim to benefit all member countries and all sectors, and which 
should include very detailed and prudently structured appropriate steps, that would lead 
to achieving the needed policy reform, and the formation of the right action plan.  
Following comprehensive literature review on that topic, and after due consideration, I 
have identified that most of such steps were elaborated by Dr. N. Saidi in his paper “Arab 
Economic Integration: An Awakening to Remove Barriers to Prosperity”) as follows: 
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6.2.1 STEP (1): Arab countries must start the process of renegotiating the General 
Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) in order to establish an Arab Regional 
Integration Agreement (ARIA)306 with a larger scope.  
Dr. Saidi states that this would include conforming trade policies with the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)307, as well as total liberation of 
the factors of production, namely (1) people, (2) services, (3) capital, (4) 
products, and other factors, all in favour of trade and investment facilitation. The 
first step towards this would be Arab countries signing the ShamGate Treaty as 
explained in the previous sections of this chapter. This would setup the platform 
for “deeper integration” based on harmonising legislations and regulations, while 
focusing on “Mutual Recognition Agreements” (MRAs).308 
 
6.2.2 STEP (2): Arab countries must strive to secure financial support to enhance 
investment which will stimulate integration.  
To be more specific, Arab countries must invest in trans-national regional 
infrastructure projects. This would be best achieved through undertaking mega 
investments in infrastructure in the form of Private Public Partnerships (PPP), 
due to necessity of the private sector’s participation. All this will lead to pan-
Arab integrated network of telecom, energy, transport, healthcare and other 
sectors. This network will comprise a main pillar to provide “infostructure”309 
which will facilitate the accession of Arab economies and societies into the 
digital age. Another suggestion is establishing a Trans-Arab Network, to be 
integrated in two strategic directions. The first heads towards the EU and the 
Trans European Network; while the second heads towards Asia to provide 
ASEAN, China, Japan and others with access to Arab region energy supplies. 
                                               
306 See Saidi, N. (2005). Arab Economic Integration: An Awakening to Remove Barriers to Prosperity. Dubai: AMF-IMF 
High Level Seminar. 
 
307 See Saidi, N. (2005). Arab Economic Integration: An Awakening to Remove Barriers to Prosperity. Dubai: AMF-IMF 
High Level Seminar. 
 
308 (MRAs) Promote trade in goods between the Economic Union and third countries. They facilitate market access and 
are bilateral agreements aiming to benefit industry by providing easier access to conformity assessment. 
See European Commission / Growth / Single Market for Goods / Int’l aspects of Single Market / Mutual Recognition Agreements.  
Web link: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/goods/international-aspects/mutual-recognition-agreements_en 
 
309 “info-structure” is the technical infrastructure supporting an information system and the organisational structure used 
for the collection and distribution of information is the technical infrastructure supporting an information system. 
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6.2.3 STEP (3): Arab countries must finance economic and social policies to support 
the junction and convergence of incomes:  
Furthermore, Saidi elaborates that integration of Arab countries and increased 
openness will require further adjustment and will probably initially lead to a 
greater income divergence levels between the partners, keeping in mind that less 
fortunate “poorer” countries in the Arab world are the less-open countries, and 
are in need of more policy reforms than others on many extensive levels. 
 
6.2.4 STEP (4): Arab countries must create the ‘Arab Target System’:  
Developing Arab capital markets should be a priority, since is considered a 
necessity for the Arab integration. This would entail the integration of the 
payment systems in the Arab countries in order to create an “Arab Target 
System” which would facilitate the establishment of a proper infrastructure and 
to set up the platform for the creation of the Arab Exchange Rate System. 
 
6.2.5 STEP (5): Arab countries must establish a set of Arab institutions to enhance 
and promote the desired Arab economic integration: 
The establishment of various main Arab institutions, starting with the “Arab 
Regional Investment & Development Bank”, would be one of the main bases of 
financial apparatus which supports the formation of the Arab Regional 
Integration Agreement (ARIA). It should also include developing structural 
adjustment funds and other institutions explained in Chapter (2) of this thesis. 
 
6.2.6 STEP (6): Arab countries must assist in financing the Arab entry into the digital 
age in order to create Knowledge-based economies.  
The digital gap is widening between most of the Arab countries and the 
industrialized economies in spite of many positive leaps on the governmental 
levels in a few Arab countries (such as the UAE). The hope remains that the 
coming few decades will not be similar to the preceding half century, which will 
hopefully lead to a well-built digital economic integration. Therefore, the 
developing an Arab “info-structure” and a consistent digital economy would be 
essential factors for the Arab region to catch up with the global digital progress 
which, if well set, will accomplish and safeguard economic stability.   
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FINAL CONCLUSION 
 
Total Solution: “Arab Sufficient Consent” and “Economic Functionalism” 
Set up the legal framework for regional economic integration, in parallel to exploring 
the extension and integration of current Arab blocs to a larger Arab Economic union 
through achieving “Arab Sufficient Consent” and “Economic Functionalism” based 
on “mutual common interest”, “regional political will” and “international support”. 
 
The efforts exerted by Arab countries towards achieving integration commenced with the 
establishment of the Arab League of States (LAS); and while this was followed by various 
attempts and initiatives for economic and even political integration, failure has always been 
the outcome. The current Arab situation and circumstances pose an increasing need for 
Arab countries to be economically and financially integrated, in order to extend their 
powers and cope with the ever growing international economic and financial blocs.  
 
In spite of the fact that over a hundred (100) years ago, prior to Sykes-Pico Accord in 1916, 
the Arabs were technically unified since physical boarders did not exist and the movement 
of the factors of production was free within the Arab world. Until our present day, no one 
has ever been able to achieve effective Arab unity, whether on the economic or political 
levels, whereby the GCC which includes the six rich oil-exporting states that created a 
common market is the closest existing bloc to economic integration. Over and above, the 
League of Arab States being the main Arab regional body, continues to fail in organising 
the Arab affairs even on the basic levels due to the continuing absence of political will, and 
is therefore still far from being the catalyst for Arab economic integration and progress. 
 
The date of completion and submission of this thesis mid 2017 marks the 60th anniversary 
for the establishment of the United Arab Republic, a short-lived union between Egypt and 
Syria that represented the zenith of pan-Arab success and sham glory at the time. That era 
witnessing Arab political unification was perceived by Arabs as the pinnacle of Arab 
triumph over colonialism; the Arabs regarded this as a quantum leap towards overcoming 
decades of divisive, disempowering schemes in a declaration of freedom which sought 
socio-economic justice through universal education, employment guarantees, minimum 
wages, semi-socialist land reform policies, infrastructure projects and cultural progress.  
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While it will always be considered as the famous attempt of Arab unity, the UAR attempt’s 
outcome was a failure due to the lack of establishing a proper legal setup and preparation of 
a sound structure, as previously elaborated in the course of many parts of this research.  
Whilst intersection of aspects will probably provoke the arousing of Arab unification; 
external threats and discrimination may be a thrust force towards market creation and 
economic integration, as stated by Saidi310, and while no ultimate final successful solution 
has been yet identified, one should explore the finest way to achieve economic integration. 
 
As a result, the most logical and efficient solution would be for the involved Arab states, 
through their official bodies in charge, professionals and experts, to explore extending the 
current existing Arab trade blocs to form an advanced Arab Economic Union. This can be 
best established by identifying existing sufficient consent, based on finding common 
grounds of interest between Arab states. Although this would be much easier in theory than 
practice, nevertheless Arabs should not wait until they attain a scenario of perfect 
correlation amongst them, since such aspects may never exist. Instead, Arab states should 
exert all efforts to start identifying the points and elements of common interests and begin 
developing them, commencing in the areas of trade as a starting point. Such initiative will 
pave the way for the healthy and sufficient build up towards economic integration, 
especially in the presence of successful experiences of a custom union being the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, which may also be adopted as the seed for the construction of the 
structure of the Arab Economic Union along with the LAS, as previously suggested.   
 
To be more precise, and to guarantee the proper initiation of the Arab economic unification 
process, there is no necessity for all Arab states to be in total harmony on all levels and 
mainly the political one. It would be adequate for the foundation of the economic union to 
concentrate on the basic factors of integration which should include in the first place the 
cessation of any military conflicts, security risks and external wars, paralleled with the 
focus on mutual intra-Arab trade, regional Arab infrastructure projects, Arab project 
financing, public-private partnerships and similar factors which lead to job creation and 
poverty reduction, in addition to other factors that achieve a sound monetary foundation 
and economic progress. Of course, this would only be realised through a proper legal setup. 
                                               
310 See Saidi, N. (2005). Arab Economic Integration: An Awakening to Remove Barriers to Prosperity. 
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Although it appears challenging, adopting this route will expedite the integration process. 
 
The suggested SHAMGATE agreement and the existence of the LAS and the GAFTA and 
CAEU will pave the way into the achievement of the long-awaited dream as long as the 
political will exists. The vigorous commencement would take place through the exploration 
and organisation of a sufficient legal and regulatory framework for unification. Along with 
the legal factor, it remains important to cater for economic, fiscal, monetary and social 
perspectives in order to bring up a new generation of responsible mature Arab individuals 
who appreciate and comprehend the importance of the creation of Arab economic unity, to 
achieve economic wellbeing of Arab citizens and the evolution of the new Arab world. 
 
If regional integration is neglected, it will result in the continuance of Arab countries to 
carry on with unstructured trade policies, without benefiting from the usual negotiating 
powers of an economic bloc. This will result in limited gains from trade creation and will 
cause loss from trade diversion, notably in relation to rapidly growing Asian economies. 
 
Based on the preceding facts, literature and analysis; the most favoured route for Arab 
states to pursue their contemplated economic unity, would be one based on Sufficient 
Integration starting with developing, amending and integrating legal and regulatory factors.  
 
The suggestion is for Arab countries to execute a unified set of Association Agreements 
among each other, with a minimum scope and content as those signed with the EU. These 
inter-Arab Association Agreements, which cover many fields including economic, 
diplomatic, social, cultural, environmental and political relations, could consider the large 
number of existing bilateral and regional agreements. Consequently, breaking down the 
factors of production barriers, namely trade, investment, movement of people and transfer 
of capital would gradually lead to an Arab awakening, which will, in principal, create a 
market with over four hundred (400) million consumers and producers; providing them 
with the benefits of economies of scale and scope, eventually realising desired progress.  
 
This Arab awakening will surely be expected to lead to a renaissance of economic growth 
and employment creation, to an improvement in socio-economic conditions, and to 
reduction of poverty, allowing Arab countries to meet the Millennium Development Goals 
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(MDGs).311 Such Arab awakening stemmed from mutual sufficient consent will lead to 
economic functionalism which is a pillar for economic integration. 
 
In conclusion, and after due observation and analysis, the alternatives for Arab states have 
become quite limited. No doubt that a genuine need has aroused to utilize the current 
challenging times and build on them to convert them into opportunities, through launching 
the real Arab unification process which should be based on a solid legal and regulatory 
infrastructure as a starting point, paralleled with development of trade and enhancement of 
economic and fiscal policies. Otherwise, Arab states will continue to lapse and deteriorate, 
whereby incompetent governance will drive them closer to further destruction and chaos. 
 
As elucidated, this can best be achieved through identifying “Mutual Arab Sufficient 
Consent” by the involved Arab countries, dependant on identifying the common interests 
which they share, in order to clamber the economic ladder and achieve economic growth 
and progress. This is expected to realise economic functionalism which sustains the AEU. 
 
Once befittingly created, the Arab Economic Union (AEU) would reflect a state of unity 
between Arab countries, where all Arab resources and skills can be deployed in the most 
efficient ways to establish a self-sufficient region that promotes the Arab citizens’ wealth 
and transforms the Arab existing power and potential into major global force and blessing.  
 
In light of this speculative research, the main hypothesis evolving around whether placing a 
legal framework to establish the Arab Economic Union based on regional common interest 
and economic functionalism, will support forming the AEU as an ultimate solution for 
Arab economic and socio-political development towards full integration; appears to be the 
right one.  
                                               
311 The United Nations Millennium Development Goals were 8 goals that all 189 UN Member States have agreed to try to 
achieve by the year 2015. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, signed in September 2000, committed world 
leaders to combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women. The 
MDGs were derived from this Declaration, and had specific targets and indicators. The MDGs have been superseded by 
the Sustainable Development Goals, a set of 17 integrated and indivisible goals that build on the achievements of the 
MDGs but are broader, deeper and far more ambitious in scope. Post – 2015 UN Development Agenda 
MDG 1: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger / MDG 3: promote gender equality and empower women / MDG 4: reduce 
child mortality / MDG 5: improve maternal health / MDG 6: combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases / 
MDG7:ensure environmental sustainability / MDG 8: develop a global partnership for development 
See United Nations. (2015). Millennium Development Goal 8: Taking Stock of the Global Partnership for Development. 
Retrieved from un.org: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG_Gap_2015_E_web.pdf 
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The previous experiences, findings and propositions presented in this research, support the 
assumption that the main factor for economic integration is mutual political consensus and 
true will, backed up by international support. This can be achieved through identifying 
common regional interests towards accomplishing economic functionalism, all of which 
require, in the first place, placing a sound legal framework and constitutional structure 
ready to be utilised when the platform is prepared.  
 
This, by itself, is a test which has never been properly sat for, and an initiative which never 
left its infancy stage.  
 
It remains to be seen whether the Arab citizen will witness the fortunate “Arab 
Awakening” which will follow the unfortunate current mismanaged “Arab Uprising”.  
 
If this was destined to occur, the Arab region and respectively Arab states and citizens will 
live in harmony, peace, growth and progress for the first time in over one hundred (100) 
years, and since the beginning of the First World War and the Arab colonisation era.  
 
This is one challenge worth taking and a sacrifice worth considering, and if triumphant will 
achieve the wellbeing of the Arab Nation as a whole.  
It will be a dream coming true... 
 
 
UNITED WE STAND... DIVIDED WE FALL 
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